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NOTES
Criminal Procedure-The North Carolina Post-Conviction Hear-
ing Act: A Procedural Snare
The federal writ of habeas corpus is available to state prisoners
.as a guarantee that every allegation of imprisonment violative of consti-
tutional standards will be fully and fairly considered.' It is the policy
of the federal court system, however, to refrain from "'upset[ting]
a state court conviction without an opportunity to the state courts to
correct a constitutional violation.' '12 State courts can examine and
correct these errors either during the criminal trial, on direct appeal,
or upon a later collateral attack by means of the common law writs of
habeas corpus' and coram nobis4 or of statutorily enacted post-con-
viction remedies. North Carolina was the second state to adopt such
a post-conviction statute.5 Since the time of adoption, however, ju-
dicial limitations and a procedural change have led to the severe dimi-
nution of the act's effectiveness, a partial abdication of the state's role
as enforcer of federal constitutional law, and a legal dilemma that
cannot be remedied through ordinary judicial action.
FEDERAL REVIEW OF STATE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
The federal court system has jurisdiction over all prisoners, both
federal and state," who assert the constitutional invalidity of their con-
1. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (1970) provides in part that "[t]he writ of habeas
corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless . . . (3) He is in custody in violation
of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States . . . ." The legislative policy
of granting a federal forum to the constitutional claims of state prisoners has often
been noted and approved by the United States Supreme Court. See, e.g., Fay v. Noia,
372 U.S. 391, 430-31 (1963); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 311 (1963); Hawk v.
Olson, 326 U.S. 271, 274 (1945).
2. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 420 (1963) (quoting Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S.
200, 204 (1950)).
3. See note 25 infra.
4. See note 24 infra.
5. Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336, 338 (1965) (Clark, J., concurring). The
statute is codified in N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15-217 to -222 (1975). Illinois enacted the
first post-conviction statute in 1949; it is now codified in ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 122
(Smith-Hurd 1973). North Carolina patterned the 1951 version of its law on the Illinois
act. Miller v. State, 237 N.C. 29, 51, 74 S.E.2d 513, 528 (1953).
6. [Where resort to state court remedies has failed to afford a full and fair
adjudication of the federal contentions raised, either because the state affords
no remedy, . . . or because . . . the remedy afforded by the state law proves
in practice unavailable or seriously inadequate . . . a federal court should
entertain his petition for habeas corpus, else he would be remediless.
Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 118 (1944) (per curiam) (emphasis added). 28 U.S.C.
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victions. 7 In the interests of federal/state comity, of limiting inter-
ference with the judicial processes of the states and of decreasing their
own habeas corpus case load, the federal courts have developed philo-
sophical and practical doctrines that transfer portions of the responsi-
bility to the states while allowing the federal courts to continue as ulti-
mate arbiters of the constitutionality of state criminal proceedings.
The first of these doctrines is that of exhaustion of state
remedies. 8  The federal courts have declined to grant habeas corpus
petitions until the state courts have had an opportunity to pass on all
questions raised by the habeas applicant through all appropriate state
procedures-that is, until all available state remedies have been ex-
hausted. 9 The exhaustion doctrine is not a limitation on federal habeas
corpus jurisdiction, which exists due to the presence of constitutional
error in the trial;' 0 the doctrine merely postpones the appropriate
exercise of that jurisdiction to give the state courts time to correct their
own errors and allow their procedure to remain undisturbed."
The second doctrine adopted by the federal courts affects the
amount of time the federal district court must expend on consideration
of the federal habeas corpus petitions of state prisoners. In Townsend
v. Sain12 the United States Supreme Court held that a federal eviden-
tiary hearing would be necessary unless the state trier of fact had pre-
viously held a full and fair hearing and found the facts of the case."
If a state evidentiary hearing meeting the Townsend requirements was
held, the federal district court judge is free to accept the facts as found
§ 2254 (1970) provides the statutory guidelines for the grant of federal habeas corpus
to state prisoners.
7. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (1970).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1970) provides:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a state court shall not be granted unless it appears
that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the
State, or that there is either an absence of available state corrective process
or the existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect
the rights of the prisoner.
The basic doctrine now codified in § 2254(b) was developed by the United States
Supreme Court in Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 250-53 (1886). For a description
of the judicial history of the doctrine of exhaustion of state remedies, see Fay v. Noia,
372 U.S. 391, 417-20 (1962).
9. E.g., Johnson v. Hoy, 227 U.S. 245 (1913); Minnesota v. Brundage, 180 U.S.
499 (1901).
10. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 430-31 (1960).
11. R. SOKOL, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS 163-64 (2d ed. 1969); see, e.g., Tyler v.
Croom, 264 F. Supp. 415, 418 (E.D.N.C. 1967); Sligh v. North Carolina, 246 F. Supp.
865, 867 (E.D.N.C. 1965) (quoting Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950)).
12. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
13. More specifically, a federal hearing is mandatory if: (1) the state court hear-
ing did not resolve the merits of the factual dispute; (2) the state record does not fairly
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at that hearing and ordinarily should do so.14 The district court judge
may always, in his discretion, rehear the evidence, despite a previous
state hearing and appropriate findings of fact.' 5 He may not, however,
accept the state court's findings of law: "It is the district judge's duty
to apply the applicable federal law to the state court fact findings inde-
pendently."'"
These doctrines, then, advance four federal court interests. First,
the interest in good federal/state relations is furthered by the states'
acceptance of a larger and more autonomous role in the consideration
of constitutional errors within their own criminal systems." 7 Second,
the federal courts have an interest in maintaining the positions of the
state courts as enforcers of federal constitutional law. State court as-
sumption of this responsibility removes from the federal courts the
pressure of policing the state courts for constitutional errors while pro-
viding for more effective enforcement due to the immediacy of the
state court adjudication and the dual nature of the effort.' 8 Third, the
increased role of the state courts in the determination of the facts be-
hind prisoners' claims greatly decreases the caseload of the federal
courts." If the federal district court judge accepts the facts found in
a state court hearing, he need only determine whether those facts,
support the state's determination of fact; (3) the state court's fact finding procedure
did not afford a full and fair hearing; (4) there is a substantial allegation of newly
discovered evidence; (5) the state hearing did not adequately develop material facts;
or (6) for some other reason, the state trier of fact did not afford the habeas applicant
a full and fair hearing. Id. at 312-13. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1970) codifies all of
these conditions of federal rehearing except the fourth, and adds that the state court must
have had jurisdiction over the case, appointed counsel when constitutionally required,
and generally granted due process of law to the habeas applicant in order for its deter-
mination of facts to be presumptively correct.
"This has been succinctly summarized by one distinguished appellate judge as mean-
ing: 'Give the slob a hearing.'" J. Craven, Federal Writs of Habeas Corpus in the
Light of Post Conviction Remedies in North Carolina 10 (June 26-29, 1966) (paper
delivered at Third Annual North Carolina Trial Judges' Seminar).
14. 372 U.S. at 318.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Federal/state judicial relations undergo an inherent strain produced by the
concurrent jurisdiction of the two court systems over these constitutional matters. It
is common for states to resent greatly federal court interference with the autonomy and
the orderly procedure of their criminal trials. See Tyler v. Croom, 288 F. Supp. 870,
873 (E.D.N.C. 1968); Wright & Sofaer, Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners:
The Allocation of Fact-Finding Responsibility, 75 YALE L.J. 895, 899 (1966); Note,
State Criminal Procedure and Federal Habeas Corpus, 80 HARV. L. REv. 422, 423
(1966).
18. Developments in the Law: Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARv. L. REV. 1038,
1094 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
19. See Tyler v. Croom, 288 F. Supp. 870, 873 n.6 (E.D.N.C. 1968) (citing U.S.
CouRTS AD. OFF. ANN. REP. 1967, at 135-37).
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as a matter of law, entitle that applicant to habeas corpus re-
lief.20  The process has been likened to a decision on the plead-
ings,21 and it takes a fraction of the time that could otherwise have
been necessary for a full habeas corpus proceeding. Finally, it is
possible that prisoners may be satisfied with the state remedies pro-
vided and never apply for federal habeas corpus relief.
22
STATE POST-CONVICTION PROCEDURES
In order to further these same interests, the federal courts have
encouraged the states to adopt post-conviction statutes.23  These
statutes extend the state court's collateral review of constitutional errors
far beyond that permitted by the common law writs of coram nobis
2'1
and habeas corpus.25  In order best to advance the federal court pur-
poses such a statutory scheme should allow state review that is as broad
as the review available on federal habeas corpus. The statute should
afford as much protection to constitutional rights as the writ itself while
shifting the full burden of fact finding from the federal to the state
courts. Some statutes provide for this desired breadth of remedy, 20
20. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
21. R. SOKOL, supra note 11, at 114.
22. Wright & Sofaer, supra note 17, at 901 n.21.
23. The most direct encouragement came from Justice Clark, concurring in Case
v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336 (1965) (per curiam), who stated, "I hope that the various
States will follow the lead of Illinois, Nebraska, Maryland, North Carolina, Maine, Ore-
gon and Wyoming in providing this modern procedure for testing federal claims in
the State courts and thus relieve the federal courts of this ever-increasing burden."
Id. at 340. See also ABA ADVISORY COMM. ON SENTENCING AND REVIEW, STANDARDS
RELATING TO POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES 2 (Approved Draft) 1968 [hereinafter cited
as ABA STANDARDS]: "The continuing need for federal habeas corpus jurisdiction as
a post-conviction remedy for state prisoners is thus clearly correlated to the adequacy
of processes in the state courts."
24. The writ of coram nobis allows the court that rendered the original judgment
in a criminal case to review the case upon a claim of an error of fact. The error
must have been in existence at the time of the original proceeding but have been
unknown to the court. Further, it must have affected the validity of the original
hearing. E. FRANK, CORAM NoBIs: COMMON LAW-FEDERAL-STATUTORY 1 (1953).
25. The common law writ of habeas corpus was available to challenge imprison.
ment by decree of a court that was without jurisdiction to consider the matter. Devel-
opments, supra note 18, at 1045.
26. The statute granting habeas corpus jurisdiction over federal prisoners, 28
U.S.C. § 2255 (1970), provides in part:
A prisoner . . . claiming the right to be released upon the ground that
the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United
States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or
that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is other-
wise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sen-
tence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
A motion for such relief may be made at any time.
This federal statute has been used as a model for a state statute that gives the state
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while others limit the grounds upon which post-conviction relief can
be claimed or the time within which that claim can be made.27
Another way that the operation of post-conviction statutes may be
made more restrictive than federal habeas corpus is by the imposition
of forfeiture rules. These rules hold that applicants have waived
constitutional issues if they could have, but did not, raise them on direct
appeal within the state court system.2 If such a waiver occurs, the
prisoner has forfeited his right to allege those issues on collateral ap-
peal. According to Fay v. Noia, 9 federal habeas corpus will be
granted to applicants despite the failure to raise constitutional claims
on direct appeal in the state courts unless that failure to appeal is
deemed an "intelligent and understanding waiver" of the right to ap-
peal.3 0 The Fay Court further explained that a federal judge may,
upon finding that a habeas applicant has intentionally avoided ,raising
his federal claims under the appropriate state court procedures, deny
federal relief to that applicant.3' But the test of intentional or deliber-
ate bypass is a stringent standard; despite the interest of the federal
courts in comity, allegations of unconstitutional restraint will not be
ignored solely on the grounds that the habeas applicant has run afoul
of state court procedures.32
When state procedure utilizes a more stringent waiver of forfei-
ture standard than the intelligent and understanding measure adopted
by the federal courts, the states have again limited their ability
to deal with cases cognizable on federal habeas corpus. From the
federal court point of view the state forfeiture rules create the same
courts equivalent jurisdiction over state prisoners. A second model is the UNIFORM
PosT-CONvICTION PROCEDURE ACT, 11 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 477 (1974), which grants
jurisdiction over the same broad subject matter but which, in its original version, limited
the consideration by requiring that all grounds for relief be raised in the first post-
conviction petition or not at all. Id. at 478-79; accord, ABA STANDARDS, supra note
23, at 3. The revised version of the Uniform Act follows the waiver standards set
forth in federal case law. 11 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. at 528.
27. A third model for state statutes is the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act,
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 122-1 to -7 (Smith-Hurd 1973). This statute is far more
restrictive than the first two; it limits the time for initiation of post-conviction pro-
ceedings to 20 years after the applicant's conviction (unless the delay is not due to
the applicant's neglect), considers claims not presented in the original or amended
petition waived, and limits the subject matter of post-conviction jurisdiction to claims
of substantial denial of rights under the United States or Illinois constitutions. Id.
§ 122-1, -3.
28. Cf. Note, supra note 17, at 433 (referring to this as the problem of waiver).
29. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
30. Id. at 399. The standard used is an extension of the waiver standard developed
in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
31. 372 U.S. at 433.
32. See Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 516-17 (1972).
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problems as jurisdictional and time limitations.3" From the state's
standpoint, such a system offers both advantages and disadvantages.
On the positive side, it allows that state's procedural network to remain
internally pure and consistent. This system not only permits the state
to maintain its well-regulated criminal procedure,34 it also allows the
state an enormous amount of control over the timing of constitutional
claims which can be permitted only at particular times during litigation.
State courts have an interest in having these claims raised and finally
adjudicated as quickly as possible. Lengthy delays decrease the ac-
curacy of the fact finding process while making it more difficult to con-
vict a second time should the first conviction be invalidated due to
constitutional error.15
In Fay v. Noia, the Supreme Court recognized the importance of
the state's autonomy30 and the state interest protected by a forfeiture
system; 37 in fact, this understanding became part of the concern for
comity that underlies the federal court policy of abstention from inter-
ference with the states' regulation of criminal justice so long as federal
constitutional rights are not thereby weakened.3 8 To advance this con-
cern further, the federal courts will enforce such forfeitures themselves
if the habeas applicant is found to have deliberately bypassed his state
remedies for strategic or tactical reasons. 39 If the state forfeiture rule
prevents the state courts from hearing the claim of an applicant who has
unintentionally or ignorantly failed to utilize state remedies that are no
longer available to him,40 the federal court will, of course, be forced
to hold a full evidentiary hearing on the case.
41
One disadvantage of a strict forfeiture rule on the state level is
that the internal autonomy created is limited and comes at a very high
33. These problems consist of the denial of the federal concerns discussed in the
text accompanying notes 17-22 supra.
34. See State v. White, 274 N.C. 220, 229-30, 162 S.E.2d 473, 478-79 (1968);
cf. Developments, supra note 18, at 1094 (federal/state comity considerations include
same concern).
35. Note, supra note 17, at 433-34 (1966); see Note, State Post-Conviction Rem-
edies and Federal Habeas Corpus, 40 N.Y.U. L. REv. 154, 161 (1965).
36. 372 U.S. at 419.
37. Id. at 431-32.
38. See note 17 and accompanying text supra.
39. 372 U.S. at 439.
40. For a limited restriction of the application of the understanding and voluntary
waiver rule of Fay, see Francis v. Henderson, 96 S. Ct. 1708 (1976).
41. Fay also held that the exhaustion of state remedies doctrine applies only to
state remedies still available at the time the habeas writ is filed. 372 U.S. at 435.
Therefore the failure of a habeas applicant to utilize state remedies in the past will not
bar habeas corpus consideration.
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price. Though the state retains the right to deny relief to any prisoner
who has failed to follow the state's procedural rules, and thereby may
gain a feeling of independence and full control of the prisoner, it has
in fact left many constitutional claims wholly in the lap of the federal
court system. Under the forfeiture rule the state courts will be free
from the stigma of federal court review of their decisions,42 but will
forego their opportunities to take an active role in the growth and for-
mulation of federal constitutional law43 as well as their obligation under
the supremacy clause 44 and the principles of federalism to enforce the
Constitution. 45  The freedom gained is merely that of roaming at
will through a severely confined space.
The advantages of this apparent state autonomy are far out-
weighed by other factors: the strain in federal/state regulations created
when the federal courts are forced to hold hearings they feel are more
appropriately held at the state level,46 the increased delay in final ad-
judication, the state's loss of its proper role in the process of adjudi-
cation of federal rights, and the loss of the effectiveness of the
forfeiture rule as a way of forcing prisoners to abide by state proce-
dures.4 7  For these reasons the most effective and sensible state post-
conviction procedures are those that grant jurisdiction as broad as
federal jurisdiction of habeas corpus petitions and follow the federal
waiver principles.48
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IN NORTH CAROLINA
The majority of states that have some form of statutory post-con-
viction procedure do not permit a prisoner to use that procedure to
42. Federal court review is a sore point with many state courts. It seems to offend
the feeling of the state courts that their supremacy in their own sphere should make
them wholly independent and untouchable in their decisions. See id. at 446-47 (Clark,
J., dissenting); Note, supra note 17, at 423.
43. Note, supra note 17, at 437-38.
44. U.S. CONST. art. VI, para. 2 provides:
This Constitution, the laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution
or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
45. Wright & Sofaer, supra note 17, at 899. For a good discussion of whether
the state could be required to grant post-conviction review commensurate with the scope
of federal habeas corpus under the supremacy clause, see Note, supra note 17, at 435-
37. The Supreme Court declined to decide this question in Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S.
336 (1965) (per curiam).
46. See text accompanying notes 17-22 supra.
47. Note, supra note 17, at 437.
48. A3A STANDARDS, supra note 23, at 19-20; Note, supra note 17, at 428-38;
Note, State Post-Conviction Remedies and Federal Habeas Corpus, 40 N.Y.U. L. REv.
154, 167-69 (1965).
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raise any issue that could have been raised on direct appeal.49 North
Carolina is among those states so limiting post-conviction relief. The
limitation comes not from the statute itself but from judicial con-
struction of the statute. The original version of the North Carolina
Post-Conviction Hearing Act was enacted in 195150 and followed the
pattern of the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act.5 The Act was
rewritten and broadened considerably in 1965,2 and exists in roughly
the same form at present.53 The grounds required to activate the
49. Each of the fifty states has some form of statutory post-conviction relief.
Statutory writs of habeas corpus are found in: ALA. CODE tit. 15, §§ 1-43 (1958);
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-2001 to -2027 (1956); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1473-
1508 (West 1970 & Supp. 1975); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-466 to -468, -470
(West Supp. 1976); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 660-3 to -32 (Supp. 1975); LA. CODE ClM.
PRO. ANN. arts. 351-376 (West 1967); MASS. ANN. LAWS. ch. 248, §§ 1-34 (Michie/
Law. Co-op 1974); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 11-43-1 to -55 (1972); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 534:1 to :32 (1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 67 (West 1976); TEx. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 11.01-.64 (Vernon 1966); VA. CODE §§ 8-596 to -609 (1957 & Cum.
Supp. 1976); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 7.36.010 to .250 (1961).
Post-conviction statutes are codified in ALAS. R. CRIM. P. 35 (Supp. 1968); ARK.
R. CRIM. P. 1 (Supp. 1975); COLO. R. CRIM. P. 35 (1973); DEL. SUPER. CT. CRIM.
R. 35 (1974); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.850 (1975); GA. CODE ANN. § 50-127 (1974 & Supp.
1976); IDAHO CODE §§ 19-4901 to -4911 (Cum. Supp. 1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
§§ 122-1 to -7 (Smith-Hurd 1973); IND. CODE ANN. P.C. Rule I (Burns 1973); IOWA
CODE §§ 663A.1 to .11 (Supp. 1976); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1507 (1976); Ky. R. CRIM.
P. 11.42 (1972); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 5502-5508 (1964); MICH. STAT. ANN.
§§ 27A.4301 to .4316 (1962); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 590.01-.06 (West Supp. 1976);
Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 532.400-.710 (Vernon 1953); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 95-2601
to -2608 (1969); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-3001 to -3004 (1975); NEv. REV. STAT. §§
177.315-.385 (1973); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-23-57 (Supp. 1975); N.Y. CalM. PROC.
LAW § 440.10 (McKinney 1971); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15-217 to -222 (1975); N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 29-32-01 to -10 (1974); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2953.21-.24 (Page
1975); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 1080-1088 (West Supp. 1976); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 138.510-.680 (1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 1180-1 to -14 (Purdon Supp. 1976);
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 10-9.1-1 to -7 (Supp. 1976); S.C. CODE §§ 17-601 to -612 (Supp.
1975); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 23-52-1 to -19 (Supp. 1976); TENN. CODE ANN. §§
40-3801 to -3812 (1975); UTAH CODE ANN. Rule 65B(i) (Supp. 1975); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13, §§ 7131-7137 (1974); W. VA. CODE §§ 53-4A-1 to -11 (Cum. Supp. 1976);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 974.06 (West 1970); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-408.1-.8 (Supp. 1975).
Thirty-four of these states place some sort of forfeiture restriction on the use of the
statutory remedy. 24 C.J.S. Crim. Law § 1606(9)(b) (1961 & Supp. 1976).
50. 1951 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 1083, § 1.
51. The present version of the Illinois Act is found in ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 122 (Smith-Hurd 1973).
52. 1965 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 352, § 1.
53. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-217 (1975) provides:
Institution of proceeding; effect on other remedies.-Any person im-
prisoned in the penitentiary, Central Prison, common jail of any county or
imprisoned in the common jail of any county and assigned to work under
the supervision of the State Department of Correction, who asserts that
in the proceedings which resulted in his conviction there was a substantial
denial of his rights under the Constitution of the United States or of the State
of North Carolina or both, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose
the sentence, or that the sentence exceeds the maximum authorized by law, or
that the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack upon any ground of
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remedy are similar to the grounds for federal habeas corpus jurisdic-
tion under 28 U.S.C. section 225551 or those of the Uniform Post-Con-
viction Procedure Act,55 which purports to create a remedy "fully as
broad as habeas corpus."' 6  Though no legislative history was kept,
at least one commentator felt that the creation of such a broad remedy
was the purpose of the North Carolina legislature in the writing of the
Act.17  The 1965 revision also added a second paragraph to section
15-217 that states that the new procedure does not affect or replace
any remedy of direct review. 5 The wording of the section does not,
however, give any indication of a forfeiture of remedy to be imposed
for failure to utilize those direct remedies.
In State v. White,50 despite the realization that the petitioner's
failure to raise his constitutional issue on direct appeal would not bar
him from federal habeas corpus relief,60 the North Carolina Supreme
Court 6' stated that petitioner's procedural default in the state court
system of direct review worked a forfeiture of his rights to col-
lateral review under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act.62  Reviewing
alleged error heretofore available under a writ of habeas corpus, writ of coram
nobis, or other common-law or statutory remedy, as to which there has been
no prior adjudication by any court of competent jurisdiction, may institute a
proceeding under this Article.
The remedy herein provided is not a substitute for nor does it affect any
remedies which are incident to the proceedings in the trial court, or any rem-
edy of direct review of the sentence or conviction, but except as otherwise pro-
vided in this Article it comprehends and takes the place of all other common-
law and statutory remedies which have heretofore been available for challeng-
ing the validity of incarceration under sentence of death or imprisonment, and
shall be used exclusively in lieu thereof.
Section 15-217.1 provides for the manner of filing and hearing of the post-conviction
petition. Section 15-218 describes the contents of the petition, and states that the appli-
cant waives any constitutional claim not alleged in the original or amended petition.
Section 15-219 waives court costs and provides counsel for indigent prisoners. Section
15-220 allows the district attorney 30 days to answer, allows withdrawal or amendment
of the petition, and provides for payment for the trial records of indigent prisoners.
Section 15-221 describes the post-conviction hearing itself. Section 15-222 provides for
appeal of the post-conviction judgment upon application for a writ of certiorari to the
North Carolina Court of Appeals.
54. See note 26 supra.
55. 11 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 477 (1974).
56. Id. at 486 (Commissioners' Comment).
57. Note, Habeas Corpus-New Post-Conviction Hearing Act, 44 N.C.L. REv. 153
(1965).
58. For wording of the statute see note 53 supra.
59. 274 N.C. 220, 162 S.E.2d 473 (1968).
60. Id. at 229, 162 S.E.2d at 478.
61. Review of post-conviction procedures was performed by the North Carolina
Supreme Court until October 1, 1967. See notes 66-69 and accompanying text inira.
62. 274 N.C. at 232, 162 S.E.2d at 480. For a forerunner of White in regard
to the original statute, see Miller v. State, 237 N.C. 29, 74 S.E.2d 513, cert. denied,
345 U.S. 930 (1953).
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the federal habeas corpus procedures set out in Fay and Town-
send, the court suggested that a federal judge's discretionary abil-
ity to disregard the state findings as unreliable and relitigate the
issue eliminates the necessity for state court adjudication of all consti-
tutional errors. 3 The North Carolina Supreme Court therefore seems
unwilling to enforce federal law and share in the habeas corpus func-
tion of the federal courts. White placed a clear limitation on the
Post-Conviction Hearing Act: the Act could be used to adjudicate only
those constitutional deprivations that petitioner was prevented from
raising earlier due to factors beyond his control. 4
Until 1967 North Carolina's post-conviction procedure was similar
to that of other states utilizing a strict forfeiture rule.", The situation
became unique when the 1967 Session of the North Carolina General
Assembly created the North Carolina Court of Appeals," and trans-
ferred the final review of post-conviction procedures to that court.07
After October 1, 1967, post-conviction hearings could be reviewed only
upon application for writ of certiorari to the court of appeals; these
hearings were the only type of case for which court of appeals review
was the final adjudication."" Further, the post-conviction hearings
present the only situation in which appeals to the court of appeals are
not granted as a.matter of right.69
This procedural change has made it difficult if not impossible to
modify judicially the interpretation placed on the Post-Conviction
Hearing Act by State v. White. The court of appeals, as a lower ap-
pellate court, cannot overturn a supreme court decision, but the su-
preme court is unable to modify its own holding since it no longer re-
views post-conviction cases. The court of appeals seems to deal with
this situation by deciding cases on non-White grounds whenever it is
possible to do S0.70 Frequently this is accomplished by refusing relief
63. 274 N.C. at 229, 162 S.E.2d at 479.
64. Id. at 226-27, 162 S.E.2d at 477 (quoting Miller v. State, 237 N.C. 29,
51, 74 S.E.2d 513, 528-29 (1953)).
65. See, e.g., In re Sterling, 63 Cal. 2d 486, 407 P.2d 5, 47 Cal. Rptr. 205 (1965).
See also 24 C.J.S. Crim. Law § 1606(9)(b) (1961).
66. 1967 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 108.
67. 1967 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 108, § 7A-28; id. ch. 523.
68. Id. ch. 108, § 7A-28. See Steed, The North Carolina Court of Appeals-
An Outline of Appellate Procedure, 46 N.C.L. R1Lv. 705, 709 (1968).
69. Steed, supra note 68, at 724.
70. The court of appeals has cited White only four times. Of these, only one ci-
tation was in reference to the forfeiture standard set forth in that case. See State v.
Bell, 14 N.C. App. 346, 349, 188 S.E.2d 593, 595 (1972). Even this one usage of
White was in a situation where the forfeiture it created did not restrict the remedy
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on the ground that no substantial constitutional question was raised
rather than facing the forfeiture issue raised by White."1 In one case
72
the court of appeals went so far as to order a remand to the trial court,
which had held the post-conviction hearing, to make a finding of fact
on the substantiality of petitioner's claim that his guilty plea was in-
voluntary." This decision is not erroneous, but it circles the
jurisdictional issue of the substantiality of the constitutional claim in
order to avoid confronting the fact that State v. White might deny juris-
diction automatically for failure to allege coercion on direct appeal.
While the court of appeals' reluctance to follow the rule of White
appears to minimize the problem presented by the case, in fact this
reluctance creates a more formidable obstacle. With White on the
books superior court judges feel bound to follow it; they are unlikely
to be swayed from their refusal to grant post-conviction relief on the
ground that the court of appeals seems to ignore the White decision.
The confusing conflict of White and the court of appeals cases makes
it difficult for criminal defendants to judge which forum (federal or
state) should properly receive their constitutional claims. The exis-
tence of White also creates a temptation in the trial courts to follow
the lead of the court of appeals and decide that no substantial consti-
tutional violation exists so as to avoid the forfeiture problem created
by the presence of such a violation. Finally, the discretionary nature
of the appeals process in these cases induces the court of appeals to
avoid deciding any case raising an unavoidable forfeiture question
under White.
REFORM OF NORTH CAROLINA PROCEDURE
The White decision, then, is not only the product of an unwise
and unworthy attempt on the part of the North Carolina Supreme Court
to avoid the appropriate role of the North Carolina state courts in the
further than federal habeas corpus would have. Post-conviction relief could as well have
been denied in that case under the voluntary waiver rule of Fay. Further, the use of
White in Bell was actually part of a secondary or alternate holding. The primary hold-
ing of the case was that defendant's claimed deprivation was so insubstantial as to con-
stitute harmless error. Id.
71. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 8 N.C. App. 348, 174 S.E.2d 651 (1970); Dixon
v. State, 8 N.C. App. 408, 174 S.E.2d 683 (1970). As there is no post-conviction
jurisdiction under § 15-217 and White unless a defendant is claiming under a constitu-
tional ground that is substantial and that could not have been raised previously, cases
decided in the absence of either of these criteria are correctly decided.
72. Battle v. State, 8 N.C. App. 192, 174 S.E.2d 299 (1970).
73. Id. at 195-96, 174 S.E.2d at 301-02.
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adjudication of federal constitutional questions;7 4 it is an error that,
through a procedural fluke, has achieved the unique status of a seem-
ingly immutable precedent. The unfortunate consequence is that it
will be extremely difficult to correct this error so that the North Caro-
lina court system can once more exercise its power and autonomy as
final fact finder for consideration of the constitutional propriety of the
convictions of state prisoners.
Change might be accomplished in one of three ways: first, the
court of appeals could reverse the supreme court's decision in White.
It is arguable that the lower court could do so since they are the final
arbiters of post-conviction matters. 5 Such action, however, would vio-
late the standard rules of stare decisis and might not be effective due
to the misleading nature of a record in which an inferior court has
"overruled" the case law of a higher court. Second, the supreme court
could consider one post-conviction case in order to overturn the White
decision. It is possible that some extraordinary writ might be used for
this purpose. The highly unusual nature of this remedy, though argu-
ably appropriate in this situation, makes it unlikely that it will be uti-
lized. Further, the supreme court would have to circumvent the fact
that the court of appeals is statutorily designated as the court of last re-
sort in such cases.7 6 Finally, the statute could be amended to bar the
forfeiture doctrine expressed by White. This possibility is the most
likely and the most effective of the solutions. Although the statute it-
self seems to present a remedy as extensive as federal habeas corpus,
the only way to allow the statute to operate as intended is to amend
it expressly to exclude only constitutional deprivations that the appli-
cant knowingly and voluntarily failed to raise on appeal for strategic
or tactical purposes.77
CONCLUSION
Without a legislative amendment or extraordinary judicial action,
the North Carolina criminal justice system will remain a captive of its
own procedure. The system will be unable to change, and therefore
unable to shape and control the changes in the administration of crim-
inal justice that future conditions may warrant. The result will be
a permanent inability to live up to the potential of the North Carolina
74. See text accompanying notes 42-45 supra.
75. See sources cited in note 68 and accompanying text supra.
76. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-28 (1969).
77. See sources cited in notes 29-32 and accompanying text supra.
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Post-Conviction Hearing Act, and a permanent strain in state and
federal court relations as the federal courts repeatedly discover that "no
hearing of any sort was accorded petitioner . . . in the courts of North
Carolina despite a modem and enlightened procedural machinery ade-
quately designed to determine the basis of historical facts under-
lying constitutional questions and to review such questions."78
ELLEN KABCENELL WAYNE
Criminal Procedure-United States v. Santana: A Reinterpreta-
tion of the Katz Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test
In its application of fourth amendment protection against unreas-
onable searches and seizures' the United States Supreme Court has be-
come increasingly sensitive to the policies that are the foundation of
that amendment since the appearance of the "reasonable expectation
of privacy" standard in Katz v. United States2 in 1968. Katz repre-
sented a philosophical shift in the Court's approach to governmental
intrusions into citizens' lives, moving the focus from the location and
structural components of the area invaded toward a more flexible and
somewhat subjective standard that requires an examination of circum-
stances in which an individual may justifiably rely upon an expectation
of privacy.'
In the recent case of United States v. Santana4 the Court appears
to have misread and misapplied the Katz standards. Officers of the
Philadelphia Narcotics Squad, acting on probable cause but without a
warrant, had driven to defendant Santana's residence and, finding her
in her doorway, proceeded to arrest her. The Court found that San-
78. Anderson v. North Carolina, 221 F. Supp. 930, 931 (W.D.N.C. 1963).
I. The full text of the amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no
Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
U.S. CONsr. amend. IV.
2. 389 U.S. 347 (1968). The phrase "reasonable expectation of privacy" comes
from Justice Harlan's concurring opinion. Id. at 361; see note 51 infra.
3. 389 U.S. at 352-53.
4. 96 S. Ct. 2406 (1976).
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tana's visibility in her doorway necessarily demonstrated that she had
no expectation of privacy under Katz and that her doorway thereby be-
came a "public place."' ; The arrest was therefore held to be valid
under a prior ruling" that no warrant is necessary to arrest a suspect
in a public place when there exists probable cause to arrest.7  There
was no discussion of Santana's actual expectation of privacy, or of the
reasonableness of such an expectation, as the Katz test would seem-
ingly have required. Although there is some question whether search
criteria should be applied to arrests," the importance of Santana is that
it appears to indicate that the Court will use the Katz holding only in
a conclusory manner following the determination of the fourth amend-
ment issue according to pre-Katz standards. While the result in San-
tana appears justifiable on its facts, the decision represents a severe
setback to the individual's right to privacy in an age of advanced sur-
veillance techniques.
On August 16, 1974, an undercover agent of the Philadelphia Nar-
cotics Squad used an intermediary to purchase several packets of heroin
from defendant Santana. The agents provided the money and the
impetus for the purchase. Immediately after the purchase, the inter-
mediary was arrested within a block and a half of the purchase site
(defendant's residence), providing some likelihood that word of the
arrest would quickly reach defendant.' Acting without a warrant but
with sufficient information to satisfy probable cause requirements,10
agents returned to defendant's residence intending to arrest her.'1
5. Id. at 2409.
6. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
7. 96 S. Ct. at 2409.
8. The three concurring Justices and the two dissenting Justices argued the case on
the basis of seizure rather than search criteria. Id. at 2410 (White, Stevens & Stewart,
JJ., concurring); id. at 2411-12 (Marshall & Brennan, JJ., dissenting). Given the
number of state statutes, see, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 844 (West 1970); Ky. REV. STAT.
§ 70.078 (1971); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-807 (1975), federal statutes, see, e.g., 18
U.S.C. § 3052 (1970) (FBI agents); 18 U.S.C. § 3056(a) (1970) (Secret Service
agents); 18 U.S.C. § 3601 (1970) (post office agents); 21 U.S.C. § 878 (1970) (Drug
Enforcement Administration agents), and federal court decisions, see, e.g., United States
v. McKinney, 379 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1967), that would support the action of the agents
in this case, it would appear that the case would not have been decided differently under
seizure-criteria. But see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 2305 (1975); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
§§ 4701 & 4702 (1974); ALI, MODEL CODE OF PRE-APRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 220.1
(3) (1975); Note, The Neglected Fourth Amendment Problem in Arrest Entries, 23
STAN. L. Rv. 995 (1971).
9. 96 S. Ct. at 2412 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
10. That there was a strong case for probable cause was determined by the district
court. Id. at 2409.
11. Id.
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When the agents arrived at defendant's residence, she was
standing in her doorway; a step forward would have put her outside
the house and a step back would have put her within the house. 12 The
officers rushed from their van shouting "police," whereupon defendant
retreated into her home where officers followed and took her into
custody. A search incident to the arrest" turned up packets of a sub-
stance that later proved to be heroin, as well as some of the marked
money that the agents had furnished the intermediary.
14
At trial in federal district court, defendant Santana moved to sup-
press the evidence. In an oral opinion, the District Court for the East-
ern District of Pennsylvania granted the motion on the ground that the
agents failed to obtain a warrant.' 5 The Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit affirmed the decision without opinion.'6 The United
States Supreme Court reversed, holding that defendant Santana's
doorway was a "public place," and that a warrantless arrest does not
violate the fourth amendment when an individual is arrested upon pro-
bable cause in a public place.17 The Court found support for its public
place determination in language from Katz and Hester v. United
States,'8 to the effect that fourth amendment protection does not ex-
tend to those things that one exposes to public view. This portion of
the opinion is extremely brief, providing no explanation for the choice
of these particular cases and offering scant analysis of their facts in light
of their holdings. In addition, the Court avoided holding that one's
doorway is a "public place."
A right of personal privacy,19 as such, is nowhere guaranteed to
the individual by the Constitution.20  Although the Bill of Rights
was intended to provide the individual with the maximum feasible pro-
12. Id. at 2408 n.1.
13. The packets fell to the floor as the agents apprehended Santana, id. at 2408;
therefore their seizure of the heroin was not constitutionally invalid. See Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969).
14. 96 S. Ct. at 2408.
15. Id. at 2409.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
19. Privacy is defined in many ways, but it seems that the ability to control access
to information about oneself is at the heart of the term. One's appearance, actions and
thoughts may provide information about one's self. It is the ability to control access to
these that gives us a sense of privacy. See Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 482-83
(1968).
20. But see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965), in which the Court
found a constitutional right of privacy to be implied by at least five of the Bill of Rights
amendments. Accord, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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tection against governmental intrusion into his or her private life, the
right to privacy only became an issue in the courts in the late
nineteenth century.2' In Boyd v. United States22 in 1886, the Court
recognized that it was not the danger of physical intrusion that so con-
cerned the drafters of the Bill of Rights, but rather it was the threat
of forcible exposure of information that an individual might have ex-
pected to keep private that was of primary concern. Governmental
search and seizure of personal property involves property rights,2  cer-
tainly, but the fundamental constitutional issue concerns an individual's
right to control access to information about himself.
24
Early in the development of case law analyzing fourth amendment
searches, the courts began to require that the individual take some
responsibility for the protection of his privacy from governmental
intrusion. In 1924 in Hester v. United States,2  the Court approved
the actions of government agents who, acting on reliable information,
approached to within one hundred yards of defendant's farm house to
observe him selling illegal whiskey. This "search" and the subsequent
seizure of incriminating evidence were upheld on the ground that the
fourth amendment does not protect people who act in "open fields,
' 02
though the agents apparently were trespassing on Hester's land at the
time of the search and were acting without a warrant.
21. See Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). "In
very early times . . . the 'right to life' served only to protect the subject from battery in
its various forms; liberty meant freedom from actual restraint; . . . now the right to life
has come to mean the right to enjoy life,-the right to be let alone . . . ." Id. at 193.
See also Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891). "No right is held more
sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every
individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or
interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law." Id. at 251.
22. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). The Court reversed a circuit court decision re-
quiring that defendant turn over invoices to federal revenue agents and finding that
such compulsory production violated the fourth and fifth amendments. Referring to
Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765), a case that was viewed as partially
responsible for the inclusion of the fourth amendment in the Bill of Rights, the Court
said:
[The principles laid down in Entick] apply to all invasions on the part of the
government and its employes of the sanctity of a man's home and the priva-
cies of life. It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his
drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the invasion of
his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty, and private prop-
erty ....
Id. at 630.
23. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 n.4 (1967) (citing Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 509 (Black, J., dissenting)).
24. See note 19 supra; Note, From Private Places to Personal Privacy: A Post-
Katz Study of Fourth Amendment Protection, 43 N.Y.U.L. REv. 968, 978 (1968).
25. 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
26. Id. at 59.
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The open fields doctrine is one of the more conservative appli-
cations of the fourth amendment. The appellation "open fields" is
misleading, since Hester was actually within the yard of his
farmhouse;2 7 therefore, in Hester the Court restricted fourth amend-
ment protections at least to enclosed spaces, and probably to the home
of an individual. "8 The trespass of the searchers in no way invalidated
the search,20 and the line of cases drawing authority from Hester has
upheld the use of searchlights, high powered field glasses and other
surveillance technology.30
Olmstead v. United States," decided in 1928 in conjunction with
Hester, provided the analytical framework for fourth amendment cases
for nearly forty years. Out of Hester came the line of cases delineating
those areas that were subject to fourth amendment protection, while
Olmstead provided the rationale for dealing with fourth amendment
violations of those areas. In Olmstead, the Court held that a physical
invasion of an area subject to fourth amendment protection was neces-
sary to sustain a violation, and thus, words that leave a home via tele-
phone wires are beyond protection.-
3 2
The Hester-Olmstead cases led to a fairly rigid framework into
which the Court had to fit subsequent search and seizure cases.
Following Hester and Olmstead the courts determined, first, whether
the area in question could be termed a constitutionally protected area3"
and, second, whether a trespass upon that area had been committed.
Under this rationale, constitutionally protected areas came to include,
27. Subsequent case law has held that the area in and around the home is protected
from a trespassory search. See United States v. Molkenbur, 430 F.2d 563, 566 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 952 (1970); Wattenburg v. United States, 388 F.2d 853, 857
(9th Cir. 1968); Texas v. Gonzales, 388 F.2d 145 (5th Cir. 1968); Care v. United
States, 231 F.2d 22 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 932 (1956).
28. Justifying the seizure of evidence, the Court said, "This evidence was not
obtained by the entry into the house ... " 265 U.S. at 58.
29. Id.
30. United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927), first approved the use of a
searchlight, and analogized it to the use of field glasses, paving the way for a large
number of cases that would approve the use of technology-assisted visual searches. See
United States v. Minton, 488 F.2d 37 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936
(1974); Fullbright v. United States, 392 F.2d 432 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 830
(1968); Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 932
(1956); Commonwealth v. Hernley, 216 Pa. Super. Ct. 177, 263 A.2d 904, cert. denied,
401 U.S. 914 (1970). On the use of field glasses and binoculars for searches see On Lee
v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952); Annot., 48 A.L.R.3d 1178 (1973).
31. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
32. Id. at 464-66.
33. The phrase itself did not appear until 1951 in United States v. On Lee, 193
F.2d 306, 314 (2d Cir. 1951) (Frank, J., dissenting), aff'd, 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
1977]
670 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55
in addition to one's home, 4 a business office,35 a store, 6 a hotel
room,3 7 an apartment, 38 a garage,39 an automobile,40 and a taxi cab;4
trespass came to include governmental intrusion in person,42 or by
microphone or surveillance device.
43
The inflexibility of this rationale led to a hair splitting analysis that
centered upon the physical location of defendant. 44  Katz v. United
States45 presented the Court with an excellent opportunity to alter the
"constitutionally protected areas" rationale. FBI agents had recorded
conversations that were a part of defendant's illegal betting operation
by placing an electronic recording device on the outside of a phone
booth that was occasionally used for defendant's illegal purposes.
Writing for the majority, Justice Stewart noted that the Court would
no longer allow the issues to be formulated in terms of invasion of
constitutionally protected areas. 46  Laying the foundation for his new
framework, Stewart noted that the fourth amendment protects citizens
against certain kinds of governmental intrusion4 7 but that it "protects
people, not places."' 48  The public-private dichotomy was not to be
34. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928); United States v. Lee, 274 U.S.
559 (1927); United States v. Hester, 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
35. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
36. Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S.
313 (1921).
37. Parks v. United States, 386 U.S. 940, 951 (1966); Hoffa v. United States, 385
U.S. 293, 301 (1966); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951); Lustig v. United
States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949).
38. See Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961); Jones v. United States,
362 U.S. 257 (1960); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948).
39. Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1 (1932).
40. Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927).
41. See Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960).
42. Id.; Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927).
43. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961); On Lee v. United States, 343
U.S. 747 (1952).
44. In 1964 the Court found that a trespass had been committed when a micro-
phone the size of a thumbtack had been put in a common wall. Clinton v. Virginia, 377
U.S. 158 (1964) (concurring opinion), rev'g per curiam Clinton v. State, 204 Va. 275,
130 S.E.2d 437 (1963). Earlier, the Court had held that a microphone placed against a
partition wall to monitor conversations was not a trespass, Goldman v. United States,
316 U.S. 129 (1942), but that the penetration of a tiny "spike mike" through a wall
required the application of the fourth amendment protections. Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961). Clearly, the intrusion issue became outdated with the
advanced surveillance technology developed during this forty year period.
45. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
46. Id. at 349-53.
47. But Justice Stewart also stated that fourth amendment protections are not
aimed at guaranteeing a general right to privacy, the protection of which is generally left
to the individual states. Id. at 350-51.
48. Id. at 351.
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based upon prior determinations of which enclosed areas were consti-
tutionally protected, but rather upon what an individual knowingly ex-
posed to the public and what he sought to preserve as private.4 9 Physi-
cal intrusion was no longer an essential factor. ° Under the new ration-
ale an individual was due the protection of the fourth amendment
whenever he justifiably relied upon an expectation of privacy."'
In Santana, the Court found support for the arrest by looking to
another recent case, United States v. Watson,52 in which it was held
that the warrantless arrest of an individual in a public place upon
probable cause does not violate the fourth amendment. Under the
Watson rationale, therefore, if the state can show that defendant
Santana's doorway is a public place, then the attempted arrest is justi-
fiable, as are the pursuit of defendant Santana into her home in order
to complete the arrest53 and the seizure of the heroin packets spilled
49. Id. at 351-52.
50. The Court specifically overruled the trespass requirements stated in Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), and Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129
(1942). 389 U.S. at 353.
51. id. In a concurring opinion, Justice Harlan laid out a two-pronged test that
has become commonly used to determine whether an individual justifiably relied on an
expectation of privacy: "first, that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy, and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared
to recognize as 'reasonable.'" Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). While the test appears
to have two parts, it seems unlikely that a court will often make use of the first criterion.
It can be assumed that an expectation will be alleged in most cases, and that it will be
found lacking only when an individual does something that would clearly undermine that
claim, such as the display of contraband in a crowded public area. The second criterion
should be determinative in most cases, however. The alleged expectation must appear
reasonable in light of the surrounding circumstances and in light of societal values, a
standard that is very close to the reasonable man standard found in tort law. See Note,
The Concept of Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 6 U. MICH. J. LEGAL REF. 154,
178-79 (1972).
The use of societal values as a standard in the determination provides substantial
flexibility in the application of the test, although the obvious difficulties of arriving at an
adequate definition of so broad a phrase insured that the Court would rely on the
previously determined "constitutionally protected areas" as a starting point for analysis.
A particularly good discussion of the Katz standards can be found in United States v.
Vilhotti, 323 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
[T]o ascertain what constitutes an unreasonable search the court must evaluate
a person's efforts to ensure the privacy of an area or activity in view of both
contemporary norms of social conduct and the imperatives of a viable demo-
cratic society ...
. U]nder Katz, an agent is permitted the same license to intrude as a
reasonably respectable citizen would take. Therefore, the nature of the prem-
ises inspected-e.g., whether residential, commercial, inhabited or abandoned-
is decisive; it determines the extent of social inhibition on natural curiosity
and, inversely, the degree of care required to insure privacy.
Id. at 43 1.
52. 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
53. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-300 (1966); McDonald v. United
States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948).
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in the process.5 4 Accordingly, the entire case turns on the characteri-
zation of defendant's doorway.
On the face of it, the description of the threshold of a residence
as a public place appears rather bizarre. A doorway is not a place one
expects strangers to cross or gather without having some legitimate
business to conduct with the occupant. While not actually within the
confines of the "home" a doorway is directly attached to it, and in this
case, separated from the public path by some fifteen feet of property
that might also be considered private. 55 A comparison with the public
place involved in Watson adds no greater strength to the Santana
rationale. Watson was arrested in a public restaurant during the lunch
hour, a place where one's claim to a specific spot is temporary, and
where one can expect to be surrounded by a substantial number of
unknown persons.56
To justify the Court's decision in Santana, Justice Rehnquist dis-
tinguished the private-public dichotomy as it is applied in a common
law property context from its application in a fourth amendment con-
text.57  The common law protected one's home and its immediate
grounds from physical trespass because they were considered private.
Under Hester, Justice Rehnquist indicated, what is not hidden from the
view, hearing and touch of the world around the individual is not pro-
tected by the fourth amendment. 58  The cases that follow Hester
support that position,59 and further, support the proposition that
government agents have at least the same right to visual search as
would a disinterested citizen since the agents are allowed to trespass
upon an individual's property to obtain a view of the "open field."
Given this interpretation of Hester, Santana's doorway would hardly be
a protected area, as she was fully visible from a public street only five
feet away. There are, however, no limits that can be drawn on visual
(and presumably aural and olfactory)6 0 searching under the Hester
rule. In an age of highly advanced surveillance techniques and equip-
54. See note 13 supra.
55. 96 S. Ct. at 2408.
56. 423 U.S. at 413.
57. 96 S. Ct. at 2409.
58. The Court could use Hester to define the type of "place" in which the
defendant was found, because the Katz case, while clearly overruling the Olmstead-
Goldman line of cases, did not overrule the line of cases defining "constitutionally
protected areas." See 389 U.S. at 352.
59. Fullbright v. United States, 392 F.2d 432 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
830 (1968); Hodges v. United States, 234 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1957); Care v. United
States, 231 F.2d 22 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 932 (1956).
60. See Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861 (1974).
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ment, a simple extension of the Hester ruling would require that an
individual spend a good deal of his life closing shades and curtains,
whispering or writing messages rather than conversing, and burning
any trash or garbage that could be marginally incriminating.,1 In con-
trast, Katz offers a more balanced approach to the questions of public
versus private places. While not eliminating the locational aspects of
the issue altogether, it focuses on the reasonableness of an individual's
expectation of privacy. Katz, although in a public place and exposed
to public view, could reasonably expect his conversations to remain
private.1
2
Rehnquist's use of the Katz case in Santana indicates that he reads
Katz as a mere extension of the Hester rationale. He quotes, out of
context, the rule that "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the
public, even in his own house or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection," 6 never recognizing that in Katz, the Court
accompanied that rule by another: that "[w]hat [a man] seeks to
to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may
be constitutionally protected." 4  There was no discussion in the
opinion of whether Santana might have justifiably relied upon an ex-
pectation of privacy as mandated by Katz, but rather the opinion con-
tained only a simple statement that Santana was not in an area where
she had any expectation of privacy." The predication of her expecta-
tion of privacy upon the area in which she was located looks very much
like the application of the "constitutionally protected areas" rationale
that was discredited in Katz.
Failure to use the Katz rationale in this case seems odd. Had
Katz been applied in full, the Court would probably have reached the
61. An extensive survey of state and federal cases involving governmental surveil-
lance has led one author to conclude that
we have the specter of a fourth amendment which protects any man who re-
treats into his home to be free from unreasonable intrusion. Any man, that is,
who is wealthy enough to afford a windowless, soundproof house, built on an
extensive area of land and surrounded by high fences, and a man who is willing
to live the life of a hermit, staying inside his home at all times, prepared to
take affirmative action to counter any new technological methods of intrusion
with which the government might be equipped.
Note, Katz and the Fourth Amendment: A Reasonable Expectation of Privacy or, A
Man's Home Is His Fort, 23 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 63, 72 (1974). See also Comment,
Police Helicopter Surveillance and Other Aided Observations: The Shrinking Reason-
able Expectation of Privacy, 11 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 505 (1975).
62. "[W]hat he sought to exclude when he entered the booth was not the intruding
eye-it was the uninvited ear." 389 U.S. at 352.
63. 96 S. Ct. at 2409 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)).
64. 389 U.S. at 351-52.
65. 96 S. Ct. at 2409.
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same result. Assuming that Santana had an expectation of privacy, the
question becomes whether that reliance was justified. Santana was
arguably within her home, an area that is specifically mentioned in the
fourth amendment and that the courts have treated as uniquely
deserving of protection, 6 but the greater number of cases that argue
for special protection for the home are concerned with trespassing
rather than visual searches. 7  It could have been argued that while
Santana could expect certain types of privacy as she stood in her
doorway, she certainly could not expect that her person would not be
noticed and identified by the public some fifteen feet away. Katz
justifiably relied upon a right to privacy in his conversations, though
he could not reasonably expect to be free from visual search. Santana's
failure to make any effort to conceal her person destroys any claim to
visual privacy that she might have had. Once that privacy is lost, even
under Katz, her arrest would likely be held valid given the existence
of probable cause.6S
The central issue in Santana was not analyzed sufficiently to
support the Court's determination; the factual basis for the classi-
fication of defendant's doorway as a public place was not discussed in
substantial detail, and the Katz case was not accurately represented in
support of the Court's decision. On the particular facts of Santana, the
Court's mistreatment of the Katz precedent was unnecessary since the
Court could have reached the same decision under a strict application
of the Katz test. The result is one that appears to clear the way for
increased governmental surveillance of individuals' lives.
EDWIN P. CHESTER
66. Camara v. Municipal Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967) ("even the most law-
abiding citizen has a very tangible interest in limiting the circumstances under which the
sanctity of his home may be broken by official authority"); Lewis v. United States, 385
U.S. 206, 211 (1966) ("the home is accorded the full range of Fourth Amendment
protections"); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) ("At the very core
[of the fourth amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and
there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion"); Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383, 389-91 (1914) (invasions of the home without a properly attested warrant
should find no sanction in the courts).
67. This factor, of course, would have been far more important had the Court not
chosen to analyze this case in terms of cases which deal with non-trespassory search.
68. But see authorities cited to the contrary in note 8 supra.
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Grand Jury Secrecy: A Grand Jury Witness' Right
to His Own Testimony
Only within the past thirty years have the courts begun to intrude
into the theretofore inviolate secrecy of the grand jury process.' De-
fendants have been far more successful in obtaining access to grand
jury testimony than have the grand jury witnesses themselves, despite
many similarities in circumstance and the logical inconsistencies that
such differences in treatment display.2 Traditionally, courts cite the
"long-established policy that maintains the secrecy of the grand jury
proceedings in the federal courts"'3 as a talisman to ward off further
analysis of the validity of grand jury secrecy.4 They have been reluc-
tant to permit access to grand jury testimony except "discreetly and
limitedly."5  The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in Bast v.
United States,' used this talismanic approach to deny a grand jury wit-
ness a transcript of his testimony despite reasonable, even compelling,
justifications for such disclosure as of right.
Plaintiff in Bast had testified voluntarily before a grand jury,
which subsequently returned no indictments. He was not a probable
defendant, nor had he testified under a grant of immunity. 7 Plaintiff
claimed that he was entitled to a copy of his grand jury testimony, of-
fering several justifications for his need. The most compelling reasons
advanced were the necessity of correcting any inadvertent errors in his
testimony and the need to combat rumors he claimed were being circu-
lated that he was a government informer.8
1. This rise roughly coincides with the introduction of Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 6 in 1946. Comment, Grand Jury Secrecy: Should Witnesses Have Access
to Their Grand Jury Testimony as a Matter of Right?, 20 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 804, 811
n.36 (1973).
2. As will be shown, an analysis of the reasons for grand jury secrecy presents
a far more compelling justification for a witness to obtain a transcript of his own grand
jury testimony than for a defendant to obtain testimony of grand jury witnesses.
3. United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681 (1958).
4. See Justice Brennan's dissent in Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States,
360 U.S. 395, 406 (1959): "The Court, while making obeisance to a 'long-established
policy' of secrecy, makes no showing whatever how denial of [defendant's] grand jury
testimony serves any of the purposes justifying secrecy."
5. United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 683 (1958).
6. 542 F.2d 893 (4th Cir. 1976). Judge Widener wrote the majority opinion
from which Judge Wyzanski dissented.
7. Id. at 894.
8. Id. Other reasons cited by plaintiff were: (1) he was suing the federal gov-
ernment in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia; (2) a tran-
script would insure accurate disclosure of his testimony; and (3) he might subsequently
be indicted as a result of his appearance before the grand jury.
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The district court denied Bast's motion requesting a copy of his
grand jury testimony and the Fourth Circuit affirmed.' The court of
appeals based its decision on the principle, set out in United States v.
Proctor & Gamble Co.,'" that release of proceedings of the grand
jury should only be granted upon a showing of some "particularized
need."" The majority in Bast did not find persuasive the argument
that since Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) 2 imposes no con-
dition of secrecy on a grand jury witness there is no justification for
nondisclosure. 13  The majority found that there was no evidence of
possible transcript error and that there was no substantiation of Bast's
claim as to the rumors that he was a government informer.1 4
The dissent in Bast noted the factual distinction between this case
and Procter & Gamble, which it felt rendered Procter & Gamble
inapposite as precedent.' 5 Citing the "equities" of allowing disclosure
the dissent felt that plaintiff's voluntary testimony gave him a prima
facie right to a copy of his own testimony, absent a showing by the
government of some compelling need for secrecy.'
An analysis of Bast requires a brief review of the historical devel-
opment of grand jury secrecy.' 7  Although the grand jury may have
9. Id. at 897.
10. 356 U.S. 677 (1958).
11. Id. at 683.
12. FED. R. CilM. P. 6(e) provides in part:
Disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury other than its de-
liberations and the vote of any juror may be made to the attorneys for the
government for the use in the performance of their duties. Otherwise a juror,
attorney, interpreter, stenographer, operator of a recording device, or any typist
who transcribes recorded testimony may disclose matters occuring before the
grand jury only when so directed by the court preliminarily to or in connection
with a judicial proceeding or when permitted by the court at the request of the
defendant upon a showing that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the
indictment . . . . No obligation of secrecy may be imposed upon any person
except in accordance with this rule.
13. 542 F.2d at 896.
14. Id. at 896-97.
15. Id. at 898 (Wyzanski, J., dissenting). Judge Wyzanski cited with approval
the reasoning of Judge Frankel in United States v. Projansky, 44 F.R.D. 550 (S.D.
N.Y. 1968), and Judge Hufstedler in Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir,
1972). Id. at 897.
16. Id. at 898-99. Although not mentioning Rule 6(e) specifically, Judge Wyzan-
ski discussed the illogic of refusing to give plaintiff a copy of his testimony although
he was free to divulge its contents. He also cited the ability to correct mistakes in
the record as another factor militating for disclosure. Id. at 898.
17. See generally Calkins, Grand Jury Secrecy, 63 MICH. L. REV. 455 (1965);
Whyte, Is the Grand Jury Necessary?, 45 VA. L. REv. 461 (1959); Comment, Secrecy in
Grand Jury Proceedings: A Proposal for a New Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
6(e), 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 307 (1969); Comment, supra note 1.
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had its deepest roots in Roman, Scandinavian and Greek criminal law,",
its common law inception occurred in 1166 with the Grand Assize.1
The Grand Assize served more of a prosecutorial, as opposed to in-
vestigatorial, function and its deliberations were open to the public.
2 0
In 1368, after the slow decline of the Grand Assize, a new body
arose-le grande inquest-which was charged with lodging all criminal
prosecutions. This body adopted the custom of hearing witnesses in
private.2' Secrecy, however, did not become institutionalized until the
trials of Stephen College "22 and the Earl of Shaftesbury2l at which time
it became a method of preventing influence and control of the grand
jury by the Crown.24
The grand jury was brought to America with the same basic prem-
ise of secrecy. 20  Eventually, fear of government abuse of the grand
jury process subsided and government prosecutors were permitted to
be present during testimony.26 Governmental influence on the grand
jury has increased and today the prosecutor often directs and controls
the grand jury. Secrecy is no longer juxtaposed between the grand
jury and the government28 but is used, instead, to shield the witnesses29
from the defendant.
18. Whyte, supra note 17, at 462. See also Kuh, The Grand Jury "Presentment":
Foul Blow Or Fair Play?, 55 COLOM. L. REv. 1103, 1106 (1955).
19. Calkins, supra note 17, at 456-57.
20. Id. at 456-57. "This was an age when little regard was given to the rights
of private citizens." Id. at 456.
21. Id. at 457.
22. 8 How. St. Tr. 550 (1681). The grand jury demanded to hear evidence of
College's treason against Henry II in private. After considering the matter the grand
jury refused to indict College. G. EDWARDS, THE GRAND JURY 28-29 (1906).
23. 8 How. St. Tr. 759 (1681). This was another case involving treason against
Henry II. After initially being forced to hear the witness' testimony in public the jury
requested and was finally granted the right to hear him in private. The jury refused
to indict based on the evidence heard in private. Calkins, supra note 17, at 457.
24. Calkins, supra note 17, at 458. One article, Tigar & Levy, The Grand Jury
as the New Inquisition, 50 MicH. ST. BJ. 693, 694 (1971), asserts that secrecy was
for the protection of the private individual while Watts, Grand Jury: Sleeping Watchdog
or Expensive Antique?, 37 N.C.L. REv. 290, 292 (1959), claims that secrecy arose
for the protection of the defendant.
25. Comment, supra note 1, at 806. In the American case of Peter Zenger, 17
How. St. Tr. 675 (1735), closely paralleling those of College and Shaftesbury, an Amer-
ican grand jury used secrecy to protect the accused from political pressure by the gover-
nor of New York. Although the grand jury refused to indict Zenger for his newspaper
attacks on the governor, he was finally charged by information. See Kuh, supra note
18, at 1108-09.
26. Calkins, The Fading Myth of Grand Jury Secrecy, 1 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC.
18, 19 (1967).
27. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 1, at 807-08.
28. See In re Russo, 53 F.R.D. 564, 569 (C.D. Cal.), aff'd, 448 F.2d 369 (9th
Cir. 1971).
29. See Calkins, supra note 26, at 20.
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The majority's opinion in Bast is paradigmatic of the approach that
most courts take in this area.30 The court cited with approval the "his-
toric" justifications for grand jury secrecy and cited precedents that
uphold the sanctity of secrecy,3 but failed to evaluate the validity of
these reasons in the context presented. A contextual analysis of grand
jury secrecy reveals that not only are there no justifications for imposing
secrecy in this instance,3 2 but there are compelling reasons why dis-
closure should be granted as a matter of right to such a witness.33
The initial question in the analysis of a grand jury witness' right
to a copy of his own testimony3 4 is whether any of the historical justifi-
cations for secrecy are viable in this context.35  Modern courts have
generally summarized these historical justifications in five reasons:
(1) To prevent the escape of those whose indictment may be con-
templated; (2) to insure the utmost freedom to the grand jury in
its deliberations, and to prevent persons subject to indictment or
their friends from importuning the grand jurors; (3) to prevent
subornation of perjury or tampering with the witnesses who may
testify before the grand jury and later appear at the trials of those
indicted by it; (4) to encourage free and untrammeled disclosures
by persons who have information with respect to the commission of
crimes; (5) to protect the innocent accused who is exonerated
36
This analysis must be carried out in light of Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 6(e), which imposes no bond of secrecy on a grand jury
witness and allows him freely to disclose what has transpired during
his presence as a witness.3  Thus, the witness is allowed to disclose
30. See generally In re Grand Jury Witness Subpoenas, 370 F. Supp. 1282 (S.D.
Fla. 1974); In re Alvarez, 351 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
31. 542 F.2d at 894-95.
32. See text accompanying notes 37-42 infra.
33. See text accompanying notes 73-78 infra.
34. Under FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) the court has the power to order disclosure.
In re Minkoff, 349 F. Supp. 154, 155-57 (D.R.L 1972).
35. This analysis assumes, as was true in Bast, that the grand jury has already
been dismissed. "[Aifter the grand jury's functions are ended, disclosure is wholly
proper where the ends of justice require it." United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,
310 U.S. 150, 234 (1940).
36. United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681 n.6 (1958) (quoting
United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 628-29 (3d Cir. 1954)). These reasons were
first set out in United States v. Amazon Indus. Chem. Corp., 55 F.2d 254, 261 (D.
Md. 1931).
More recent discussions of these reasons for secrecy tend to combine reason (1)
with (3) as a single policy consideration. See In re Russo, 53 F.R.D. 564, 569 (C.D.
Cal.), aff'd, 448 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1971). See also 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2360,
at 734-35 (McNaughten rev. 1961).
37. See In re Disclosure of Evidence Before October, 1959 Grand Jury, 184 F.
Supp. 38 (E.D. Va. 1960).
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the very information of which he is trying to obtain a transcribed
copy.3
8
The grand jury's deliberation and vote are in total secrecy and dis-
closure of a witness' recorded testimony does not interfere with the
jurors' freedom. 39  Thus the second reason is inapposite. At first
blush, the first and third reasons seem persuasive, but, since the witness
is free to disclose all that he know, the "evil" is in the witness' freedom
to disclose, not in furnishing him with a transcript. The last justifi-
cation is perhaps the most persuasive, but again the witness' freedom
to disclose his own testimony makes production of a written copy no
more damaging to the grand jury's secrecy. Continued existence of
Rule 6(e) impliedly indicates that the innocent accused has not suf-
fered under this rule of disclosure.
The remaining justification for secrecy is to encourage free dis-
closure by grand jury witnesses without fear of retaliation. This ration-
ale is also inapplicable when the witness is seeking his own testimony.
If the witness has the right to disclose his own testimony, then
furnishing him with a recorded transcript in no way further violates the
* protection that he has essentially waived.
It is important to note that allowing a witness to obtain a recorded
copy of his testimony in no way forces him to divulge the contents of
his testimony. Existing practices that prevent disclosure of the witness'
testimony absent some "compelling necessity"40 are logically consistent
with disclosure to the witness, since the privilege of non-disclosure is
that of the witness himself.41 Thus the major distinction in Bast is that
the witness is seeking his own testimony, and in light of Rule 6(e)
none of the justifications for secrecy seem valid.42
The majority in Bast cited United States v. Procter & Gamble Co.
for the proposition that grand jury testimony will not be disclosed with-
out a showing of "particularized need. '43  An examination of the fac-
tual setting in Procter & Gamble indicates that the pronouncement may
38. It is evident from the fact that Rule 6(e) has been in effect for over 30 years
without substantial change that its policy of allowing a witness the freedom to disclose
his own testimony is sound and that freedom has not undermined the grand jury's effec-
tiveness. See In re Russo, 53 F.R.D. 564, 570-71 (C.D. Cal.), alf'd, 448 F.2d 369
i (9th Cir. 1971).
39. See Calkins, supra note 26, at 25.
., 40. See Arlington Glass Co. v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 24 F.R.D. 50, 52 (N.D.
II. 1959).
41. 8 J. WIGMOiE, supra note 36, § 2362, at 736.
42. See Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 872 n.18 (1966).
, 43. 542 F.2d at 895 (citing 356 U.S. at 681-82). In 1957, in Jencks v. United
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not be applicable in the Bast situation.44 Procter & Gamble involved
a defendant in a civil antitrust suit who sought discovery under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 34" of the entire grand jury transcript. The
Court, in denying defendant discovery, relied heavily upon one justifi-
cation of the rule of secrecy: "To encourage all witnesses to step
forward and testify freely without fear of retaliation. ' 46  In the context
States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957), a case dealing with a criminal defendant's right to review
secret FBI reports, the Court announced a broad policy of disclosure. 353 U.S. at
667-72. Because the language was so broad, many commentators interpreted this policy
to include grand jury testimony. Comment, supra note 1, at 812.
The next year the Court, in Procter & Gamble, retreated from this broad policy
and announced the "particularized need" test. See 356 U.S. at 681-82. The formulation
of this test was never clear. Justice Douglas listed examples of situations where particu-
larized need was shown, such as: (1) to impeach a trial witness, (2) to refresh a
trial witness' recollection and (3) to test credibility of a trial witness. Id. at 683. But
the Court failed to announce any specific criteria. Referring to the case at hand the
Court held that no compelling necessity had been shown "for wholesale . . . production
of a grand jury transcript," id. at 684, indicating that perhaps defendant's transgression
was to ask for too broad a discovery. Indeed, it should also be kept in mind that
the defendant was seeking discovery under FED. R. Civ. P. 34, which specifically requires
a showing of "good cause."
44. In the year following the Procter & Gamble decision the Court extended the
"particularized need" test to cover a criminal defendant's attempt to discover a trial
witness' grand jury testimony. In Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S.
395 (1958), the majority refused to allow disclosure over the strong dissent of four
Justices who felt that the majority had "exaltaed] the principle of secrecy for secrecy's
sake." Id. at 407. The dissenters in PPG were particularly disturbed by the majority's
reliance on Procter & Gamble as precedent, since in PPG defendant was seeking only
a particular portion of the grand jury testimony rather than the whole testimony. They
felt that the purpose of the "particularized need" test was to prevent "fishing expedi-
tions," not to deny defendant this type of legitimate access. See Comment, supra note
1, at 814.
The specific holding in PPG has been changed by statute. The 1970 amendment
to the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970) provides in part:
(b) After a witness called by the United States has testified on direct ex-
amination, the court shall, on motion of the defendant, order the United States
to produce any statement (as hereinafter defined) of the witness in the posses-
sion of the United States which relates to the subject matter as to which the
witness has testified.
(e) The term "statement," as used in subsection (b) . . .means-
(3) a statement, however taken or recorded, or a transcription
thereof, if any, made by said witness to a grand jury.
45. FED. R. Civ. P. 34 provides in part:
Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor and upon notice
to all other parties, and subject to the provisions of Rule 30(b), the court in
which an action is pending may (1) order any party to produce and permit
the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving
party, of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photo-
graphs, objects or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain
evidence relating to any of the matters within the scope of the examination
permitted by Rule 26(b) and which are in his possession, custody, or control
46. 356 U.S. at 682.
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of Procter & Gamble this protection of the witness by non-disclosure
may be valid.47 Providing a witness with his own testimony, however,
is not inconsistent with this policy.
The court of appeals ignored the most recent examination by the
Supreme Court of grand jury secrecy. In Dennis v. United States,
48
the Court reversed a criminal defendant's conviction and remanded for
a new trial because the trial court had refused defendant's request
seeking disclosure of grand jury testimony of four government
witnesses. 49  The trial court had based its denial on defendant's failure
to show "particularized need."," The majority, finding that defendant
had demonstrated a "particularized need,"'" recognized the long-estab-
lished policy of secrecy but emphasized "the growing realization that
disclosure, rather than suppression, of relevant materials ordinarily
promotes the proper administration of criminal justice." 52
The significance of Dennis is that for the first time the Supreme
Court took a pragmatic approach to the scope and intended purpose
of the secrecy doctrine. 53 The implication of Dennis seems to be that
the "particularized need" test of Procter & Gamble is simply a
balancing test, weighing the traditional reasons for secrecy against the
need for disclosure. 4 In fact, the Court seemed to be citing Procter
& Gamble as one in a line of cases in the trend of liberalizing disclosure
of grand jury testimony. 5 Thus, even under the "particularized need"
test, if there is no need for secrecy, the grand jury testimony should
be disclosed.56
47. In the Procter & Gamble context, where the grand jury testimony of a witness
is being sought by another person (there a defendant) at least reason (4) has some
validity. But see 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 36, § 2362, at 736.
48. 384 U.S. 855 (1966).
49. Id. at 875.
50. Id. at 868.
51. Id. at 872.
52. Id. at 870.
53. Calkins, supra note 26, at 32.
54. One commentator has argued that the factors that the Court in Dennis relied
on as supporting defendant's "particularized need" were so general and confusing as
seemingly to render the test a nullity. See Note, Impeaching the Prosecution Witness:
Access To Grand Jury Testimony, 28 U. Prr. L. REv. 338, 341-42 & n.21 (1966).
See also United States v. Projansky, 44 F.R.D. 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
In criticizing the majority's use of the "particularized need" test, the dissent in
PPG stated: "Grand jury secrecy is, of course, not an end in itself. Grand jury secrecy
is maintained to serve particular ends. But when secrecy will not serve those ends
or when the advantages gained by secrecy are outweighed by a countervailing interest
in disclosure, secrecy may and should be lifted . . . ." 360 U.S. at 403 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
55. 384 U.S. at 869-71.
56. "[W]hen once the reasons for a policy to be pursued no longer exist, certainly
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It is clear from recent developments in statutory law that the valid-
ity of this policy of liberalizing disclosure has been recognized. 7
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(A) provides in part:
"Upon request of a defendant the government shall permit the defen-
dant to inspect and copy or photograph . . . recorded testimony of the
defendant before a grand jury which relates to the offense charged."
It is clear from the 1975 amendment to Rule 16, which changed the
Rule's language from "the court may order" to "the government shall
permit," 18 that a defendant's right is not subject to the court's discre-
tion." Disclosure to the defendant of his-grand jury testimony is man-
dated by the growing recognition of the proper mode of criminal prose-
cution and by the recognition that providing a defendant with his own
testimony does not violate any of the traditional justifications for grand
jury secrecy. 60
The dissent in Bast argued that it follows a fortiori from Rule
16(a) (1) (A) that a voluntary witness has a right to a copy of his
own grand jury testimony.6' The analogy to 16(a) (1) (A) is convinc-
ing especially in light of the previous conclusion that secrecy has no
validity with respect to a witness' own testimony. The dissent felt that,
analogous to a defendant's right under Rule 16(a) (1) (A), a witness
was entitled to a transcript of his testimony as of right, absent a show-
ing by the government of compelling grounds for non-delivery.
2
Another recent extension of this liberalized disclosure policy is
seen in the 1970 amendment to the Jencks Act.03 This statute, passed
in response to the Supreme Court's decision in Jencks v. United
the requirement to pursue that policy ends." Atwell v. United States, 162 F. 97, 99
(4th Cir. 1908).
57. The majority in Bast saw FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(A) as a method by
which plaintiff could obtain his testimony if he was indicted. 542 F.2d at 897. No
analogy was drawn between a criminal defendant's rights under the rule and the rights
of plaintiff in this case.
58. Many courts interpreted the old language as implying that disclosure was dis-
cretionary. The change reflects the policy that, not only is a defendant's right to his
own testimony mandatory, but the defendant need not even seek court approval for
disclosure. See 1975 Comm. Note to FED. R. CRiM. P. 16.
59. For a case anticipating the non-discretionary nature of Rule 16(a) (1) (A) dis.
covery see United States v. Projansky, 44 F.R.D. 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
60. See 8 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 16.05[2], at n.20 (1976). See also
Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 871-72 & n.18 (1966).
61. 542 F.2d at 899 (Wyzanski, J., dissenting).
62. Id. "It is not suggested in the case at bar that the government has shown
or could show any extraordinary circumstances militating against disclosure .... Nor
is it indicated that ... plaintiff would be unwilling to meet his fair share of any ex-
pense already incurred or hereafter to be incurred." Id. at 897.
63. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970), quoted in note 44 supra.
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States,4 allows a criminal defendant to discover pretrial statements of
a witness after the witness has testified at trial. 5 The most significant
provision of the amendment broadens the scope of the defendant's dis-
covery to allow a witness' grand jury testimony to be discovered. 6 The
underlying policy is that once a grand jury witness testifies at trial there
is no longer any need for secrecy of his grand jury testimony, and the
possibility of inconsistencies because of perjury or the passing of time
militates for discovery.
This statutory development of liberalized disclosure in favor of the
criminal defendant and the lack of statutory provisions for disclosure
to the grand jury witness is not a rejection of the witness' concomitant
rights to discovery of his own testimony. It is merely a recognition of
the urgent need for expanding the rights of the criminal defendant,
especially in light of the reluctance that the courts have traditionally
displayed.1
7
Implicit in the disclosure policies of Rule 16(a)(1)(A) and the
Jencks Act, as well as in a witness' request for a transcript of his grand
jury testimony, is the assumption that such a transcript exists. Presently,
there is no requirement that testimony before a federal grand jury be
recorded verbatim. 8  Acknowledged to be the "better procedure,"69
it is argued by commentators that recording should be made manda-
tory.70 Failure to record circumvents the usefulness of statutory dis-
covery procedures 71 such as Rule 16(a)(1)(A) and the Jencks Act
as well as the benefits flowing from disclosure to the witness.
72
It is perhaps not enough to say that there is merely no valid justifi-
cation for non-disclosure of a witness' testimony. It is clear, though,
that disclosure aids the criminal process in several ways. Some of
these reasons were expounded in Judge Ferguson's opinion in In re
Russo, 73 a case involving the right of a grand jury witness to condition
64. 353 U.S. 657 (1957)..
65. The pre-1970 Act did not include a witness' grand jury testimony. See Pitts-
burgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 398 (1959).
66. See note 44 supra.
67. See Comment, supra note 1, at 816.
68. See 8 J. Mooan, supra note 60, at M 6.02[2][d] n.24.
69. United States v. Cramer, 447 F.2d 210, 214 (2d Cir. 1971).
70. See 8 J. MooRE, supra note 60, at 6.02[2][d] nn.24 & 24.1. See also Com-
ment, supra note 1, at 821.
71. See the dissent in United States v. Cramer, 447 F.2d at 223.
72. See text accompanying notes 73-77 supra.
73. 53 F.R.D. 564 (C.D. Cal.), aff'd, 448 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1971).
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his testimony on receiving a transcribed copy afterwards.7 4 Judge
Ferguson felt that a written transcript would insure that the witness'
attorney was provided with an accurate record of the proceedings.7 5  A
written transcript would also minimize the possibility of the witness'
publicizing false information regarding the grand jury proceedings.'"
Judge Ferguson was especially impressed by the opportunity a written
transcript would give the witness and his attorney to correct errors in
the transcript or inadvertent mistakes in the testimony itself.7   After
examining the traditional justifications for secrecy, in the light of Rule
6, and finding none of them applicable when a witness seeks his own
testimony, Judge Ferguson held that a witness could obtain a copy
of his testimony upon "show[ing] only that his testimony was recorded
and a transcript could be made.
78
Jurisprudential thought has progressed substantially from Learned
Hand's pronouncement, in United States v. Garsson, that "the accused
74. The case involved the grand jury testimony of Anthony Russo concerning his
connection with the Pentagon Papers episode. Russo was subpoenaed to appear before
the grand jury but refused, claiming a privilege against self-incrimination. At the gov-
ernment's request, the district court granted him immunity, but Russo still refused to
testify. He was then held in contempt and committed to custody.
The litigation in Russo involved Russo's motion to submit to grand jury questioning
if a copy of his testimony were supplied to him. The district court had approved Russo's
motion, but after testifying, he was refused a transcript. Although the question raised
was whether the court had "the power to purge the witness of civil contempt of court
by accepting his promise to testify if he is furnished a transcript of his testimony,"
53 F.R.D. at 566, Judge Ferguson considered the issue of whether a grand jury witness
had any right to a transcript of his testimony and held that he did. Id. at 572.
75. 53 F.R.D. at 571. Disclosure not only assures that errors in transcripts can
be detected but also gives the witness' attorney an opportunity to discover governmental
excesses. See Comment, supra note 1, at 819.
See also Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1972), in which the
court held that a grand jury witness could obtain a copy of his testimony in order
to protect him from repetitious questions, unless the government could show "some par-
ticularized and substantial reason why this should not be allowed." Id. at 1080.
76. The opposite side of this coin was presented in Bast, where the witness wanted
a copy of the testimony to counter rumors that he was a government informer. See
542 F.2d at 894.
77. 53 F.R.D. at 571. As Judge Ferguson said:
Any attorney who has ever undertaken the laborious process of deposing
witnesses knows how errors and mistakes creep into the reporter's transcript.
Any trial judge who has had to determine motions to correct transcripts knows
that mistakes are made and how vitally important it is that they be corrected
immediately when the testimony is still fresh in the minds of the court, counsel
and witnesses.
Id. at 571-72.
The dissent in Bast also cited correction of errors as a motivation for disclosure,
542 F.2d at 898. This motivation does not require any showing of actual mistake or
even probability of actual mistake.
78. 53 F.R.D. at 572. See also In re Craven, 13 Cium. L. REP. (BNA) 2100
(N.D. Cal. 1973).
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has every advantage." 9  The development of the defendant's rights
to discovery have included substantial rights to examine heretofore
secret grand jury testimony. Unfortunately, concomitant rights of
the grand jury witness have not developed as rapidly. Too often
the courts, in denying the witness a copy of his own grand jury
testimony, refuse to examine the present validity of the "historical"
justifications for grand jury secrecy. Such an examination leads inex-
orably to the conclusion that these justifications are not viable where
the witness is seeking his own testimony, and that the benefits of dis-
closure mandate it as of right.
ALAN A. HARLEY
Labor Law-Application of Right-To-Work Laws in Multistate
Workforce Situations
Sections 8(a)(3) 1 and 14(b)2 of the Labor Management Rela-
tions (Taft-Hartley) Act' provide that union4 -and agency 5 shop agree-
79. 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
1. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1970). This section provides in part:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for any employer-
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in
any labor organization: Provided, That nothing in this subchapter, or in any
other statute of the United States, shall preclude an employer from making
an agreement with a labor organization . . . to require as a condition of
employment membership therein on or after the thirtieth day following the
beginning of such employment or the effective date of such agreement,
whichever is the later ....
2. 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1970). This section provides: "Nothing in this subchap-
ter shall be construed as authorizing the execution or application of agreements requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment in any State or
Territory in which such execution or application is prohibited by State or Territorial
Law."
3. Act of June 23, 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187
(1970)).
4. Section 8(a) (3), passed in 194-7 as a reaction to widespread abuses of closed
shop agreements originally allowed under § 8(3) of the National Labor Relations Act,
Act of July 5, 1935, ch. 372, sec. 8(3), 49 Stat. 452, bans the closed shop in industries
covered by federal labor law, but continues to permit union shops subject to § 14(b).
The union shop requires the employee to join the union within a specified time after
hiring, whereas the closed shop requires union membership as a prerequisite to both
initial and continued employment.
5. It is well settled that § 14(b) applies to the agency shop as well as the union
shop agreement. See Retail Clerks Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746 (1963).
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ments are valid except when they conflict with a state's right-to-work
law.' Congress, by its passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, chose not to
establish a uniform national rule allowing the union shop, and left the
states free to pursue more restrictive policies concerning union security
agreements.' However, "the language of § 14(b) provides no clear
guidance for determining" which, if any, state's law "should prevail in
a multijurisdictional situation."8 In a case of first impression, Oil,
Chemical & Atomic Workers Union v. Mobil Oil Corp.,' the United
States Supreme Court held that the employees' predominant job situs
is the controlling factor in determining which state is empowered to
prohibit agreements requiring union membership as a condition of em-
ployment. 10
Mobil Oil Corporation Marine Transportation Department, Gulf-
East Coast Operations (Company), is headquartered in Beaumont,
Texas, from which it operates a fleet of eight ocean-going oil tankers. 1
The Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, AFL-CIO,
with its Local 8-801 (Union), is the exclusive collective bargaining re-
presentative of 289 unlicensed seamen who man the Company's
Under the agency shop, union membership is not a condition of continued employment;
in lieu of such membership, however, employees are required to pay union dues and
initiation fees as if they were members. The agency shop agreement was designed to
curb the abuses of compulsory unionism while at the same time preventing "free riders"
who benefited from union representation without having to pay union dues. S. REP. No.
105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE-
LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947, at 407 (1948).
6. See generally Morgan, Right-to-Work Laws: The Current State of Affairs, 23
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 570 (1972); Skinner, Legal and Historical Background of the
Right-to-Work Dispute, 9 LAB. L.J. 411 (1958).
7. See Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd.,
336 U.S. 301, 313-14 (1949). Section 14(b) "was designed to prevent other sections of
the Act from completely extinguishing state power over certain union-security
arrangements. . . . It was desired to 'make certain' that § 8(a) (3) could not 'be said to
authorize arrangements of this sort in States where such arrangements were contrary to
the State policy.'" Retail Clerks Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 751 (1963)
(quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 60 (1947)). "By [the
enactment of § 14(b)], Congress has not only authorized multiformity on [union
security agreements], but practically guaranteed it." Motor Coach Employees v. Lock-
ridge, 403 U.S. 274, 317 (1971) (White, J., dissenting). "There is . . .conflict between
state and federal law; but it is a conflict sanctioned by Congress with directions to give
the right of way to state laws .... " Retail Clerks Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375
U.S. 96, 103 (1963).
8. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Union v. Mobil Oil Corp., 96 S. Ct. 2140, 2151
(1976).
9. 96 S. Ct. 2140 (1976).
10. Id. at 2144.
11. Id. at 2143. Additionally, all personnel records are maintained in Beaumont,
and all final hiring decisions are made there. Id.
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tankers. 12  These seamen perform all of their duties aboard ship, and
eighty to ninety percent of their work is performed while the ships are
on the high seas, outside the territorial bounds of Texas. 3
In 1969 the Company and the Union entered into a collective bar-
gaining agreement that contained an agency shop clause.14  This clause
compelled all employees to decide within thirty-one days from the date
of employment either. to join the union or pay the regular union dues
and initiation fees. 15 In 1971 the Company initiated a declaratory
judgment action under section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act' " to deter-
mine the validity of the agency shop clause. The Company contended
that the clause violated the Texas right-to-work laws and was, there-
fore, void and unenforceable. 17  In response, the Union asserted that
the job situs of the seamen was predominantly on the high seas, outside
the State's territorial bounds, and that the Texas right-to-work laws
should not be applied to the union security provision.' 8
The district court, after a full evidentiary hearing, found that
Texas was more closely connected with the company/seamen employ-
ment relationship than any other state, and, therefore, Texas law ap-
12. Id. at 2142 n.3, 2143. Of the 289 seamen in question, 123 were residents of
Texas and 60 were residents of New York. The others were spread over 21 states. Sixty
percent of the workers applied for their jobs in Beaumont and forty percent applied in
New York. Beaumont, New York City and Providence, R.I., comprised the three cities
designated by the seamen as "home port," but this designation was used solely for
determining travel allowances to and from their residences. Id. at 2143.
13. Id. The seamen have the option of drawing their wages aboard ship, having
allotments sent from Beaumont to designated payees, or both. Id.
14. Id. at 2142-43. The collective bargaining agreement was negotiated and
executed in New York and was re-executed in Texas. Id. at 2143.
15. Id. at 2143; see note 5 supra.
16. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
17. 96 S. Ct. at 2143. It was conceded by the parties that Texas law forbids both
union shop and agency shop agreements. Id. The following statutes are in point:
It shall be unlawful for any labor union, any labor organizer, any officer,
any agent or representative or any member of any labor union to collect, re-
ceive or demand, directly or indirectly, any fee, assessment, or sum of money
whatsoever, as a work permit or as a condition for the privilege to work from
any person not a member of the union ....
TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5154a, § 8a (1971);
It is hereby declared to be the public policy of the State of Texas that
the right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged on account of
membership or nonmembership in any labor union or labor organization and
that in the exercise of such rights all persons shall be free from threats, force,
intimidation or coercion.
Id. art. 5154g, § 1;
"No person shall be denied employment on account of membership or nonmember-
ship in a labor union." Id. art. 5207a, § 2.
In addition, the Texas Attorney General has decided that union shop agreements
violate the above statutes. Op. ATr'Y GEN. TEx. No. WW-1018 (March 14, 1961).
18. 96 S. Ct. at 2144.
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plied to terms of the collective bargaining agreement.19 Accordingly,
the court declared that the agency shop clause was invalid in contra-
vention of the Texas right-to-work laws. A three-member panel of the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed.20 On rehearing en
banc,2 ' however, the full court vacated the panel's decision and held
that Texas law was applicable despite the fact that the employees' job
situs was on the high seas.22
The Supreme Court reversed. Writing for a majority of five,23
Justice Marshall stated that section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act does
not authorize the operation of a state's right-to-work laws to void a
union security agreement, permitted under section 8(a)(3), when the
employees' job situs is located outside the state having such laws.24
The Court concluded that since the employees' predominant job situs
was on the high seas, Texas' right-to-work laws could not apply to the
agency shop provision.2 5
19. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Union, 81 L.R.R.M. 2051,
2052 (E.D. Tex. 1972).
20. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Union, 483 F.2d 603 (5th
Cir. 1973), noted in 11 Hous. L. REv. 709 (1974). The panel was divided with Judge
Thornberry dissenting. The majority emphasized the predominant importance of the
employees' job situs. Since state right-to-work laws can only apply to employees of that
particular state and since the seamen's principal place of employment was on the high
seas, the majority concluded that the seamen were not employees of Texas or any other
state for the purposes of the collective bargaining agreement and, therefore, that state
right-to-work laws could not apply. 483 F.2d at 610.
21. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Union, 504 F.2d 272 (5th
Cir. 1974) (en banc), noted in 88 HARv. L. REV. 1620 (1975) and 44 U. CIN. L. Rgv.
384 (1975). Judge Thornberry wrote for the majority in an eight to six decision. Judge
Ainsworth wrote a dissenting opinion, and Chief Judge Brown wrote a separate dissent.
Brown, joined by Judge Dyer, stated that the case should rest in the primary jurisdiction
of the NLRB. 504 F.2d at 287-89.
22. 504 F.2d at 275. After a careful analysis of the relevant contacts that Texas
had with the seamen in question and the purposes of the Taft-Hartley Act, the court
held that "the federal labor legislation, the predominance of Texas contacts over any
other jurisdiction, and the significant interest which Texas has in applying its right-to-
work law to this employment relationship warrant application of the Texas law and,
consequently, invalidation of the agency shop provision." Id.
23. Justice Stevens joined the majority except for the suggestion that federal policy
favors permitting union security agreements. 96 S. Ct. at 2147-48. Chief Justice Burger
concurred in the majority's judgment, id. at 2147, as did Justice Powell. Powell,
however, stated in a separate opinion that the job situs test is neither appropriate nor
required. He felt that seamen, as wards of admiralty, maintain a special status with
respect to the regulation and control of their employment, and that they should be
exempt from the operation of § 14(b). Id. at 2148; see text accompanying notes 51 &
52 infra. Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissented, stating that the place of
hiring is a more appropriate test in determining the choice of law for union security
agreements. Id. at 2148-55; see text accompanying note 33 infra.
24. 96 S. Ct. at 2144. The Court held that "it is the employees' predominant job
situs rather than a generalized weighing of factors or the place of hiring that triggers the
operation of section 14(b)." Id.
25. Id. at 2147. The Court emphatically concluded that if the employees' predomi-
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To reach this result without any explicit statutory basis, the major-
ity relied first upon its statutory interpretation of section 14(b) as it
applies to section 8(a)(3). To the Court, section 8(a)(3), in dealing
with union and agency shop agreements, directly relates to post-hiring
conditions, both in "effect and purpose."26  The Court reasoned that
section 14(b) is simply a reflection of section 8(a)(3) in that the
former section focuses on state regulation of the post-hiring employ-
ment relationship, the center of which is the job situs. 27  Additionally,
the majority ascertained from the legislative history to the Taft-Hartley
Act a congressional intent that the job situs was of central concern to
section 14(b).28
The Court was impressed by two practical considerations for the
use of the job situs test. First, it concluded that the test minimized
"the possibility of patently anomalous extra-territorial applications of
any given State's right-to-work laws."29 Secondly, the job situs test was
nant job situs is outside the bounds of any state, then no state has "sufficient interest" in
the employment relationship to be able to apply its own right-to-work laws. Id. This
conclusion effectively excludes all seamen in the maritime industry from state right-to-
work laws. Although the Court stated that under this test it has not created an
exemption for the entire maritime industry (e.g., longshoremen and other workers whose
job situs is still ashore), id., it has done judicially for the majority of maritime workers
what the 1951 Railway Labor Act Amendment, 45 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1970), did
legislatively for railway and airline workers, that amendment having exempted rail and
air transport unions from stace right-to-work laws. By the mere fact that the Court
settled on the job situs test, rather than a substantial contacts or place-of-hiring test, it
excluded the operation of § 14(b) from the mobile maritime industry, for under the
other tests state right-to-work laws would be allowed to extend out on the high seas.
26. 96 S. Ct. at 2145. This view is contrary to that of Judge Thornberry in his
opinion for the Fifth Circuit, 504 F.2d at 277, and to that of Justice Stewart in the
Supreme Court dissent, 96 S. Ct. at 2153, both of which saw the emphasis on the hiring
process itself. The Court here properly concluded that the abuses of the hiring process
were eliminated with the outlawing of the closed shop and with it, the hiring hall, and
that, therefore, Congress' concern over the hiring process was exhausted upon its passage
of § 8(a) (3). Id. at 2144-45; see note 1 supra. The focus is no longer on the hiring
process but on conditions to be imposed upon an employee only after he is hired. See S.
REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947, at 407 (1948). See also
NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 740-41 (1963). The post-hiring
conditions concern the benefits to be gained by union representation during the employ-
ment period, while the worker is on the job. 96 S. Ct. at 2145.
27. 96 S. Ct. at 2146. The Court emphasized the importance of the job situs to
the employment relationship in describing it as that "place where the work that is the
very raison d'etre of the relationship is performed." Id.
28. Id. The House Committee Report on the Taft-Hartley Bill concluded that
union or agency shop agreements would be valid "only if they are valid under the laws of
any State in which they are to be performed." H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
34 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS AcT, 1947, at 325 (1948). The Court held that union security agreements
are "performed" on the job situs. 96 S. Ct. at 2146.
29. 96 S. Ct. at 2146.
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recognized as facilitating the determination of the validity of a union
security agreement by parties who are in the collective bargaining pro-
cess.
3 0
In his dissent, Justice Stewart, on the other hand, felt that the
place of hiring is the critical factor in the analysis of the choice of state
law." He buttressed this position with the conclusions: (1) the legis-
lative intent of the Texas right-to-work laws focused on the hiring pro-
cess;32 (2) the state of the place of hiring is most deeply concerned
with the conditions of hire; and (3) the state of the place of hiring
normally provides the largest portion of the workforce.
3 3
Although the Supreme Court majority in Mobil presented a
tenable argument that Congress in 1947 intended for the job situs to
be the focal concern of the operation of section 14(b), the dissent pre-
sented an equally plausible argument that Congress simply neglected
to confront the choice of law problems in multistate workforce situa-
tions. Hence, reliance on the language of the statute and legislative
history of section 14(b) as an approach to this issue results in tenuous
legal conclusions at best. Therefore, the determination of which test
to apply is better understood in light of the historical background and
practical considerations that underlie the right-to-work controversy.
The National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (Wagner Act),34
through the legalization of union security agreements, especially the
30. Id. at 2146-47.
31. Id. at 2152-53.
32. Id. at 2152. Finding no guidance from the language or legislative history of §
14(b), the dissent turned to the Texas statutes for assistance, weakly rationalizing that
since § 14(b) allowed the individual states to prohibit union security agreements in
accordance with their own state's policy, an analysis of Texas' policy concerning such
agreements could shed light on how § 14(b) should be applied. Id. at 2152-53. Just
because Texas right-to-work laws reflect a state concern over the hiring process,
however, one cannot infer that all other states with right-to-work laws enacted them
primarily because of the same concern. It appears to be arbitrary and capricious to
impose upon all states a test that merely reflects one state's purpose in enacting its own
right-to-work laws and to ignore the many and varied policies of the other right-to-work
states. Otherwise, to allow the dissent's approach would be to narrow this decision to
the application of Texas right-to-work laws only. Accordingly, the Court would subse-
quently have to analyze the right-to-work policies of every other state with a right-to-
work law and formulate a test for each state in accordance with those policies. Needless
to say, there could be as many tests as states, and the result would be an unworkable
mixture of conflicting state policies being applied in a criss-cross fashion over the entire
nation.
33. Id. at 2153. The dissent seems to have misinterpreted the Texas statutes as
even applying to the hiring process, for concern over the hiring process as controlled by
union security agreement was eliminated with the banning of the closed shop. Right-
to-work laws reflect concern over conditions of employment after hiring. See note 26
supra.
34. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1970).
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closed shop, increased tremendously the power of labor unions at the
expense of management by allowing the unions to control the hiring
process. 5 By 1947, Congress felt that this authority had created an
overshifting of power in labor's favor and that a necessary realignment
should be imposed upon union/management relations in order to read-
just this imbalance.3 6 As a result, Congress passed the Taft-Hartley
Act, which specifically outlawed the closed shop and, through the con-
troversial section 14(b), allowed the individual states to outlaw all
other forms of union security agreements.3 7  The passage of the Taft-
Hartley Act, viewed by the labor unions as a large set-back to their
movement, 3 created the impetus for the current right-to-work contro-
versy.
39
Debate on the right-to-work laws has flourished ever since.
40
Proponents of these laws bridle at the thought of compulsory union
membership. 41 The fact that federal labor policy42 allows for fifty-one
percent of the employees in an employment relationship to impose
union membership upon the remaining forty-nine percent without the
latter's consent raises for right-to-work proponents an emotional issue
primarily based on morality and individual freedom. 43  Opponents of
these laws argue that without the authority to make union security
35. See also Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (pt.
1I), 61 HARV. L. REV. 291 (1948); Skinner, supra note 6, at 416.
36. 96 S. Ct. at 2150; see S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1947),
reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
ACT, 1947, at 407 (1948). See also notes 4 & 26 supra.
37. See notes 2 & 5 supra.
38. See generally Cox, supra note 35, at 296; Pollitt, Right to Work Law Issues:
An Evidentiary Approach, 37 N.C.L. REv. 233, 242 (1959).
39. See notes 6 & 7 supra. In fact, the nation's first right-to-work law was passed
in Florida in 1944, three years before the Taft-Hartley Act. FLA. CONST. OF 1885,
Declaration of Rights, § 12 (1944) (now FLA. CONST. art. I, § 6). The constitutionality
of the right-to-work law was sustained by the Supreme Court in Lincoln Fed. Labor
Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949), and AFL v. American
Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538 (1949). In Lincoln Federal the Court stated, "States
have the power to legislate against what are found to be injurious practices in their
internal commercial and business affairs, so long as their laws do not run afoul of a
federal constitutional prohibition or federal law." 335 U.S. at 536.
40. See generally Cox, supra note 35; Dempsey, The Right-to-Work Controversy,
16 LAB. L.J. 387 (1965); Eissinger, The Right-to-Work Imbroglio, 51 N.D.L. REV. 571
(1975); Morgan, supra note 6; Pollitt, supra note 38; Skinner, supra note 6; Warshal,
"Right-to-Work," Pro and Con, 17 LAB. L.J. 131 (1966). Eleven years after the
enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act, one index contained 23 typewritten pages on articles
dealing with the right-to-work issue. See Hutchinson & Patterson, List of Publications
on the Right-to-Work Question (1958), cited in Pollitt, supra note 38, at 234.
41. Eissinger, supra note 40, at 575.
42. See NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967).
43. See Pollitt, supra note 38, at 264.
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agreements, unions become ineffective and unable to represent prop-
erly their members because of a dilution of their economic strength and
power base.
44
With the passage of section 14(b), Congress determined not to
force a uniform union security policy upon the states, but to allow each
state to enact laws to reflect its own policy."5 Under the authority of
section 14(b), nineteen states46 have enacted right-to-work laws with
the power to interpret and enforce union and agency shop restrictions
within their own jurisdictions.47 Yet until Mobil no case had discussed
the applicability of a state's right-to-work laws when the situs at which
all the employees covered by a union security agreement performed
the bulk of their work was located outside the state having such laws. 48
An analysis of the Court's selection of the job situs test as opposed to
a "place of hiring" or a "substantial contacts" test49 results in a realiza-
tion that the job situs test is the only practical solution to this right-
to-work issue if the national labor policy,"0 as legislatively enacted, is
to continue as intended.
44. See id. at 266. The issue is seen as a "conflict . . . between labor's right to
organize, solidify its strength and preserve the group interest [and] the individual
worker's right to obtain and keep his job. . . unfettered by organizational entanglements
he may not want." Eissinger, supra note 40, at 575.
45. See note 7 supra.
46. Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Mississippi,
Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming. Four states-Delaware, New Hamp-
shire, Maine, and Indiana-passed and then repealed right-to-work laws. Twenty states
have specifically rejected them. Louisiana's law pertains only to agricultural workers.
Two states, Colorado and Wisconsin, allow union security agreements; however, they
have enacted regulatory laws over such agreements. See Morgan, supra note 6, at 572-
575; Skinner, supra note 6, at 419.
47. See Retail Clerks Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96 (1963); Retail
Clerks Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746 (1963); NLRB v. General Motors
Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963).
48. The cases that can be labelled closest to precedent on this issue were decided
under § 9(e)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 159(e)(1) (1970), which requires the NLRB to supervise
employee elections to authorize the negotiation of union security agreements. In Giant
Food Shopping Center, Inc., 77 N.L.R.B. 791 (1948), and Western Elec. Co., 84
N.L.R.B. 1019 (1949), the Board held that the job situs at the time of the election
determines which state law applies to multistate workers, and that a state's laws out-
lawing such agreements could not apply to workers whose job situs was in another
state. See note 65 infra.
49. In addition to the dissent's place of hiring test and the Fifth Circuit's substan-
tial contacts test, other discussed solutions besides the job situs test were: (a) maritime
exemption for seamen, supported both by Justice Powell, 96 S. Ct. 2148; see note 23
supra, and Judge Ainsworth in his dissent, Mobil Oil Corp. v. Oil, Chem. & Atomic
Workers Union, 504 F.2d 272, 282 (5th Cir. 1974); (b) the laws of the state where the
bargaining agreement was negotiated, 96 S. Ct. at 2153 (dissent); see note 62 infra; and
(c) the laws of both places of hire, in this case, Texas and New York. See 88 HARv. L.
REV. 1620, 1629-30 (1975). See also note 62 infra.
50. See text accompanying note 42 supra.
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Although Mobil involved a labor dispute in a maritime work en-
vironment, the maritime element was merely secondary to a broader
issue. Primarily at issue was the application of a state's right-to-work
laws on an employment relationship involving workers who perform
their jobs outside the bounds of that state. The job situs test relied
upon by the Court is applicable to both terrestrial and maritime labor
relations. An approach to this case solely on the maritime issue, as
advocated by Justice Powell in his concurring opinion,51 would have
affected the maritime industry in exactly the same manner as the ma-
jority's decision, 52 but it would have done no more. The Mobil major-
ity did not view the case as a decision concerning the imposition of state
laws in the maritime field only, and the absence of discussion related
to maritime law in the majority's decision is relevant in appreciating
their expanded view of the problem.
This broad perspective53 places heavy emphasis on the policies
and purposes of the national labor laws, which allow for conflicting
policies among the states concerning the applicability of right-to-work
laws within each state. 54 Because the right-to-work law greatly affects
conditions of employment among the workers in a state, this national
policy can be interpreted to express the importance for each state to
have the power to control employment conditions according to its view
of its own commercial and business affairs. If the federal government
fully recognizes state authority to legislate right-to-work laws, 5 it fol-
lows that state governments are also required to recognize another
state's authority in this area.
The job situs test is the only one of the proposed tests that
fully recognizes state jurisdiction over union membership as a condition
of employment within state boundaries. Before Mobil, the nineteen
states with right-to-work laws had the power to enforce them within their
own boundaries.5" The remaining thirty-one states either favored or
allowed under certain conditions the formation of union security agree-
51. 96 S. Ct. at 2148; see notes 23 & 49 supra.
52. Under Justice Powell's approach, the seamen would be placed in an exceptional
status, under the regulation of federal statutory and admiralty law removed from the
operation of § 14(b). The practical result is that union and agency shop agreements
would be permissible, which is the same result reached by the majority. See note 25
and accompanying text supra.
53. Both the Supreme Court dissent, 96 S. Ct. at 2148, 2150-55, and the court of
appeals, 504 F.2d at 274-82, viewed the issue from this broader perspective.
54. See note 7 supra.
55. The only exception to this is the Railway Labor Act. See note 25 supra.
56. See generally Morgan, supra note 6, at 572-73; Skinner, supra note 6, at
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ments within their territorial bounds.5" No state had imposed its right-
to-work law on a non-right-to-work state. After Mobil, with a job situs
test for multistate workforce situations, the same nineteen states can
apply their right-to-work laws to employment relationships with pre-
dominant job sites within their territorial bounds, and the same thirty-
one states without right-to-work laws cannot be affected by the right-
to-work laws of the other nineteen. With this test, right-to-work laws
cannot be forced upon employee-employer relationships in states that,
under section 8(a)(3), have permitted the existence of union and
agency shop agreements. This result appears to be a rational con-
clusion of congressional intent reflected in sections 8(a)(3) and 14(b)
of the Taft-Hartley Act.
Not only does the job situs test maintain the intent of the national
labor policy, but also it provides for certainty in application of the law.5 8
If the predominant job situs is located within a particular state, that
state's laws on union security agreements will apply. This predictabil-
ity of law allows collective bargaining parties to determine in advance
whether a union security agreement will be permitted to cover employ-
ees at a certain job situs.5"
The place of hiring test advocated by the Supreme Court dissent
is at least equally certain of application.10 If this test were to be ap-
plied, however, it is conceivable that the right-to-work states, if they
were the places of hiring, could impose their right-to-work laws on all
the other non-right-to-work states.6 The place of hiring test could in-
duce employers to forum shop to establish their place of hiring in a
right-to-work state."2 In effect, this test would defeat the purpose of
section 14(b) to allow the states to govern union security agreements
57. See Morgan, supra note 6, at 572; Skinner, supra note 6, at 419.
58. 96 S. Ct. at 2146-47.
59. Id. at 2147.
60. See note 32 supra, however, for a criticism of the dissent's rationale in reaching
this test as one to be applied uniformly to all union security agreements regardless of the
state.
61. 96 S. Ct. at 2146.
62. Id. The dissent claims that there is nothing illegal or unethical about a
company's relocating to seek more favorable labor laws, 96 S. Ct. at 2153 n.10; however,
in criticizing a test based upon the state where the bargaining agreement was negotiated,
the dissent attacks it as one that would encourage forum shopping. 96 S. Ct. at 2153.
Admittedly, a corporate relocation entails a much greater burden than the selection of a
site to negotiate a new employment contract; yet, the dissent still appears to condone
forum shopping in support of the place of hiring test while attacking it in criticizing an
opposing test. Id. Also, a company could legitimately locate its place of hiring
separately from its corporate location with very little burden and without taint of evasion
of labor laws.
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since the employer, by its choice of place of hiring, could govern which
state's laws would control its employment relationships regardless of the
job situs. Forum shopping under the job situs test would be a useless
procedure, for regardless of the employer's forum, its employees would
be subject to the laws of the state of their job situs.
Application of the place of hiring test would also create the ques-
tion of which state law should apply to the employment relationship
upon a change of the place of hiring.13  Such a change, if made be-
tween a right-to-work state and a non-right-to-work state, "could easily
disrupt the management of labor relations and would create unjustifi-
able uncertainties in the law."' 64  Such disruptions, as a result of the
place of hiring test, would definitely not promote "[ihe goal of na-
tional labor policy, [which] is to promote industrial peace and stabil-
ity."05
The Fifth Circuit's substantial contacts test, with its weighing of
factors approach, " provides for a more flexible resolution of this issue
63. For example, if employees were hired in Maryland to work predominantly at a
Virginia job site, they would be bound, under the place of hiring test, by their union shop
agreement despite Virginia's right-to-work laws. If the employer then changed its place
of hiring to Virginia, a determination would have to be made on whether the place of the
employees' actual hiring or the new location of the hiring office would be the controlling
factor on which state's law applied. Under the former alternative, the union shop could
continue to exist even when Maryland no longer had any interest in the employment
relationship. Additionally, any new employees would be hired in Virginia subject to
Virginia right-to-work laws and would be working alongside employees compelled by
Maryland law to have joined the union. Under the latter alternative, with the abrupt
change of the place of hiring, the union shop agreement would be abolished, an event
that would also create problems for management of labor relations in addition to distrust
and uncertainty between collective bargaining parties over the formation of union
security agreements.
64. 96 S. Ct. at 2153 n.9 (dissent). The dissenters argue against this frictional
situation in opposing a solution that would allow the law of more than one state to apply
to union security agreements. For the solution they were opposing, see 88 HARv. L.
REV. 1620 (1975).
65. Eissinger, supra note 40, at 593. The Mobil decision covers only the situation
where all of the employees under a union security agreement perform most of their work
outside a state having right-to-work laws. 96 S. Ct. at 2144. In this manner the Court
has assured that uniformity of laws will exist for all of the employees of the collective
bargaining unit, a result that aids in the peace and stability of labor relations.
A collective bargaining unit consisting of employees, some who work in a right-to-
work state and others who work in a non-right-to-work state, cannot practically all be
subject to one union security agreement. A possible solution to this dilemma facing the
union that desires to organize under such an agreement is to create smaller bargaining
units to encompass those areas whose right-to-work laws are similar in purpose and
application. This approach was suggested under a different fact situation by the NLRB.
See note 48 supra. The majority in Mobil noted that their job situs test was consistent
with that of the NLRB's construction of the application of § 14(b) under § 9(e)(1) of
the Wagner Act. 96 S. Ct. at 2147 n.11.
66. See note 22 supra.
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than the rigid job situs test; and concededly, the substantial contacts
test could often produce results parallel to those of the job situs test."
Despite its favorable points, however, the substantial contacts approach
is hampered by the uncertainty of the identification and balancing of
factors in each employment relationship.' 8 Such uncertainty gives rise
to an unpredictability in the determination of the validity of proposed
union security provisions. For this reason, reliance on the job situs
standard, with its certainty of application, is more desirable, since it en-
ables collective bargaining parties to know in advance what laws will
apply to their employment relationship.
Despite its practicality, the job situs test cannot possibly cover
every conceivable employment relationship, and even when the stand-
ard is utilized, courts may be called upon to determine which job situs
in an employment relationship is the predominant one. In some situa-
tions, courts may conclude that no job situs is so predominant as to be
the controlling factor in the determination of state right-to-work law
applications, and therefore, some reliance on a substantial contacts ap-
proach may be necessary. As long as right-to-work laws remain valid,
however, the job situs test represents the best practical solution that
recognizes the intent of the Taft-Hartley Act and the national labor
policy to deal with multistate workforce situations.
JONATHAN ADAMS BARRETT
Labor Law-J.P. Stevens: Searching for a Remedy To Fit the
Wrong
The stated purpose and policy of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA or Act)' is to prescribe the rights of employees and employers
in their interactions and to encourage the collective bargaining
process.2  Section 7 of the NLRA3 guarantees to employees the right
67. The Supreme Court majority conceded this possibility in its criticism of the
substantial contacts approach. See 96 S. Ct. at 2147.
68. Id.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
2. Id. § 151.
3. Id. § 157.
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to organize themselves, to form, join or assist labor organizations, or
to refrain from such activities. In a determined campaign to prevent
or forestall unionization of its Southern plants, the J.P. Stevens
Company has effectively negated these purposes, policies and guaran-
tees. This campaign has involved numerous flagrant unfair labor
practices, including coercive interrogation of union adherents, 4 surveil-
lance of union organizers, 5 appeals to racial animosities,6 threats of
plant closings,7 and economic reprisals such as extensive discriminatory
discharges.8 Neither fifteen adverse National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB or Board) decisions, most of which have been enforced by
circuit courts of appeals,9 nor two contempt orders, issued by the
4. See, e.g., J.P. Stevens & Co. [Stevens l], 163 N.L.R.B. 217, 218, enforced
as modified sub nom. Textile Workers Union v. NLRB, 388 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 836 (1968).
5. See, e.g., J.P. Stevens & Co. [Stevens 1], 157 N.L.R.B. 869, 923 (1966), en-
forced as modified, 380 F.2d 292 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1005 (1967).
6. See Oversight Hearings on the National Labor Relations Act Before the Sub-
comm. on Labor-Management Relations of the House Comm. on Education and Labor,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 181 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1976 Hearings].
7. See, e.g., J.P. Stevens & Co. [Stevens VII], 179 N.L.R.B. 254, 257-58 (1969),
enforced, 441 F.2d 514 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 830 (1971).
8. See, e.g., J.P. Stevens & Co. [Stevens 1], 157 N.L.R.B. 869 (1966), enforced
as modified, 380 F.2d 292 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1005 (1967).
9. For ease of reference, and following the pattern used by the NLRB and the
courts of appeals, these cases will be cited as follows:
Stevens I: J.P. Stevens & Co., 157 N.L.R.B. 869, 872 (1966), enforced as modified,
380 F.2d 292 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1005 (1967).
Stevens 11: J.P. Stevens & Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 217, enforced as modified sub nom.
Textile Workers Union v. NLRB, 388 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
836 (1968).
Stevens III: J.P. Stevens & Co., 167 N.L.R.B. 266 (1967), enforced as modified,
406 F.2d 1017 (4th Cir. 1968).
Stevens IV: J.P. Stevens & Co., 167 N.L.R.B. 258 (1967), enforced as modified,
406 F.2d 1017 (4th Cir. 1968).
Stevens V: J.P. Stevens & Co., 171 N.L.R.B. 1202 (1968), enforced, 417 F.2d
533 (5th Cir. 1969).
Stevens VI: Black Hawk Corp., 177 N.L.R.B. 944 (1969), enforced in part and
denied in part, 431 F.2d 900 (4th Cir. 1970).
Stevens VII: J.P. Stevens & Co., 179 N.L.R.B. 254 (1969), enforced, 441 F.2d
514 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 830 (1971).
Stevens VIII: J.P. Stevens & Co., 181 N.L.R.B. 666 (1970), enforced in part and
denied in part, 449 F.2d .595 (4th Cir. 1971).
Stevens IX: J.P. Stevens & Co., 183 N.L.R.B. 25 (1970), enforced, 461 F.2d 490
(4th Cir. 1972).
Stevens X: Black Hawk Corp., 183 N.L.R.B. 267 (1970).
Stevens XI: J.P. Stevens & Co., 186 N.L.R.B. 180 (1970), enforced without opin-
ion, 455 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1971).
Stevens XII: J.P. Stevens & Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 751 (1971), remanded, 475 F.2d
973 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), modified, 205 N.L.R.B. 1032 (1973).
Stevens XIII: J.P. Stevens, 217 N.L.R.B. 513 (1975), enforced, 93 L.R.R.M.
2262 (4th Cir. 1976).
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Second 10 and Fifth" Circuits, have deterred J.P. Stevens' anti-union
animus. Not even the payment of $1.3 million in backpay awards to
approximately 300 discriminatorily discharged workers has slowed the
J.P. Stevens crusade.
The Textile Workers Union of America (TWUA) and the Indus-
trial Union Department of the AFL-CIO launched their coordinated
campaign to organize approximately twenty-five of the forty J.P.
Stevens plants in North and South Carolina in the Spring of 1963.1'
Prior to the coming of the union, plants had been operated in a per-
missive manner. The Company was tolerant, even lenient, in such
matters as absences, work breaks, transfers and re-hirings. 18 This
pattern was quickly changed with the advent of the union. In the
initial months of its campaign the union succeeded in enlisting a sub-
stantial number of employees, many of whom sent letters to Stevens
notifying it of their support for the TWUA. 14 Subsequently, J.P.
Stevens reprimanded and/or discharged many of these workers be-
cause of their union support; discharges followed as quickly as pre-
text could be found.'5
This pattern of disregard for the dictates of the NLRA, with the
added refinements of plant closings and unlawful refusals to bargain
with NLRB recognized unions, has continued to the present. As the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated in Stevens VII,1" "Stevens' intran-
sigent recidivism is patent and overt. . . . [N]either passage of time
nor the admonishments of judicial tribunals have caused the Company
Stevens XIV: J.P. Stevens & Co., 219 N.L.R.B. 850, enforced, 93 L.R.R.M. 2262
(4th Cir. 1976).
Stevens XV: J.P. Stevens & Co., 220 N.L.R.B. No. 34 (1975).
10. NLRB v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 464 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972) (per curiam).
11. NLRB v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 538 F.2d 1152 (5th Cir. 1976).
12. For a factual history of the J.P. Stevens situation, see 1976 Hearings, supra
note 6, at 178-93. Ironically, J.P. Stevens, the second largest textile manufacturer in
the South, with some 46,000 workers, was chosen as the target for this campaign be-
cause it was thought that J.P. Stevens would be more receptive to unionization than
would Burlington Industries, the largest textile manufacturer in the South. Interview
with Daniel H. Pollitt, Professor of Law, in Chapel Hill, N.C. (Jan. 7, 1977).
13. Stevens 1, 157 N.L.R.B. 869, 963-64 (1966), enforced as modified, 380 F.2d
292, 296 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1005 (1967).
14. This was done to ensure compliance with a Board requirement that in order
to prove a discriminatory discharge in violation of section 8(a) (3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)
(3) (1970), it must be shown that the employer had knowledge of the worker's union
affiliation. See generally Comment, Employer Discrimination under Section 8(a)(3),
5 U. TOL. L. REv. 722 (1974).
15. See Stevens I, 157 N.L.R.B. 869 (1966), enforced as modified, 380 F.2d 292
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1005 (1967).
16. 441 F.2d 514 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 830 (1971), enforcing 179
N.L.R.B. 254 (1969).
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to alter its now all too familiar pursuance of full-scale war against
unionization."'1 7  The economic rationale behind this "intransigent
recividism" is obvious: the Company has saved untold millions of
dollars by refusing to cooperate in collective bargaining. One estimate
has placed the value of J.P. Stevens' unlawful conduct at $18,400 per
hour.'
8
As long as violation of federal law wins financial enrichment for
the wrongdoer, there remains a continuous and open invitation to
ignore the law. This incentive to violate the NLRA emphasizes the
need for a proper remedy for the J.P. Stevens situation. The Board
and the courts must be especially concerned not only with the narrower
context of struggle between union and employer but also with respect
for the mandates and policies of the NLRA. 19 Neither the Board in
its remedial orders20 nor the courts in their contempt orders21 have ade-
quately confronted the need for an extraordinary remedy for the J.P.
Stevens situation. It has become clear that only an order that requires,
or holds out the promise that it may require, Stevens to pay out an
amount of money commensurate with the amount it has saved by
avoiding a collective bargaining contract 2 will serve to halt the J.P.
Stevens anti-union crusade.
BOARD REMEDIES
The National Labor Relations Board has been given broad powers
17. 441 F.2d at 521. See also the Second Circuit's contempt citation, in which
the court stated:
[R]espondents have flouted our prior decrees in many ways. In a continued
attempt to dissuade employees from joining the Textile Workers Union of
America, the company and its management personnel in various plants, despite
our prior orders, have continued to resort to such unlawful tactics as engaging
in surveillance of organizing activities, interrogating employees about their
union inclinations, threatening pro-union employees with discharge and other
reprisals, discriminatorily altering their working conditions and discharging
them because of their union sympathies. In fact, one of the employees so dis-
charged had been illegally terminated before, was reinstated by our prior order,
but was then illegally discharged again.
NLRB v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 464 F.2d 1326, 1328-29 (2d Cir. 1972) (per curiam)
(footnote omitted).
18. 1976 Hearings, supra note 6, at 164; see 464 F.2d at 1329.
19. See SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND
LABOR, 90TH CONG., 2D SESS., NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT REMEDIES: THE UN-
FULFILLED PROMISE (Comm. Print 1968).
20. See, e.g., Stevens 1, 157 N.L.R.B. 869 (1966), enforced as modified, 380 F.2d
292 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1005 (1967).
21. See 1976 Hearings, supra note 6, at 184. The Fifth Circuit has not yet formu-
lated its order. NLRB v. J.P. Stevens &Co., 538 F.2d 1152 (5th Cir. 1976).
22. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
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to remedy unfair labor practices through section 10(c) of the NLRA. -I
The Supreme Court has often expressly acknowledged that broad dis-
cretion has been vested in the Board by Congress to formulate reme-
dies.24  Nevertheless, the Court has imposed two significant limitations
on the Board's discretion: the sanction applied must be remedial rather
than punitive, 25 and it must be appropriate to the particular situation
before the Board.2"  In Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB2 7 the Court
justified the punitive-remedial distinction as being in keeping with the
remedial tone of the Act read as a whole. -8  Consequently, the Board
cannot justify an order solely by showing that the remedy will deter
unfair labor practices.29 Rather, the remedy must be a reasonable at-
tempt to compensate for the damage caused by the unfair labor prac-
tice. The second limitation is essentially a corollary of the first; a
remedy not appropriate to the particular circumstances before the
Board will be oppressive. Furthermore, an inappropriate remedy will
fail to effectuate the policies of the Act."
Within these limitations the Board may properly exercise consid-
erable discretion. Too often, however, the NLRB resorts to preor-
dained formulas that fail to safeguard adequately the rights guaranteed
by the Act in the precise context before the Board.3' In the J.P.
Stevens cases the Board has restricted itself to the traditional frame-
work of a cease and desist order accompanied by reinstatement with
backpay and posting of notice orders. Only within the posting require-
ment has the NLRB attempted to tailor a remedy to fit the precise cir-
cumstances. Recognizing that the effects of Stevens' unfair labor
practices extend beyond the plants directly involved, the Board in
23. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970) provides that, upon a finding that an unfair labor
practice has occurred, the Board "shall issue and cause to be served . . . an order re-
requiring such person tu cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take
such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay,
as will effectuate the policies of this [Act]."
24. E.g., Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941); International
Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 72, 82 (1940).
25. Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 10 (1940); Consolidated Edison
Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 235-36 (1938).
26. NLRB v. Cheney Cal. Lumber Co., 327 U.S. 385 (1946); NLRB v. Express
Publishing Co., 312 U.S. 426 (1941).
27. 311 U.S. 7 (1940).
28. Id. at 10.
29. Local 60, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 651, 658 (1961)
(Harlan, J., concurring).
30. See NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344 (1953).
31. See Note, The Need for Creative Orders Under Section 10(c) of the National
Labor Relations Act, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 69 (1963).
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Stevens 112 and IP directed that the notice be mailed to each employee
of the Stevens plants in North and South Carolina and copies posted
at all such plants. The NLRB further ordered that the notice be read
to all employees, convened during working time, by a Company
spokesman. 4
In Stevens XI1" the NLRB found that Stevens, in violation of
section 8(a)(4)1" of the NLRA, had discriminated against two workers
for having testified on behalf of the union at a hearing. The Board's
remedy consisted only of an order to cease and desist and to post com-
pliance notices at the plant where the violations occurred. Acting upon
the TWUA's petition for review of the NLRB order, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit remanded the case to the
Board for consideration of a more stringent remedial order.3 7  In re-
sponse, the Board granted only the Union's request that additional
material be added to the notice and directed that it be posted at all of
J.P. Stevens' plants in North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia.38
The ineffectiveness of such orders is amply demonstrated by the
continuing stream of unfair labor practice charges involving J.P.
Stevens that have been brought before the NLRB. Currently, ninety-
four such charges are pending.30  There is no question that the Board
can and should take J.P. Stevens' history of recalcitrance into account
in designing its remedy. 0 The Board's challenge, then, is to construct a
sanction severe enough to deter Stevens' anti-union campaign while
complying with the punitive-remedial distinction imposed by the Su-
preme Court." Although under Supreme Court standards, deter-
32. 157 N.L.R.B. 869 (1966), enforced as modified, 380 F.2d 292 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 1005 (1967).
33. 163 N.L.R.B. 217, enforced as modified sub nom. Textile Workers Union v.
NLRB, 388 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 836 (1968).
34. This part of the order was later modified by the court of appeals to allow
Stevens the option of having a Board representative read the notice. Stevens I, 380
F.2d at 304-05; Stevens 11, 388 F.2d at 903-04.
35. 190 N.L.R.B. 751 (1971), remanded, 475 F.2d 973 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam),
modified, 205 N.L.R.B. 1032 (1973).
36. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (4) (1970).
37. 475 F.2d 973 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (per curiam).
38. 205 N.L.R.B. 1032 (1973).
39. See Oversight Hearings on the National Labor Relations Board before the Sub-
comm. on Labor-Management Relations of the House Comm. on Education and Labor,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 128 (1975) (testimony of NLRB Chairman Betty Murphy). It
should be noted that these 94 charges all involve discriminatory discharges and, hence,
may not constitute a complete list of J.P. Stevens cases pending before the NLRB.
40. Cf. NLRB v. J.H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 396 U.S. 258 (1969) (cost of Board
delay properly borne by wrongdoing employer).
41. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
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rence in itself is not sufficient to justify a Board order it is certainly
desirable that a properly remedial order have that effect.
42
The net effect of fourteen years of unfair labor practices by J.P.
Stevens has been to deny Stevens' employees their section 743 guaran-
teed rights to organize and bargain collectively. 44 Effective redress for
this ultimate violation of section 8(a)(1)4" should both compensate the
party wronged and withhold from the wrongdoer the fruits of its vio-
lation.40 Only the unique remedy of monetary compensation for loss
of section 7 rights will serve directly to accomplish both these ends.
While employees choose to be represented by a union for a variety
of reasons, it is axiomatic that the principal reason is economic. Em-
ployees want the opportunity to bargain collectively through a union
because invariably there is a significant and direct monetary gain to
them as a result of the first collective bargaining contract. 47  Thus,
the economic value of the right to organize is the monetary gain that
the employee may reasonably expect to obtain if the employer co-
operates in the collective bargaining process. A compensatory remedy
would direct Stevens to make its employees whole for the lost wages.
Correspondingly, the economic benefit to the employer may be
measured by the increased wages not paid to its employees. 48  A re-
lated benefit to J.P. Stevens lies in the weakened support of the TWUA
by Stevens' employees. As a result of Stevens' flagrant unfair labor
42. Local 60, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 651, 659 (1961)
(Harlan, J., concurring).
43. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
44. In light of this pattern of unfair labor practices it seems doubtful that Stevens'
employees can freely exercise their right to organize. See Pollitt, NLRB Re-Run Elec-
tions: A Study, 41 N.C.L. REv. 209 (1963). This study of 20,153 elections (of which
267 were re-runs) held between 1960 and 1962 shows that in over two-thirds of the
cases in which re-run elections were held the party who caused the election to be set
aside by its unfair practices won the re-run election. See id. at 212. Further, certain
unfair labor practices are more effective than others in destroying election conditions.
Threats of economic reprisals are clearly the most effective. See id. at 216. Finally,
time appears to be a major factor. The study shows that if the re-run is held within
thirty days of the election or more than nine months after, the chances of a different
result are only one in five. Id. at 221. Thus, it appears unlikely in the J.P. Stevens
situation that the union can expect an untainted election in the near future.
45. 29, U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice
for an employer-(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title."
46. See Montgomery Ward & Co. v. NLRB, 339 F.2d 889, 894 (6th Cir. 1965).
47. See Ross, Analysis of Administrative Process Under Taft-Hartley, in 1966
LABOR RELATONS YEARBOOK 299, 306; Schlossberg & Silard, The Need for a Compensa-
tory Remedy in Refusal-to-Bargain Cases, 14 WAYNE L. REv. 1059, 1082-85 (1968).
48. The average pay of textile workers, excluding overtime pay, is $3.38 per hour,
as compared to an average of $4.84 for all manufacturing production workers.
1976 Hearings, supra note 6, at 153.
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practices, the union has proven itself too weak to bargain effectively
when it has reached the bargaining table.4" A final benefit inuring
to Stevens lies in its improved competitive position in the marketplace
as a result of its artificially low labor costs.50 This last benefit should
be of special concern to the NLRB in that it would seem to act as a
continuous inducement for other employers, particularly other textile
manufacturers, to violate flagrantly the NLRA. Thus, an order
designed to make Stevens employees economically whole for the denial
of their guaranteed right to organize is appropriate. 51
In the context of J.P. Stevens' massive violations of section
8(a)(1), a make whole order cannot be classified as punitive. Em-
ployees would not be enriched by such a remedy; rather, they would
merely be afforded monetary compensation equivalent to the loss sus-
tained. Arguably, an order directing Stevens to make its employees
whole for lost wages is less than fully compensatory in that it fails to
account for the intangible benefits of a collective bargaining contract
such as dignity and job security.52  Nor can this make whole remedy
be dismissed as speculative. "  The rule barring recovery of uncertain
damages does not preclude the recovery of damages that are definitely
attributable to the wrong and only uncertain as to their amount.54 When
the nature of the wrongful act itself precludes the ascertainment of the
49. The TWUA won an election at the J.P. Stevens plant in Roanoke Rapids,
North Carolina on August 28, 1974. No contract has resulted, however. Rather, the
union has filed refusal to bargain charges with the NLRB, under § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(5) (1970). Id. at 191-92.
50. See note 48 supra.
51. The economic value of the right to organize is borne out by a recent study
that found that a collective bargaining contract resulted in 86% of the cases in which
the union was recognized by the employer as required by law. Ross, supra note 47,
at 306. It should be noted that the appropriateness of this remedy is not undermined
by recognition of the fact that section 7 also guarantees the right to refrain from self-
organization. The reasonable expectation of monetary gain from the collective bar-
gaining process is not dependent upon whether an employee supports the union or not.
Rather, that expectation is a constant, an objective factor that must be weighed by the
fully informed employee in deciding whether he wants union representation. In this
context, the economic value of the right foregone is equal to that of the right exercised.
52. In theory, a make whole remedy is less oppressive than the common reinstate-
ment with backpay remedy for discriminatory discharge cases. There the employer must
in essence pay twice for the same work-once to the discharged worker and once to
the worker hired to replace him. See Ex-Cell-O Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 107 (1970), en-
forcement denied sub norn. UAW v. NLRB, 449 F.2d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (per
curiam).
53. For a discussion of the mechanics of determining the amount of compensation,
see Note, Monetary Compensation as a Remedy for Employer Refusal to Bargain, 56
GEo. L.J. 474, 497-504 (1968).
54. Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946); Story Parch-
ment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 562 (1931).
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amount of damages with certainty, the wrongdoer must bear the risk
of the uncertainty that he has created. 51 Without question the Board
is empowered to order relief that merely approximates the conditions
that would have prevailed in the absence of an unfair labor practice."
The Board's decision in Ex-Cell-O Corp.17 raises a more signifi-
cant objection. In that case the NLRB denied a union's request for
a make whole remedy on the ground that such an order would consti-
tute a compelled agreement in violation of section 8(d) of the
NLRA.58 Ex-Cell-O Corp., however, involved a section 8(a)(5) un-
lawful refusal to bargain. 9 In that context, the make whole remedy
operates as a direct, though retroactive, intervention in the bargaining
process. In contrast, the J.P. Stevens make whole order would be de-
signed to remedy violations of section 8(a)(1). °° Presumed con-
tracts benefits, in the form of lost wages, merely serve, in the section
8(a)(1) context, as a device to measure the injuries sustained by
Stevens employees. The Board would not be interfering in any on-
going bargaining process. Thus, the J.P. Stevens make whole order
cannot be characterized as a compelled agreement, "any more than a
statutory treble damage action under the antitrust laws becomes a 'con-
tract' action" merely because the plaintiff's damages "are measured in
part by the estimated more favorable contract terms [he] would
have secured but for the unlawful conspiracy."
6'
As an alternative to this section 7 make whole remedy, the NLRB
might direct J.P. Stevens to bargain with the TWUA, despite the un-
ion's failure to win a representation election. The Supreme Court, in
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.,6 2 specifically authorized such a bar-
gaining order. Balancing the sometimes conflicting goals of deter-
ring employer misbehavior and effectuating employee free choice, the
Court found that two circumstances justify the bargaining order reme-
dy. First, even when a union has never demonstrated majority support
55. Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. at 265.
56. See NLRB v. Mooney Aircraft Inc., 375 F.2d 402 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 859 (1967); F.W. Woolworth Co. v. NLRB, 121 F.2d 658 (2d Cir. 1941).
57. 185 N.L.R.B. 107 (1970), enforcement denied sub nom. UAW v. NLRB, 449
F.2d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (per curiam).
58. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (Supp. V 1975) prohibits the Board from compelling either
party to agree to a proposal or make a concession. See H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB,
397 U.S. 99 (1970).
59. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1970).
60. Id. § 158(a)(1).
61. St. Antoine, A Touchstone for Labor Board Remedies, 14 WAYNe L. REv.
1039, 1053 (1968).
62. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
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in an appropriate unit, the Board may issue a bargaining order when
the employer's unfair labor practices are so "outrageous" and "per-
vasive" that their "'coercive' effects cannot be eliminated by the
application of traditional remedies, with the result that a fair and re-
liable election cannot be had."6  Second, when the employer's unfair
labor practices are less pervasive, the Board may issue a bargaining
order upon a finding, not only that a fair election is improbable, but
also that at one point the union had majority support."4 The rationale
behind the Court's decision is clear: if the Board could enter only a
cease and desist order and direct an election or a rerun, it would in
effect be rewarding the employer and allowing him to profit from his
wrongful acts, while at the same time severely curtailing the employees'
right freely to determine whether they desire union representation. 65
The Board, however, has traditionally been reluctant to issue a bar-
gaining order without a finding that the union at one time had majority
support.06
The NLRB has issued a bargaining order in only one of its fifteen
Stevens decisions. 7 In enforcing that order, the court of appeals held
that, though the Board had carefully based its order upon a finding of
majority status, a bargaining order would have been appropriate even if
the Union had never possessed majority support.s This holding lends
considerable support to the proposition that the Stevens situation fits
well within the first set of circumstances that the Supreme Court found
to justify a bargaining order and, consequently, it should be unneces-
sary for the Union to prove it once had majority support. The efficacy
of a bargaining order in the J.P. Stevens context, however, remains
open to question. In theory, the bargaining order deters interference
with employees' rights to organize by making such unfair labor practices
unprofitable. That deterrent force is completely undercut when the
employer is willing, as J.P. Stevens obviously is,09 to continue its unfair
63. Id. at 613-14 (quoting NLRB v. Logan Packing Co., 386 F.2d 562, 570 (4th
Cir. 1967)).
64. Id. at 614-15.
65. See Franks Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702 (1943).
66. See, e.g., Stevens 1, 157 N.L.R.B. 869, 877 (1966), enforced as modified, 380
F.2d 292 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1005 (1967); Stevens VII, 179 N.L.R.B.
254, 254 n.2 (1969), enforced, 441 F.2d 5'14 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 830
(1971).
67. Stevens VII, 179 N.L.R.B. 254 (1969), enforced, 441 F.2d 514 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 830 (1971).
68. 441 F.2d at 522.
69. J.P. Stevens' reaction to the bargaining order in Stevens VII was to refuse
to bargain in good faith. Finally, in 1975, Stevens closed down the plant involved,
allegedly for economic reasons. 1976 Hearings, supra note 6, at 187-88.
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labor practices by refusing to bargain in good faith. Experience has
indicated that the Board is unable to devise an adequate remedy for
section 8(a)(5) refusals to bargain."
The same practical considerations militate against an order di-
recting the employer to negotiate contract benefits retroactively to the
time the bargaining would have occurred if the employer had accepted
its statutory responsibility. 7 Given J.P. Stevens' history of anti-
unionism, it seems likely that such an order would only reinforce
Stevens' intransigence. Therefore, it appears that only the section 7
make whole remedy will serve to deter Stevens' unfair labor practices
and to compensate its employees. While both the bargaining order
and the retroactive bargaining order hold out the promise of deterrence
and compensation, in practice it appears that neither are adequate to
counter J.P. Stevens' "intransigent recidivism."
CONTEMPT REMEDIES
Section 10(e) of the NLRA12 provides that the Board may pe-
tition the federal courts of appeals for enforcement of its orders. As
the Supreme Court has recognized, 73 this section contemplates that a
future contempt proceeding may be necessary either to ensure com-
pliance with or punish disregard for the court-enforced order. The
contempt power is particularly well suited for cases of repeated flagrant
violators of the NLRA such as J.P. Stevens. Unrestricted by statutory
limitations, a court's power to design contempt sanctions to fit the cir-
cumstances of the case before it is almost completely discretionary. 7"
In most cases the civil contempt power, as opposed to the
criminal contempt power,75 is more suitable to the labor law con-
70. See H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 109 (1970). See also Schlossberg
& Silard, supra note 47, at 1059.
71. See A Survey of Labor Remedies, 54 U. VA. L. REV. 38, 52 (1968).
72. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1970).
73. See NLRB v. Warren Co., 350 U.S. 107 (1955).
74. See Lance v. Plummer, 353 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S.
929 (1966) (auxiliary deputy deprived of badge). See generally Dobbs, Contempt of
Court: A Survey, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 183, 267-82 (1971).
75. In contrast to civil contempt cases, use of the criminal contempt power brings
into play the constitutional safeguards of the criminal process. In the context of a
labor law violation, two of these safeguards are problematical. The criminal process
requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt, a standard of proof that might cause many
violations to go unpunished given the abundant possibilities for inventing legitimate
sounding excuses for many unfair labor practices. Further, the court may not order
imprisonment of more than six months without affording the contemnor the right to
a jury trial-and juries have often reached questionable results in the controversial at-
mosphere of labor trials. See Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representa-
text. 70  A civil contempt order may be coercive, compensatory or both,
while, in contrast, the purpose of a criminal contempt proceeding is to
vindicate the court's authority. 77 The Second Circuit's 1972 civil con-
tempt order against Stevens,78 however, failed to accomplish either end.
In its order, the Second Circuit, rather than directing a monetary
penalty, attempted to protect the union's organizational activities by
affording the union "similar facilities" to respond to the Stevens' anti-
union representations. 79  The order has failed to deter Stevens' anti-union
campaign; in 1973 the NLRB filed a second petition for adjudication in
civil contempt with the Second Circuit." A third petition was filed in
1976.81
A more viable alternative to the Second Circuit's approach is sug-
gested by the Fifth Circuit's recent contempt orders in NLRB v. Schill
Steel Products Inc.8 2 and NLRB v. Johnson Manufacturing Co.83  In
Schill Steel Products, the court found that the company had arbitrarily
refused to sign an agreed-upon contract in violation of an earlier court
order to bargain in good faith.84 In its purgative order the court di-
rected the company, in addition to executing the contract, to make its
employees whole for all wages and benefits lost as a result of the com-
pany's refusal to sign the agreement.85 In Johnson Manufacturing Co.
the Fifth Circuit held the company in contempt of an earlier contempt
order to bargain in good faith.8 6 In its contempt order, the court
fashioned a make whole remedy for the union, directing the company
to reimburse the union for its expenses incurred by reason of the com-
pany's failure to comply with the first contempt order.87
tion Elections under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARV. L. REv. 38, 125-26
(1964).
76. The most significant limitation on the civil contempt power as a tool in en-
forcing the NLRA is the Board's traditional reluctance to petition for adjudications in
contempt. During fiscal 1975, only 30 petitions for adjudication in contempt for non-
compliance with decrees enforcing Board orders were filed, 29 seeking civil contempt
relief and 1 seeking criminal sanctions. 40 NLRB ANN. REP. 172 (1975).
77. See Dobbs, supra note 74, at 235-49.
78. NLRB v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 464 F.2d 1326, 1348 (2d Cir. 1972).
79. See 1976 Hearings, supra note 6, at 184. The Fifth Circuit has not yet issued
its contempt order.
80. Id. at 169-70.
81. Id.
82. 480 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1973).
83. 511 F.2d 153 (5th Cir. 1975).
84. 480 F.2d at 592-93.
85. Id. at 598.
86. 511 F.2d at 154. The earlier order is reported in NLRB v. Johnson Mfg.
Co., 458 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1972).
87. 511 F.2d at 1.57.
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Given the particular circumstances of the J.P. Stevens situation,
it apparently is within the court's contempt power to construct a remedy
designed to make Stevens employees whole for the losses sustained as
a result of Stevens' flagrant unfair labor practices. 88 The chief advan-
tage of such an order is its effect of removing the profit factor from
the past contemptuous violations of court-enforced NLRB orders.8"
The contempt stage is crucial to the statutory scheme for preventing
unfair labor practices; it is incumbent upon the courts to design con-
tempt orders that, in the precise context of the cases before the court,
will deter violations of the NLRA.
CONCLUSION
J.P. Stevens, by its adamant refusal to recognize its employees'
rights to self-organization, has challenged the integrity of the NLRA.
In Stevens 11," Trial Examiner Boyd Leedom, a former Chairman
of the NLRB, suggested that it may be impossible within the frame-
work of the NLRA to devise a remedy that will right the wrongs of
an employer who persists in violations in the manner that Stevens has
persisted. Such defeatism belies the considerable discretion vested in
the Board's remedial powers and the court's contempt powers. As
Justice Whittaker noted in Local 60 v. NLRB, 1 "It is certain that
Congress did not intend by the Act 'to hold out to [employees] an
illusory right for which it was denying them a remedy.' ,,92
ALAN E. KRAUS
88. See text accompanying notes 47-52 supra.
89. In contrast, the coercive fine is purely prospective. Its intent is merely to
forestall future violations. Although a coercive fine might serve as a valuable adjunct
to a make whole order, such a fine alone would allow Stevens to retain a handsome
profit from its past violations.
90. 167 N.L.R.B. 266, 303 (1967), enforced as modified, 406 F.2d 1017 (4th Cir.
1968).
91. Local 60, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 651 (1961).
92. Id. at 662 (Whittaker, J., dissenting) (quoting Graham v. Brotherhood of Fire-
men, 338 U.S. 232, 240 (1949)) (brackets in original).
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Professional Responsibility-A Constitutional Challenge
to Disciplinary Rule 7-109(C)
In a recent and unprecedented decision' a federal district court
ruled that the application of Disciplinary Rule 7-109(C)" of the
New York State Code of Professional Responsibility,3 which prohibits
the payment of expert witnesses on a contingent fee basis, violates the
equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment.
The memorandum and order in Person v. Association of the Bar of
New York4 grants to all litigants in the Eastern District of New York
involved in civil actions the right to retain expert witnesses on a con-
tingent payment basis. The court premised its holding on a finding
that the rule "must particularly forbid to the less affluent and to the
indigent a means of obtaining an equal hearing to that accorded to a
more affluent adversary in the same case." 5  Person marks an un-
warranted expansion of the due process and equal protection tests
prescribed by the United States Supreme Court; and heralds the dis-
integration of a heretofore unquestioned standard of legal ethical con-
duct.7
1. Person v. Association of the Bar of New York, 414 F. Supp. 144 (E.D.N.Y.
1976).
2. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 7-109(C) provides:
A lawyer shall not pay, offer to pay, or acquiesce in the payment of com-
pensation to a witness contingent upon the content of his testimony or the out-
come of the case. But a lawyer may advance, guarantee, or acquiesce in the
payment of:
( 1 ) Expenses reasonably incurred by a witness in attending or testifying.
(2) Reasonable compensation to a witness for his loss of time in attending or
testifying.
(3) A reasonable fee for the professional services of an expert witness.
3. The instant case dealt specifically with the Lawyers Code of Professional
Responsibility promulgated by the Association of the Bar of New York City. Reference
will be made, however, to the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, since the New
York Bar and every state bar association (with the exception of California) have
adopted the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility in whole or in part. See ABA
ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY i (unverified draft 1975).
4. 414 F. Supp. 144 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
5. Id. at 146.
6. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377-80 (1971) (absent counter-
vailing state interest of overriding significance, persons forced into judicial process must
be given a meaningful opportunity to be heard; a person may not be deprived of a
fundamental right regardless of validity of the legitimate exercise of state power);
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (reasonable basis test); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (compelling governmental interest necessary to
penalize the exercise of a constitutional right).
7. Cf. in re Shapiro, 144 App. Div. 1, 128 N.Y.S. 852 (1911) (holding
contingent compensation agreements with witnesses violative of public policy); S.
WILLISTON, CONTRAcrs § 1716, at 879 (3d ed. 1972) (stating the basic premise of the
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Person, s an attorney prosecuting an antitrust case, applied for the
convening of a three judge court" to enjoin the enforcement of DR 7-
109(C). 1" He alleged inter alia that the cost of the antitrust litigation
had become so prohibitive that his client, plaintiff in the pending liti-
gation, could not bear the expense of hiring an expert witness, although
in contrast, wealthy industrial defendants in such cases usually could
afford and did retain experts to aid in their defense." It was further
alleged that the application of the rule resulted in a legally enforced
disparity in treatment that transgressed the litigant's constitutional right
to access to the courts.12  Person reasoned that the denial of the right
to retain an expert witness essentially denigrates the right to litigate
fully one's civil action, since expert testimony is often indispensable in
the prosecution of antitrust litigation.
After a consideration of New York law, 3 the district court found
rule); ABA ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 98-99 (unverified draft
1975) (no state has made significant changes in the rule).
8. A question arose whether Person had standing to bring suit on behalf of his
clients. Judge Dooling addressed this point in cursory fashion as follows:
It is the plaintiff who is the one directly restricted by the Rule and rendered
less effective than . . . he would be if able [to retain] expert testimony unin-
hibited by [DR 7-109(C)] ....
• . . [B]ut while the disciplinary rule, of necessity, directly affects the
lawyer, it affects the client's underlying interest [in having genuine access to
the courts] more drastically.
414 F. Supp. at 145.
The case was decided on the basis of the client's right of access to the courts. In
regard to whether Person's interest and his relationship to his clients were substantial
enough to confer standing upon him, see Singleton v. Wulff, 96 S. Ct. 2868, 2871-76
(1976); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965).
9. Pursuant to Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 988 (formerly 28 U.S.C.
§ 2281 (1970)), which required that no injunction restraining the enforcement, operation
or execution of any state statute due to its unconstitutionality shall be granted unless
the application therefor is heard and determined by a district court of three judges.
This statute was later repealed. Act of Aug. 12, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-381, 90 Stat. 1119.
10. Person v. Association of the Bar of New York, 414 F. Supp. 139 (E.D.N.Y.
1976). Two opinions are dealt with in this Note. The first, reported at 414 F. Supp.
139 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), dealt with the denial of the convening of a three judge court.
The second, reported at 414 F. Supp. 144 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), declared DR 7-109(C)
unconstitutional.
11. 414 F. Supp. at 140. It was also alleged that experts who regularly testify for
large industrial concerns are influenced as expert witnesses due to a continuing relation-
ship between the two. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 143. The court cited In re Schapiro, 144 App. Div. 1, 128 N.Y.S. 852
(1911); Laffin v. Billington, 86 N.Y.S. 267 (App. Div. 1904); and ASSOCIATION OF
THE BAR OF NEw YORK COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 213 (1932) &
No. 76 (1927-1928), all of which give support to DR 7-109(C). Wellington v. Kelly,
84 N.Y. 543 (1881), stands as virtually the only New York case allowing a contingent
payment agreement with a witness for the production of critical testimony.
DR 7-109(C)
that the New York State Bar Committee would not likely acquiesce in
Person's prospective violation of DR 7-109(C) in view of that state's
strong renunciation of contingent payments to witnesses. 14  Since Per-
son had not as yet contracted with an expert witness, however, any en-
forcement of DR 7-109(C) in the form of a disbarment proceeding was
necessarily premature.'5 Therefore, the district court correctly denied
Person's motion to convene the three judge panel.
Three months later Person moved for a summary declaratory
judgment' " to invalidate DR 7-109(C) based essentially on the alle-
gations filed in the earlier action. 17 The court accepted without ques-
tion plaintiff's contention that he was disadvantaged in the pending
antitrust case because of his client's financial inability to obtain account-
ing and economic testimony.' Apparently without supporting facts,
the court also accepted that this predicament recurred frequently in the
plaintiff's antitrust practice.'" Having identified a pattern of "recur-
rent" discrimination as a result of imminent state enforcement of DR
7-109(C), the court, relying on Boddie v. Connecticut20 and Winters
v. Miller,2' found a deprivation of plaintiff's access to the courts. In
light of traditional constitutional practice,22 the court then balanced the
denial of plaintiff's access to the courts with the basis and purpose of
the rule.
The court observed that DR 7-109(C) condones non-contingent
payment to expert witnesses if such payment is reasonably measured
by time spent by the expert, difficulty of the problem, and the incon-
venience imposed upon the expert. 23 The recognition of a reasonable-
ness requirement in DR 7-109 (C) indicated to the court the ABA's
awareness that any payment to an expert witness might prove an in-
centive to untruthful testimony. On that basis, the court concluded that
14. 414 F. Supp. at 143.
15. Id. at 141, 144.
16. 414 F. Supp. at 144.
17. Id. at 145.
18. Id.
19. See id.
20. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
21. 446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1976).
22. The court concluded that the case was partly governed by United States v.
Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973) (no denial of due process or equal protection when indigents
are incapable of paying filing fees in bankruptcy proceedings); Lindsey v. Normet, 405
U.S. 56 (1972) (double-bond prerequisite for appealing a forcible entry and detainer
action a violation of equal protection); and Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971)
(denial of due process when indigents incapable of paying court fees denied access to
court in divorce proceedings). 414 F. Supp. at 145.
23. Id. at 146.
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contingent payment to an expert witness will create no more of an in-
centive for perjury than any other payment if the contingent payment
is reasonable.24 Stated another way, the court found no good reason
for the exclusion of contingency of payment as a relevant factor in a
determination of reasonableness of payment. Thus, when the right to
full and equitable litigation was balanced against a rule of questionable
effectiveness and validity25 that categorically denied a less than affluent
party the right to retain an expert witness, the court determined the ap-
plication of DR 7-109(C) to be "too irrational to survive Fourteenth
Amendment analysis.
20
The court in Person did not clearly indicate which form of "Four-
teenth Amendment analysis" was applied in the invalidation of DR 7-
109(C). 27 Under both due process and equal protection analysis the
Supreme Court in recent years has steadfastly employed a balancing
test in cases in which personal and state interests are in conflict.28
Inherent in this balancing test is the necessity that the infringed right
be of a "fundamental" nature, or at least of a certain "constitutional
level.112  The determination of whether the individual or state right
will take precedence is achieved through a weighing of the significance
that the court gives to the underlying rationales of the two conflicting
interests.'" In the due process cases the state must adduce a "counter-
vailing"'" interest to overcome a claimant's personal right; in the equal
protection cases the state must exhibit a "compelling governmental in-
terest. 3 -12  The distinction is largely one of semantics.
Alternatively, if the right sought to be preserved does not achieve
a level of constitutional importance, the Supreme Court has applied a
rational justification test.33  Under this less stringent test, the consti-
24. Id.
25. Id. at 146. The court stated:
The interest in access to the courts on a basis of equality may not exact re-
dress of every imbalance that disparity of means can produce, but it is of such
fundamental importance that it cannot be subjected to a constraint that is not
adapted to effective achievement of its professed goal and which exacts a
sacrifice which must, in any case, be disproportionate to the merely conjectured
probability of occurrence of the wrong aimed at.
Id.
26. Id.
27. See note 22 supra.
28. See cases cited note 6 supra.
29. See, e.g., United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 444 (1973).
30. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380-82 (1971); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633-38 (1968).
31. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377 (1971).
32. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1968).
33. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
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tutionality of a law is upheld upon a showing that it rests upon a non-
arbitrary and rational basis. 4
In Boddie v. Connecticut,3" a case upon which the court in Person
heavily relied, appellant welfare recipients challenged Connecticut's re-
quirements for payment of court fees alleging that such costs denied
them access to the courts in their attempt to bring an action for di-
vorce. 3  The decision, sounding in due process, recognized the basic
importance to the public interest of the marriage relationship, 37 the in-
dispensability of access to the courts in dissolving a marriage,3 8 and the
state's "monopoly" in the control of the marriage relationship.3 9 Having
established the importance of access to the courts, the Supreme Court
balanced it against any possible countervailing state interest of over-
riding significance, and, finding none sufficient,40 ruled that the
requirement of the fee denied appellants due process. The Court,
however, tempered its holding with a caveat:
We do not decide that access for all individuals to the courts is a
right that is, in all circumstances, guaranteed by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment so that its exercise may not
be placed beyond the reach of any individual, for . . . in the case
before us this right is the exclusive precondition to the adjustment
of a fundamental human relationship.
41
Although Boddie was determined solely on due process grounds,
its rationale can be logically applied to cases arising under the equal
protection clause, particularly when the essential grievance to be re-
dressed is that of invidious discrimination whereby a fundamental right
has been denied. 2 The line of demarcation between due process and
34. Id. at 79.
35. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
36. Id. at 372.
37. Id. at 377; see, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S.
535 (1942).
38. 401 U.S. at 381 & n.8 (citing Jeffreys v. Jeffreys, 58 Misc. 2d 1045, 1056,
296 N.Y.S.2d 74, 87 (Sup. Ct. 1968)).
39. 401 U.S. at 374. These factors led the majority of the Court to the view that
"although [appellants] assert here due process rights as would-be plaintiffs, we think
[their] plight . . . is akin to that of defendants faced with exclusion from the only
forum effectively empowered to settle their disputes." Id. at 376.
40. Id. at 380-82. The state's interests were (1) "prevention of frivolous litiga-
tion," (2) "use of court fees and process costs to allocate scarce resources," and (3) the
"balance between the defendant's right to notice and the plaintiff's right to access." Id.
at 381.
41. Id. at 382-83.
42. Mr. Justice Douglas in his concurrence with the result achieved by the majority
in Boddie criticized the mode of decision stating:
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equal protection has never been clearly defined, and, in many instances
both have been applied to the same set of circumstances. a3 In United
States v. Kras,4 4 decided two years after Boddie, the Supreme Court
held that denial to Kras of access to a discharge in bankruptcy due to
his inability to meet fee requirements was not a denial of due process
nor of equal protection of the law. 4' The district court,"n relying on
Boddie, had ruled that the required fees served to deny Kras "his Fifth
Amendment right of due process, including equal protection."47  It also
held that a discharge in bankruptcy was a "fundamental interest" that
could be denied only when a "compelling government interest" was
demonstrated. 48  In reversing the district court, the Supreme Court de-
limited and clarified its holding in Boddie,4" which theretofore had
been seen by some as a gateway to increased procedural rights for indi-
gent civil litigants tantamount to those afforded indigent defendants
in criminal actionsY
0
The Court today puts "flesh" upon the Due Process Clause by concluding that
marriage and its dissolution are so important that an unhappy couple who are
indigent should have access to the divorce courts free of charge ...
An invidious discrimination based on poverty is adequate for this case
• . Affluence does not pass muster under the Equal Protection Clause
for determining who must remain married and who shall be allowed to separate.
Id. at 384-85, 386. Mr. Justice Brennan in his concurrence simply stated: "The validity
of this partial denial . . . can be tested as well under the Equal Protection Clause." Id.
at 388.
43. E.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (in criminal proceedings due
process requires that all persons have access to the courts; equal protection requires that
the poor have the same access as the wealthy); see, e.g., United States v. Kras, 409 U.S.
434 (1973); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
44. 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
45. Id. at 443-46.
46. In re Kras, 331 F. Supp. 1207 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
47. Id. at 1212.
48. Id. at 1214.
49. Boddie was distinguished on several grounds: (1) access to courts is not the
only conceivable relief available to bankrupts; (2) the interest in a discharge in
bankruptcy does not attain the same constitutional level of fundamentality as the interest
in the dissolution of the marital relationship; and (3) "[there is no constitutional right
to obtain a discharge of one's debts in bankruptcy." 409 U.S. at 446. The Court, upon
these determinations, found the rational justification test a more appropriate test of the
fee requirement's validity and dispensed with the more stringent fundamental rights test.
Id. at 445-49.
50. See, e.g., Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co., 402 U.S. 954 (1971), denying cert.
to 225 Ga. 91, 166 S.E.2d 88 (1969), in which Mr. Justice Black, the only dissenter in
Boddie, evidenced a change of heart:
In my view, the decision in Boddie v. Connecticut can safely rest on only
one crucial foundation-that the civil courts of the United States and each of
the States belong to the people of this country and that no person can be
denied access to those courts, either for a trial or an appeal, because he cannot
pay a fee, finance a bond, risk a penalty, or afford to hire an attorney ...
19771 DR 7-109(C) 715
Two predicates emerge from Kras: (1) in civil cases the funda-
mentality of the right of access to the courts is made contingent upon
the nature of the wrong sought to be redressed; and (2) if the underly-
ing right is not of a substantial constitutional level such as the right to
free speech or marriage the appropriate test is the "rational justifica-
tion" test and not the "compelling governmental interest" test applied
in Boddie.
The court in Person summarily dispensed with Kras in the belief
that that decision was based primarily on the assumption that alternatives
to bankruptcy appeared to be available in that case and that no such al-
ternatives to antitrust litigation are available."' It would appear, how-
ever, that there are as many alternatives to antitrust litigation as there
are to bankruptcy.52 Thus Person and Kras are not logically distin-
guishable on this ground and are perhaps even analogous.
It is difficult to ascertain the true nature of the right actually
sought to be protected in Person. The court apparently believed it was
protecting plaintiff's right of access to the courts.5 3  This- view is some-
what misguided, however, since DR 7-109(C) prohibits payment to ex-
pert witnesses on a contingent basis and affects only the quality of the
case, not the right to commence litigation. The deprived litigant is not
denied access to the courts, but only the aid of an expert witness.
5 4
[P]eople might recognize that this constitutional decision will eventually ex-
tend to all civil cases but believe that it can only be enforced slowly . . . so
that the country will have time to absorb its full import.
Id. at 955-56.
51. 414 F. Supp. at 145.
52. The primary alternative offered by the court in Kras was negotiated agreement
with the bankrupt's creditors. The alternative to antitrust litigation would similarly be a
settlement. Neither possibility is particularly viable. Observations such as this led
Justice Black, in his dissent from the denial of certiorari in several access to the court
cases, to conclude that exclusivity of redress in the courts was no limit at all to open
access to the courts. This was premised on the fact that the "States and the Federal
Government hold the ultimate power of enforcement in almost every dispute" and that
"the alternatives [to litigation in other areas of law] are exactly the same as in a divorce
case." Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co., 402 U.S. 954, 956-57 (1971), denying cert. to
225 Ga. 91, 166 S.E.2d 88 (1969).
53. In Person, the court cited as supporting its decision Winters v. Miller, 446
F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1971) (forced medication on a woman of questionable sanity in
violation of her belief in the Christian Science faith held violative of her first amend-
ment rights without a prior adjudication of her sanity having been made). 414 F. Supp.
at 146. In Winters the court stated: "Under our Constitution there is no procedural
right more fundamental than the right of the citizen, except in extraordinary circum-
stances, to tell his side of the story to an impartial tribunal." 446 F.2d at 71.
54. Reliance on the right to an expert witness in Person necessarily imports an
expansion of procedural due process in civil trials. Such procedural rights as this, though
afforded to criminal defendants, have been extended no further than Boddie (as limited
by Kras) permits. See Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 659 (1973) (per curiam). The
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Even if the right in issue is conceded to be plaintiff's access to the
courts--on the assumption that denial of an expert essentially denies
one a proper trial-it is apparent, in light of Kras, that in Person that
right cannot be considered to be of a fundamental nature as it was
found to be in Boddie. It is evident that the right to vindicate one's pro-
perty rights in antitrust litigation is more closely akin to the right to
a discharge in bankruptcy than to the right to the dissolution of a mar-
riage. Like the right to seek a declaration of bankruptcy," the right
to bring an antitrust action"6 is a statutorily created benefit of Congress,
and is not of a constitutional nature.57  Furthermore, in the antitrust
situation, as in the bankruptcy case, there is no "adjustment of . . .
fundamental human relationship[s]" ' at stake as was the case in
Boddie. Consequently New York should only have been required to
show that it had a rational basis in enforcing DR 7-109(C) to the pur-
ported disadvantage of impoverished litigants.
On its face, DR 7-109(C) 0 exhibits a compelling state purpose
in maintaining the integrity of the judicial system. The payment to a
witness of an amount contingent upon the outcome of the case and
in some instances upon the favorable content of the witness' testimony
can serve only as an invitation to prevarication. Such concern is mag-
nified in the case of the expert witness whose testimony is "difficult,
often inscrutable and, therefore, especially open to calculated distor-
tion."60  The court in Person, however, attacked not the premise upon
which the rule was based, but the application of the rule in categorically
denying to all litigants, regardless of the intent of the parties or the
reasonableness of the agreement, the ability to retain an expert on a
contingent payment basis.6
Prior to the ABA's adoption of the Code of Professional Respon-
sibility in 1969, no specific prohibition against contingent payment to
expert witnesses had been enunciated. Before its amendment in
1937,62 Canon 39, the predecessor to DR 7-109(C), provided that any
general sentiment, however, is to the contrary. See note 49 supra; Note, Litigation
Costs: The Hidden Barrier to the Indigent, 56 GEo. L.J. 516 (1968); Note, The
Indigent's Right to Counsel In Civil Cases, 76 YALE L.J. 545 (1967).
55. 11 U.S.C. § 11 (1970).
56. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
57. See United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 446-47 (1973).
58. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 383 (1971).
59. See note 2 supra.
60. 414 F. Supp. at 142.
61. 414 F. Supp. at 146.
62. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs No. 39.
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compensation demanded or received by any witness in excess of statu-
tory allowances should be disclosed to the court and adverse counsel.6 3
Implicit in this rule was the possibility that an attorney, if forced to ac-
quire an expert witness on a contingent payment basis, might do so if
the court were informed of the agreement.
In re Schapiro," a New York decision, illustrates the basic
approach that courts have taken in dealing with contingency fees for
expert witnesses. Schapiro, an attorney, was coerced by a physician
into entering a contingent fee agreement on threats that if forced to
appear under subpoena the physician would testify adversely to the at-
torney's cause unless he were paid one-third of the judgment in the
case."5 At trial, the doctor had testified on cross-examination that he
had no interest in the litigation whatsoever. Schapiro was disbarred
for gross misconduct in acquiescing to the physician's demands and
failing to inform the court of the witness' substantial interest in the
case.6"
Paramount in the Schapiro court's analysis was a judicial concern
for the maintenance of the orderly and efficient administration of jus-
tice. Such contingent witness payment contracts, regardless of the
form of the arrangement, were condemned as violative of public policy
in their tendency to promote perjured testimony and unjust awards from
juries unaware of biased testimony. 7  Nevertheless, the court did re-
cognize that the attorney had a duty to inform the court of the unlawful
agreement so that the jury in its consideration of the testimony could
weigh its credibility."
Despite a sparse caselaw foundation,"' it appears that the absolute
prohibition against contingent payment to expert witnesses is founded
on the policy exemplified by In re Schapiro. However, a literal reading
of the rule allows no credence to the implication that informing a jury
63. ABA OPINIONS OF THE COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND GRIEVANCES
WITH ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 39.
64. 144 App. Div. 1, 128 N.Y.S. 852 (1911).
65. Id. at 4, 128 N.Y.S. at 855. The physician's testimony was vital in establish-
ing the attorney's client's recovery. See id.
66. Id. at 12, 128 N.Y.S. at 860.
67. Id. at 9, 128 N.Y.S. at 858-59.
68. Id. at 11, 128 N.Y.S. at 859-60.
69. Footnote 90 to DR 7-109(C) makes reference to In re O'Keefe, 49 Mont. 369,
142 P. 638 (1914). O'Keefe dealt solely with contingent payment to ordinary fact
witnesses, not experts, and the court took into consideration O'Keefe's honest intentions
in reducing his penalty from disbarment to suspension for 30 days. It is unusual that no
reference was made to In re Schapiro, a case so solidly in line with the prohibition of the
rule.
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of an expert's interest in the outcome of a case will alleviate the possi-
bility of unjust results from perjured testimony. Nor does the rule al-
low any review of the intent of the parties or of the particular factors
precipitating the contingent fee arrangement.
In Barnes v. Boatmen's National Bank 0 the Missouri Supreme
Court demonstrated a willingness to examine all aspects of a particular
contingent payment relationship. It upheld a contract for the contin-
gent payment of $25,000 to a psychiatrist testifying in a will contest.
The court rejected the common presumption,"' adopted at least vicar-
iously by the ABA, that every contingent payment contract with an ex-
pert witness is ipso facto void as against public policy.
7 2
Rule 7-109(C) permits reasonable noncontingent compensation
to an expert for his time and labor in preparing to testify. 73 In Person
the court found it irrational that reasonable compensation was permit-
ted but that contingent compensation, regardless of its reasonableness,
would never be permitted.74 The court's analysis implies that a twenty
percent stake in the outcome of a case would be considered unreason-
able, whereas a payment of ten dollars an hour contingent upon success
at trial would be reasonable and therefore permitted. 75 In the former
arrangement the more the expert exaggerated and colored his testi-
mony, the greater would be his compensation; such inducement would
be dissipated in the latter instance. Although the inducement to per-
jure himself is reduced, the expert is still faced with a win or lose pro-
position and some incentive to lie remains. On the other hand, there
appears to be no greater inducement to prevarication than is present
in any case involving the testimony of an interested witness such as a
party to the litigation.76 Courts have consistently allowed interested
70. 348 Mo. 1032, 156 S.W.2d 597 (1941).
71. See Laos v. Soble, 18 Ariz. App. 502, 503 P.2d 978 (1972); Burchell v.
Ledford, 226 Ky. 155, 10 S.W.2d 622 (1928); Sherman v. Burton, 165 Mich. 293, 130
N.W. 667 (1911); Griffith v. Harris, 17 Wis. 2d 255, 116 N.W.2d 133, cert. dented, 373
U.S. 927 (1962).
72. 348 Mo. at 1040-41, 156 S.W.2d at 602.
73. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY DR 7-109(C) (3).
74. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
75. See 414 F. Supp. at 146, where the court stated: "It is not meant to suggest
that in the case of the expert a fee measured as a percentage of the recovery might not
generally or in particular cases be regarded as per se unreasonable."
76. At common law interested parties were disqualified from testifying on the
premise that their interest in the outcome would induce them to perjure themselves. See,
e.g., Taber v. Perrott & Lee, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 39 (1815); DeFarges v. Ryland &
Brooks, 87 Va. 404, 12 S.E. 805 (1891). Exceptions were made, however, in cases
where no other means of proof were available. See, e.g., United States v. Murphy, 41
U.S. (16 Pet.) 203, 210 (1842).
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witnesses to testify after cautioning the jury about the possible biased
nature of their testimony. 77  There is no logical reason why testimony
of an expert witness paid on a contingent basis could not be conditioned
in the same manner. 8
On its face DR 7-109(C) makes no distinction among different
types of litigation in prohibiting contingent payment to experts. Given
the necessity of expert testimony and the diverse roles experts play in
certain areas of the law, however, it would appear that consideration of
such factors would be warranted in a determination of the propriety
of a contingent fee arrangement. It is not coincidental that the major-
ity of disputes over contingent payment to expert witnesses have arisen
in the area of personal injury suits.7 9 In such cases the doctor who
treated the plaintiff and who is retained on a contingent fee to give
expert testimony is in a particularly favorable position to perjure him-
self, since he has personal knowledge of the facts of his client's treatment
to which the opposing party's expert has no access. These facts may
be exaggerated and distorted by the expert in his formulation of an
opinion about the extent of injuries and length of recovery period in
order to increase the amount of his compensation without serious refuta-
tion from an opposing expert. Conversely, in the areas of antitrust
and products liability both experts have equal access to data and facts
from which they formulate opinions, and an objective review of the
veracity of those opinions is available to discount the injurious effects
of one or both experts perjuring themselves.
These observations serve to point out some of the considerations
absent in the ABA's promulgation of DR 7-109(C). A less rigid appli-
cation of the language of the rule would serve to reduce the unjust
results achieved when a party due to his indigency is categorically de-
77. The common law prohibition has been put to rest and disqualification by
interest has been removed by statute in almost all jurisdictions in this country. See, e.g.,
Sanderson v. Paul, 235 N.C. 56, 61, 69 S.E.2d 156, 160 (1952); Stream v. Barnard, 120
Ohio 206, 209, 165 N.E. 727, 728 (1929). Renunciation of the prohibition was due to
acceptance of the theory that it is better to receive testimony, however biased, leaving
credibility of witnesses to the jury. Griswold v. Hart, 205 N.Y. 384, 395, 98 N.E. 918,
921-22 (1912).
78. See 31 AM. JUR. 2d Expert and Opinion Evidence § 181 (1967), where it is
stated that "[ilt is generally recognized that the relative weight and sufficiency of expert
and opinion testimony is peculiarly within the province of the jury to decide, consider-
ing [inter alia] . . . his possible bias in favor of the side for whom he testifies, [and]
whether he is a paid witness .... "
79. E.g., Sherman v. Burton, 165 Mich. 293, 130 N.W. 667 (1911); In re Schapiro,
144 App. Div. 1, 128 N.Y.S. 852 (1911); Davis v. Smoot, 176 N.C. 538, 97 S.E. 488
(1918).
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nied the vital use of an expert at trial. The rule as it stands necessarily
overreaches its purported goal of reducing the possibility of perjury in
that it applies to all instances of contingent payment to an expert, re-
gardless of the motivating factor behind such arrangements and regard-
less of the particular circumstances of the arrangement.
Nevertheless it is doubtful that such considerations are within the
ambit of constitutional review in this case. The degree of scrutiny that
a statute comes under in testing its rationality is commensurate with the
value and significance of the interest upon which that statute purpor-
tedly infringesP-° the higher the value of the interest, the more intense
the scrutiny. An analysis of United States v. Kras revealed that in
an access to the court case the Supreme Court centered its attention
on the right to a discharge in bankruptcy." The right was declared
to be of an economic and social nature and therefore more deference
was granted to the legislative purpose in requiring the payment of court
fees8 2 than was conceded in Boddie where marital rights were involved.
Because marital rights are protected under the first amendment, the
court utilized a more intense scrutiny of the statute requiring payment
of court fees to find that requirement unconstitutional.
8 3
Like the right to a discharge in bankruptcy, the right to bring an
antitrust action is an economic right. Therefore if there is some ration-
al basis for a law that infringes upon that right, the court will not scru-
tinize the application of the law intensely but will defer to what appears
on the face of the statute to be a rational justification.8 4 DR 7-109(C)
clearly exhibits a rational basis in upholding the principles of judicial
and legal ethics and in its concomitant objective of reducing fraud and
perjury in civil proceedings. If precedents such as Cohen v. Beneficial
80. CI. G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 658-63 (9th
ed. 1975) (summarizing old and new forms of equal protection analysis).
81. See text accompanying notes 44-52 supra.
82. See United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 447-48 (1973).
83. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 380-82 (1971).
84. Dictum in Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1948), exhibited the
Supreme Court's reluctance to delve into the intricacies and theories supporting a state
law if the law were shown to have a rational basis. Petitioners in Cohen challenged the
constitutionality of a New Jersey statute requiring small shareholders bringing stockhold-
ers' derivative actions to post security for expenses incurred by the corporation in
prosecuting the action. In upholding the statute on equal protection and due process
grounds, the Court found sufficient justification for the law in its positive action taken
toward alleviating the corporation's burden of dealing with fraudulent suits. And though
other plausible means for achieving the result desired were feasible, the Court did not
invalidate the state legislation because it failed "to embody the highest wisdom or provide




Loan Corp.85 that exhibit extreme deference to legislative purpose are
given credence, alternatives to the rule will warrant little consideration
in the face of a rule replete with valid, justifiable objectives and the
support of a vast majority of cases.
However, the deferential manner in which a court might deal with
this issue should not preclude a reconsideration of the policy behind
DR 7-109(C). It is apparent that in many instances the prohibition
of the rule does render an injustice. If contingent payment to expert
witnesses were tempered by requirements that the payment be reason-
able and that there be full disclosure to the court, jury and opposing
counsel, such agreements could be permissible.
Although the decision in Person has no further jurisdictional reach
than the boundaries of the Eastern District of New York, it may spark
the ABA and state bar associations to institute changes in DR 7-109
(C). Total revocation of the rule would inevitably lead to abuses of
a privilege that should be reserved for exceptional situations. Retention
of the rule and its arbitrary and categorical denial of expert testimony
to those who cannot afford such testimony is itself an abuse of justice.
Difficulty of administration should not prevent the amendment of a rule
unyielding in its absolute denial of the only means an indigent plaintiff
might have for obtaining fair treatment at trial.
MICHAEL A. HEEDY
Taxation-The Twilight Zone of Charity: The IRS Denies Ex-
emption for a Free Tax Planning Service Under Section 501(c)(3)
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) exercises a major influence
over the development of public charities through its power to charac-
terize an organization as "charitable" under section 501(c)(3) 1 of the
85. 337 U.S. 541 (1948); see note 84 supra.
1. I.R.C. § 501 provides in part:
(a) EXEMPTION FROM TAxATIoN.-An organization described in subsec-
tion (c) . . . shall be exempt from taxation ....
(c) LIsT OF EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS. ....
(3) Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organ-
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Internal Revenue Code. An organization denied the protection of tax
exempt status normally suffers a severe shortage of income since con-
tributions given to it are not deductible as "charitable contributions"
under section 170(c)(2).1 Unless overruled by federal court deci-
sions or congressional action, the IRS determines whether the activi-
ties of a particular organization should be supported by tax exempt
public contributions. In Revenue Ruling 76-4423 the IRS ruled that
an organization that offers free personal tax planning services to those
who wish to make charitable gifts is not operated exclusively for chari-
table purposes, and hence does not qualify as a 501(c)(3) organiza-
tion. This restrictive ruling represents an overly narrow percep-
tion of the primary policy of section 501(c)(3), which is to encourage
charitable giving and can be viewed as inconsistent with previous in-
terpretations of the statute.
The organization discussed in Revenue Ruling 76-442 employed
a staff of salaried attorneys to provide its services. It did not charge
fees for its services although obviously its clients were generally not
indigent. The organization derived most of its income from public
contributions but was not affiliated with any particular charity or group
of charities. Rather, it encouraged its clients to give to charities of
their personal choice.
4
The IRS focused on whether the organization could be considered
to serve a public rather than a private interest" and concluded that in
aiding individuals in tax planning the organization was providing a com-
mercially available service to people who could afford it rather than a
ized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for
public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or
international amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its activi-
ties involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the
prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earnings of
which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no
substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or
otherwise attempting to influence legislation, (except as otherwise provided
in subsection (h)), and which does not participate in, or intervene in
(including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political cam-
paign on behalf of any candidate for public office.
2. See 4 T. RABKIN & M. JOHNSON, FEDERAL INCOME, GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION
§ 59.01(2), at 5903b (1976). The definition of organizations eligible to receive deductible
charitable contributions found in § 170(c)(2) mirrors the language of § 501(c)(3)
except that trusts are also eligible, the organization must be created in the United States
or under United States law, and, curiously, "testing for public safety" is not mentioned.
3. 1976-46 I.R.B. 12.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 13 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (1959), which pro-
vides: "An organization is not organized or operated exclusively for charitable purposes
. . . unless it serves a public rather than a private interest.")
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charitable activity in the legal sense. 6 This private purpose was held
to be predominant although the public could benefit from funds being
made available to charity as a result. The public benefit was thought
to be tenuous; the fact that charitable gifts were contemplated in the
plans drawn up could not transmute such services into a charitable
activity.
7
Case law and IRS ruling policy in this area must be understood
against the common law background of charity. The federal tax laws
have traditionally acknowledged that charities "lessen the burdens of
government"" by providing what government might otherwise be obli-
gated to perform. For this reason Congress has granted favored tax
status to charities and charitable giving. In this respect the Code is
no innovation; instead it generally incorporates the common law
principles of charity9 as developed mainly through the law of charitable
6. The IRS's working definition of "charitable" is found in its Regulations:
The term "charitable" is used in section 501(c)(3) in its generally ac-
cepted legal sense and is, therefore, not to be construed as limited by the separ-
ate enumeration in section 501(c) (3) of other tax-exempt purposes which may
fall within the broad outlines of "charity" as developed by judicial decisions.
Such term includes: Relief of the poor and distressed or of the underprivileged;
advancement of religion; advancement of education or science; erection or
maintenance of public buildings, monuments, or works; lessening of the bur-
dens of Government; and promotion of social welfare by organizations designed
to accomplish any of the above purposes, or (i) to lessen neighborhood ten-
sions; (ii) to eliminate prejudice and discrimination; (iii) to defend human and
civil rights secured by law; or (iv) to combat community deterioration and
juvenile delinquency.
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (1959). This definition includes some of the terms
other than "charitable" found in § 501(c)(3). See note 1 supra. The Code should be
understood as treating "charitable" as inclusive of these types of activities as well (since
all of § 170(c) is under the heading of CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTION DEFINED), although
the full meaning of charity is not exhausted by any checklist of activities. See Reiling,
Federal Taxation: What Is a Charitable Organization?, 44 A.B.A.J. 525, 526 (1958).
7. 1976-46 I.R.B. at 12, 13.
8. The definition of "charitable" in the Treasury Regulations scarcely differs in
substance from the classic definition formulated by Justice Gray of Massachusetts:
A charity, in the legal sense, may be more fully defined as a gift, to be applied
consistently with existing laws, for the benefit of an indefinite number of per-
sons, either by bringing their minds or hearts under the influence of education
or religion, by relieving their bodies from disease, suffering or constraint, by
assisting them to establish themselves in life, or by erecting or maintaining
public buildings or works or otherwise lessening the burdens of government.
Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 539, 556 (1867). See also Statute of
Charitable Uses, 1601, 43 Eliz. 1, c. 4.
9. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(2) (1959), quoted in note 6 supra ("The
term 'charitable' is used . . . in its generally accepted legal sense .... "); Reiling, supra
note 6, at 526; Thrower, IRS is Considering Far Reaching Changes in Ruling on Exempt
Organizations, 34 J. TAx. 168 (1971); cf. Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1157
(D.D.C.), afj'd, 404 U.S. 997 (1971) (" 'strong analogy' can be derived from the general
common law of charitable trusts, at least for close interpretive questions"). But cf.
Faulkner v. Commissioner, 112 F.2d 987, 992 (1st Cir. 1940) ("Interpretation of the
word 'charitable' in a federal revenue act is a matter of federal, not local, law.").
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trusts. These flexible common law principles allow great latitude for
diverse organizations to be brought within the ambit of section 501(c)
(3). These very characteristics of flexibility and generality, however,
inhibit the development of concrete guidelines for eligibility under the
exemption and result in a certain inconsistency of interpretation. 10
Court decisions and revenue rulings often fulfill a rulemaking function
only by default. While organizations factually similar to organizations
previously ruled upon are likely to be analyzed and treated similarly,
articulable rules can be discerned only with difficulty. This result
is attributable to the inherently amorphous character of any conception
of what is charitable.
Another factor that further hampers the emergence of precise
rules is the frequent mandate from the federal courts that the charitable
exemption and deduction statutes, unlike other tax statutes, should be
liberally construed in the favor of the taxpayer in order to encourage
charitable activity. According to Judge Augustus Hand:
The policy of exempting these [charitable] corporations is firmly
established and has been continuously expanding ever since the
system of income taxation was adopted. The statute [predeces-
sor of section 501] should be read, if possible, in such a way as
to carry out this policy and not to make the result turn on acci-
dental circumstances or legal technicalities."'
In place of "legal technicalities" the courts and the IRS have closely
scrutinized proffered charitable activity in order to decide whether its
particular factual characteristics comport with abstract notions of what
is "religious, scientific, [or] educational . . . ." A broad construc-
tion of such charitable categories will generally result in an expansive
reading of section 501(c)(3).
One common touchstone that underlies this scrutiny and serves as
a prerequisite for a finding of charitability is the extent to which an
activity is conducted for the public benefit. 12  There are two aspects
10. See Reiling, supra note 6, at 525. In a sense it is fortunate that rigid rules
have not crystallized. Otherwise, the creative process of founding new types of charita-
ble activity might be curbed, or at least shunted into certain prescribed directions. A
Commissioner of the IRS once recognized the growth of innovative types of charitable
organizations. Thrower, supra note 9, at 168.
11. Slocum v. Bowers, 15 F.2d 400, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1926), af 'd, 20 F.2d 350 (2d
Cir. 1927). See also, e.g., United States v. Pleasants, 305 U.S. 357, 363 (1939);
Helvering v. Bliss, 293 U.S. 144, 150-51 (1934); Threlfall v. United States, 302 F. Supp.
1114, 1118 (W.D. Wis. 1969).
12. The Code does not use the term, but it is implicit in Gray's definition of
charity as being "for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons." See note 8 supra.
The Regulations specify that a charitable organization must serve "a public rather than a
private interest." Treas. Reg. § 1.501 (c) (3)-1 (d) (1) (ii) (1959).
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to this inquiry in the context of section 501(c)(3): on the one hand,
an activity must be "public" in that it benefits an indefinite number
of persons' rather than ascertainable individuals,"4 while on the other,
it must be of "benefit" to the community." Such a concept as "public
benefit" is of dubious utility without examination of those factual
patterns where public benefit has necessarily been found by virtue of
the granting of the exemption.' 6 Difficult cases arise where any per-
ceived public benefit is indirect or tenuous, as when some of the organ-
ization's activities are clearly not charitable. Examples of these pro-
blems are readily found in the treatment of legal or law-related organ-
izations. The facts that the advocacy element associated with tradition-
al legal services often injects an aspect of personal benefit into the
activity and that legal services cannot be easily placed in the separately
enumerated charitable categories give rise on occasion to strained apo-
logia for findings of public benefit. The legal aid society that provides
free services to indigent persons who could not otherwise afford them
is a type of legal service organization that readily qualifies under tra-
ditional notions of charity. This sort of activity is clearly subsumed
under charity in its most popularly understood guise, expressed in the
IRS's definition as "[r]elief of the poor and distressed or of the
underprivileged.' Accordingly the IRS has always held such organi-
zations to be exempt.'
13. See note 8 supra; Estate of Carolyn E. Gray, 2 T.C. 97, 103 (1943). The
class to be directly benefited need not encompass the entire public. It is enough that the
community benefits by the aid given to the class. Id.
14. This also proscribes individuals from profiting by operating the organization.
The provision in § 501(c)(3) requiring that "no part of the net earnings of which inures
to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual" expresses this principle. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (1959). Payment of reasonable salaries, how-
ever, does not violate the inuring doctrine. Mabee Petroleum Corp. v. United States,
203 F.2d 872, 876 (5th Cir. 1953).
15. The statute states that an organization must be "organized and operated exclu-
sively for . . . charitable . ..purposes." In actual practice this is satisfied by being
"primarily" or "dominantly" charitable. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c) (1959);
Passaic United Hebrew Burial Ass'n v. United States, 216 F. Supp. 500, 505 (D.N.J.
1963). It is more difficult to reach a consensus on the meaning of "primarily" in a
given situation than on "exclusively." This gloss on the wording of the statute serves to
add confusion to uncertainty. See Keir, What is a Charity: Statutory Definition;
Exclusively; Lobbying, in N.Y.U., PROCEEDINGS OF FOURTEENTH ANN. INST. ON FED.
TAX. 19, 22 (H. Sellin ed. 1958). "The basic question, however, as to the 'primary'
purpose of an organization is factual and not always of simple solution." Id.
16. Cf. Goldberg & Cohen, Does Higher Authority than IRS Guidelines Exist for
Public Interest Law Firms?, 34 J. TAx. 77 (1971) (the phrase "broad public interest"
adds little to case law or policy); Reiling, supra note 6, at 595 (whether the public
interest is served by an exemption is a matter of generally accepted opinion).
17. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d) (2) (1959).
18. Rev. Rul. 69-161, 1969-1 C.B. 149. It is also considered charitable for a legal
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In Revenue Ruling 72-55911 the IRS granted exempt status to a
legal aid society whose means clearly had personal benefit aspects, but
that were subsidiary to an overall charitable purpose. There the
purpose was to provide free legal services to low income residents of
economically depressed communities through subsidizing recent law
school graduates who were willing to commit themselves to such work.
The IRS ruled that although the organization provided professional
training and a salary to the interns, who were not themselves members
of a charitable class, the organization's principal purpose remained
charitable in view of the fact that the interns were to be the instruments
through which the charitable purpose was to be accomplished. 0 This
ruling thus stands for the proposition that personal benefit to individ-
uals, which is not of itself charitable, will not preclude a finding of a
primarily charitable purpose if the personal benefit is necessary for
the accomplishment of the charitable objectives.2 1  A charity may
work through indirection; a noncharitable activity may induce further
activity which is charitable-all for an overriding resultant charitable
purpose.
Such circuitous public benefit has also been found in the operation
of law libraries and the activities of bar associations. In United States
v. Proprietors of Social Law Library22 an organization was held to be
charitable as furthering an educational purpose even though use of the
law library that it operated was confined to dues-paying subscribers and
though law students were excluded altogether. The First Circuit ad-
dressed itself to the fact that the specialized learning offered by a law
library is not itself directly useful to the general public. It found in-
direct public benefit by reasoning that the opportunity for research in
the law by those in a position to affect or apply an understanding of
it helps to strengthen those principles of law on which government
aid society to post bail or pay bondsmen's fees for indigent persons accused of crimes,
Rev. Rul. 76-21, 1976-3 I.R.B. 5; Rev. Rul. 76-22, 1976-3 I.R.B. 6.
19. 1972-2 C.B. 247. The organization trained young lawyers, set them up in
practice and compensated them for three years. During this time they were required to
perform free legal services, and after three years were expected to have their own paying
practice and to devote a substantial amount of time to providing free legal services to low
income residents.
20. Id.
21. An alternative analysis could have been that subsidizing the interns was
equivalent to paying reasonable salaries to employees and hence did not violate the
inuring doctrine. See Mabee Petroleum Corp. v. United States, 203 F.2d 872, 876 (5th
Cir. 1953).
22. 102 F.2d 481 (1st Cir. 1939).
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rests-a process vital to the public at large.23  Self interest is even
more obvious and the finding of public benefit more strained in the
cases dealing with bar associations, Dulles v. Johnson24 and St. Louis
Union Trust Co. v. United States, 25 in which charitable deductions for
contributions to such organizations were upheld under the estate tax
analogue of section 170(c).2 In each case, while some of the asso-
ciation's activities were clearly charitable (e.g. , publishing legal arti-
cles, extending legal services to the poor, educating laymen on the law),
others such as regulating the unauthorized practice of law, disciplining
the profession, and advocating legislation, presented the issue of
whether the bar associations were primarily protecting their own com-
mercial interests. Both courts found the regulatory function of the bar
associations to be in the public interest in the sense of helping to pre-
serve the integrity and competence of the legal profession, which serves
the public and in whom the public places its trust.2I Union Trust also
found that the social activities sponsored by the bar association, while
not in themselves charitable, were only incidental to the other chari-
table activities.28
23. Id. at 484; accord, Rev. Rul. 75-196, 1975-1 C.B. 155, which also points out
that the fact that users may derive personal benefit is just a logical by-product of the
educational process. The court also stressed the library's directly educational purpose in
that not only law books, but also books on government, history, and other general inter-
est topics were included, and that the class of beneficiaries was not small or closed in
that membership was open to others besides members of the bar. 102 F.2d at 483.
24. 273 F.2d 362 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 834 (1960).
25. 374 F.2d 427 (8th Cir. 1967).
26. I.R.C. § 2055(a) (2).
27. 273 F.2d at 365-66; 374 F.2d at 436. "We think the government overempha-
sizes the incidental economic benefits and unjustifiably would taint with an accusation of
commercialism legal activity which is dedicated to the public good." Id. at 435.
Moreover, the court in Dulles found that what the bar association did in attempting to
influence legislation was not the "attempting . . . to influence legislation" proscribed by
§ 2055(a)(2) since it was only directed to form, clarity of expression, and the
legislation's relation to other law, rather than to the serving of any selfish motive. 273
F.2d at 367.
28. 374 F.2d at 438. Dulles and Union Trust may serve to illustrate that a finding
of public benefit may be as much an assumption as a conclusion. A given set of
ambivalent facts can be made to support either a positive or a negative finding depending
upon which aspect-public or personal-a court places its emphasis. The holding in
Union Trust, however, is tempered by an acknowledgement that each case turns on its
facts and that some bar associations might not qualify. 374 F.2d at 440. The IRS has
expressed its disapproval of these cases in denying § 501(c)(3) status to a bar
association and will not use them as precedents for exemption questions under this
section. Rev. Rul. 71-505, 1971-2 C.B. 232. Bar associations do qualify as exempt
"business leagues" under § 501(c)(6). Id. In the above ruling the IRS found such
activities as promulgating minimum fee schedules, directing programs aimed at making
the practice of law more profitable, and sponsoring social activities to be "substantial"
noncharitable purposes. This demonstrates that-as in the public-private benefit distinc-
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A recently developed form of legal services organization to which
the IRS has granted exempt status is the public interest law firm. The
requisite public benefit "9 derived from the features that distinguish this
type of law firm from an ordinary commercial law firm. To qualify,
such firms must pursue the interests of the public (such as environ-
mental issues or governmental abuses) in such a form that there is no
direct representation of the private financial interest of individual clients
(as through class actions or injunctions against government)." Further-
more they may neither solicit nor accept attorneys' fees from clients. 1
The exemption is denied if a public interest firm too closely resembles
a commercial firm. 2 Practically, this means that aside from having
to refuse fees, the firm must also ordinarily accept work only when the
individual interests are so diffuse that commercial firms would find it
economically unfeasible to accept the case.
33
Another form of indirectly charitable activity that does not involve
legal services per se is assistance to charitable organizations for the pur-
pose of facilitating their charitable activities. These services are of
indirect public benefit in the sense that only charitable organizations
are directly served, but the public at large benefits from the resultant
increase in efficiency of the charities so served. Otherwise these
activities are closely akin to ordinary commercial services. In Revenue
Ruling 69-57234 an organization formed to construct and maintain a
facility to house member agencies of a community chest (all of which
were exempt under 501(c)(3)) was granted exempt status. 3 The
tion-the line between "substantial" and "incidental" is one more of emphasis than
substance.
29. This activity is charitable not because the viewpoints it may advance are
necessarily the most auspicious for the public as a whole, but because it helps to
illuminate the issues of significant public interest that might otherwise be ignored. Rev.
Rul. 75-74, 1975-1 C.B. 152, 153. See generally Goldberg & Cohen, supra note 16;
Note, TIze Tax-Exempt Status of Public Interest Law Firms, 45 So. CAL. L. REv. 228
(1972).
30. Rev. Proc. 71-39, 1971-2 C.B. 575, 576 (guidelines for issuing advance ruling
of exemption to public interest law firms).
31. Rev. Proc. 75-13, 1975-1 C.B. 662 (amplifying Rev. Proc. 71-39). They may,
however, accept out-of-pocket expenses or court-awarded fees from opposing parties.
Id.
32. See Rev. Rul. 75-75, 1975-1 C.B. 154, which denied an exemption to a firm
that charged and accepted attorneys' fees when clients were willing to pay. The fees
never exceeded actual costs and were much less than those charged by commercial
firms.
33. See Rev. Rul. 75-74, 1975-1 C.B. 152, 153.
34. 1969-2 C.B. 119.
35. What distinguished this organization from an ordinary landlord was that rental
income was only equivalent to operating costs (significantly below the fair market value
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provision of this facility was judged to further a charitable purpose by
encouraging coordination among the member agencies and aiding the
more efficient use of their labor resources, thus enhancing the perfor-
mance of their respective charitable functions.30 A comparable aid to
charity is the management or consulting service. In Revenue Ruling
71-52911 an organization formed to help 501(c)(3) charities manage
their funds more effectively was held to be performing a charitable
function itself.3
Against this background, those attributes of the organization in
Revenue Ruling 76-442 that would tend to obstruct a finding of chari-
tability are readily apparent. The essential reason for the negative
finding appears to be the refusal by the IRS to recognize the indirect
public benefit of increased charitable giving derived from the tax counsel-
ing services. As pointed out above, when an activity serves both a
private and a public interest, the conclusion as to which "predominates"
is largely a matter of emphasis.3 As in the bar association and law
library cases,40 individuals may receive a direct benefit, but that does
not necessarily preclude a finding that an indirect public benefit over-
bears the significance of the private benefit.
A narrow focus upon the act of tax planning or even of giving,
independent of the ultimate charitable use of the funds, would support
a finding that the organization's activity is not directly charitable.
Nevertheless, tax planning directly facilitates charitable activity through
of comparable office space) and that certain amenities were provided, such as a large
central meeting room for the free use of the lessees. Id.
36. Id. "The performance of a particular activity that is not inherently charitable
may nonetheless further a charitable purpose. The overall result in any given case is
dependent on why and how that activity is actually being conducted."
37. 1971-2 C.B. 234.
38. The fact that the organization was controlled directly by a membership
composed of exempt colleges and universities, was funded by capital received from these
institutions, and charged fees to its members of less than 15% of cost, distinguished its
service from that of a commercial consulting firm. Id. Other organizations providing
similar services, however, have been denied exemption as being too akin to a trade or
business. Rev. Rul. 69-528, 1969-2 C.B. 127. One basis of the denial was that if a tax
exempt organization performed such a service on a fee basis it would result in taxable
unrelated business income. Id. at 128. This infirmity was not overcome even when the
services were provided at cost and exclusively for exempt organizations. Rev. Rul. 72-
369, 1972-2 C.B. 245.
39. See note 27 supra. The IRS's position in the instant ruling that "[a]lthough
funds may ultimately be made available to charity as a result of the organization's
planning assistance to individuals, the benefits to the public are tenuous in view of the
predominately private purpose served by arranging individuals' tax and estate plans"
betrays this tacit bias. Rev. Rul. 76-442, 1976-46 I.R.B. at 13.
40. See notes 22-28 and accompanying text supra.
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serving a middleman function of bringing contributor and charitable
organization together. This function is analogous to that of those
organizations such as the consulting service and the landlord whose
charitable purposes are to promote the efficiency of other charitable
organizations4' and are thus inextricably intertwined and dependent
upon the existence of other organizations' charitable activities. 4
2
The direct benefit to the individual client derived from the organi-
zation's services should not of itself preclude a finding of charitability.
Directly apposite on this point is the ruling granting exemption to the
legal aid society that subsidized legal interns in order that they might
provide free legal services to the indigent. There, the IRS stated:
The fact that recipients of the organization's financial assistance,
the legal interns, are not themselves members of a charitable class
does not mean the organization is not operating primarily for
charitable purposes. The interns are merely the instruments by
which the charitable purposes are accomplished. Therefore, the
fact that they derive personal gain from the arrangement does not
detract from the organization's charitable purposes. 43
In the instant ruling the individual clients are analogous to the interns.
Since they are the contributors to charity, they are the indispensable
"instruments" for accomplishment of the charitable purpose of making
more funds available for charitable use. Without some support (i.e.,
personally advantageous tax planning) it is likely that they could not
be induced to give as much or at all to charity. The fact that clients
could afford legal tax planning services (whereas young lawyers could
not afford to work for free without starving) should not necessarily
mean that free tax planning is not indispensable to the furthering of
the organization's eleemosynary purpose. It is probable that high
income taxpayers who would make charitable gifts as part of their
estate and tax plans in any case would not avail themselves of this
service, but would instead utilize private firms. When large deductions
hinge on reliable tax advice high income taxpayers are likely to place
their trust in the commercial services of the tax bar rather than in free
legal services. The middle income taxpayers who have a desire to con-
tribute to charity, however, may be deterred from doing so if they have
41. See notes 34-38 and accompanying text supra.
42. Perhaps "meta-charitable" would be an apt description of this function. This
should be distinguished from the charity that dispenses funds through a second tier of
foundations and the non-exempt § 502 "feeder organization," which distributes its profits
to exempt § 501 organizations.




to retain high priced counsel in order to take advantage of the induce-
ments that the tax law provides for charitable giving.44
The IRS perhaps unduly emphasized the assumed ability to pay
on the part of the organization's clients in concluding that the "com-
mercial" nature of the service taints any charitable purpose.' 5 Whether
an activity is "commercial" and hence noncharitable entails a broader
inquiry than payment by clients, even though otherwise charitable
organizations, such as a public interest law firm46 and a charitable con-
sulting service,47 have been disqualified solely for receipt of fees. For
instance, the IRS distinguishes public interest law firms from commer-
cial law firms not only because they accept no fees, but also because
they perform work that commerical law firms ordinarily do not.4 8 Com-
merical law firms routinely engage in estate and tax planning on a pro-
fitable basis. In addition, tax planning in its most immediate context
benefits only the individual, not the public. Since any individual in
a position to avail himself of such services is almost certainly not indi-
gent, the organization could not be said to benefit the class of the "poor
and distressed" as the legal aid organization does in providing admit-
tedly ordinary legal services.49
Nevertheless, if the tax counseling organization's services would
for the most part be sought by those who would not otherwise seek
to retain tax counsel, then the argument that this service is "commer-
cial" is somewhat specious. The services performed by legal aid so-
cieties are also obtainable from ordinary law firms, but that fact alone
does not render them commercial. What the IRS seems legitimately
concerned with in Revenue Ruling 76-442 is not so much that a benefit
may inure to those who operate the service if payment is accepted, but
rather that its clients will abuse the service by obtaining free advice
and at the same time deduct any fees they might choose to pay5" for
44. In this respect, the provision of legal services for the middle income class of
citizens, who are in general not well provided for by the legal profession, could be viewed
as a directly charitable activity, though as yet there is no precedential support for this
proposition.
45. "The organization is providing commercially available services to individuals
who can afford them." Rev. Rul. 76-442, 1976-46 I.R.B. at 13.
46. See note 32 supra.
47. See note 38 supra.
48. See notes 29-33 and accompanying text supra.
49. See notes 17-21 and accompanying text supra.
50. The ruling does not state that the organization does in fact accept fees for
service. Nevertheless, the statement that it "does not require any payment for its
services" implies that it does not refuse such payment. Rev. Rul. 76-442, 1976-46 I.R.B.
at 12.
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these services as "charitable contributions" under section 170. Tax-
payers would be obtaining a deduction for learning how to obtain de-
ductions, a situation that would understandably displease the IRS.
Section 170 itself, however, is sufficient to prevent this undue advan-
tage even if the instant organization were granted exemption under
section 501(c)(3).
Since the definition of "charitable contribution" in section 170(c)
almost precisely parallels section 501(c)(3), 5 ' any deduction allowed
under section 170 must a priori be to an organization qualifying under
section 501(c)(3). Therefore, all of the considerations germane to
the latter section are encompassed by section 170 as well, with the ad-
ditional requirement that the proffered contribution not be made with
the expectation that the donor will receive a consideration for his pay-
ment. The concept of public benefit permeates section 170 as well:
a payment made for the receipt of a personal benefit precludes the con-
tribution from being charitable. The test is objective, centering not
on the donor's subjective intent, but rather on what he actually receives
for what he pays.52 The characterization of the payment made by the
donor or the donee is not determinative. If the benefits to the con-
tributor are not "substantial" then the deduction is allowed for the
reason that the benefits flowing to the public offset the benefits flowing
to the contributor. 3
An example of this categorization process is provided by Oppewal
v. Commissioner,54 in which a taxpayer's contributions to a religious
education society that operated a school supported entirely by public
contributions were held to be nondeductible when the taxpayer's
children attended the school.55 The First Circuit reasoned that the
payments should be regarded in substance as tuition since such pay-
ments, though not required, served the same function as tuition in sup-
porting the operation of the school. This focus upon value allows those
contributions that are in excess of the fair market value of the consid-
eration received to be deductible to the extent of the excess. 6
51. See note 2 supra.
52. Crosby Valve & Gage Co. v. Commissioner, 380 F.2d 146, 146-47 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 976 (1967).
53. Singer Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 413, 423 (Ct. CI. 1971).
54. 468 F.2d 1000 (1st Cir. 1972), noted in 8 SuFF. L. REv. 349 (1974).
55. Id. at 1002. See Delong v. Commissioner, 309 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1962), for
another school contribution qua tuition case.
56. See Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104 (deductibility of payments in connection
with participation in fund-raising activities for charity).
EXCLUSIONARY ZONING
The IRS would clearly be justified under this judicially developed
principle of section 170 in disallowing deductions by the Revenue
Ruling 76-442 organization's clients for their donations to the extent
the value of the donations equals the cost of comparable tax planning
services. This action would substantially exorcise those dimensions of
commercialism and private benefit to which the IRS objected. Such
an approach would have been preferable to denying 501(c)(3) status
altogether, for the prior decisions and policy of section 501 would
support a finding by a federal court that the organization qualifies for
the exemption. Section 501 as manipulated in Revenue Ruling 76-
442 is simply too blunt an instrument for use in deterring individual
taxpayers from utilizing the charitable exemption as a subterfuge by
which otherwise nondeductible personal legal expenses are trans-
formed into charitable gifts. Section 170 could accomplish this result
more directly and with more finesse. Such an alternative approach
would permit the organization to continue to pursue its purpose of en-
couraging gifts to charity without imposing a tax burden of atonement
on the organization itself for the possible sins of its clients.
FRANK LANE WILLIAMSON
Zoning-Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Develop-
ment Corp.: An Implicit Endorsement of Exclusionary Zoning?
In recent years there has been considerable uncertainty in the
federal courts about the precise nature of the equal protection standards
applicable to cases of allegedly exclusionary zoning.' Lower federal
1. See Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the
Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767, 799-800 (1969). Compare Comment, Challenging Ex-
clusionary Zoning, 10 RxCH. L REv. 646, 686 (1976) (courts will apply rational basis
test, so challenge will usually fail) and Comment, Does a Zoning Ordinance with Ra-
cially Discriminatory Effects Violate the Constitution? Metropolitan Housing Develop-
nent Corporation v. The Village of Arlington Heights, 7 Loy. Cm. L.J. 141, 157 (1976)
("steadily expanding limits of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
have now infringed on the formerly solid police powers of local governments to
determine land use") with Note, Challenging Exclusionary Zoning: Contrasting Recent
Federal and State Court Approaches, 4 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 147, 157 (1975) (ordinance
that perpetuates residential segregation likely to fall, as federal court will apply strict
scrutiny test).
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courts have upheld the claims of low and moderate income plaintiffs
seeking adequately priced housing in the suburbs where the activities
of the municipality were overtly discriminatory, - but courts have found
it more difficult to deal with cases in which discrimination is more
subtle but equally effective.3 While generally disfavoring the claims
of low income plaintiffs, 4 the United States Supreme Court had, until
recently, avoided deciding exclusionary zoning cases on equal protec-
tion grounds. The recent case of Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.5 is the first instance in which
the Supreme Court has directly met the substantive equal protection
issue, and its decision implies that plaintiffs will have to carry a heavy
burden to be successful in the federal courts.
Arlington Heights, a suburb about twenty-five miles northwest of
Chicago, consists primarily of single family homes that accommodated
a population that was 99.6% white in 1970.0 In 1970, the Clerics of
St. Viator (a religious order) decided to develop fifteen acres located
within Arlington Heights for low and moderate income housing. The
Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation (MHDC), a nonprofit
housing developer that had constructed similar projects in nearby
suburbs, was given a ninety-nine year lease on the property with an
option to purchase contingent upon obtaining federal financing and the
2. See United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975) (within two months of HUD approval of a housing
project, all-white area incorporated itself and zoned out low and moderate income
housing); Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1970) (city rezoned plaintiff's land for park, declared
building moratorium, and mayor refused to sign form that would allow plaintiff's project
to tie onto city sewer system); Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir.
1970) (city's refusal to rezone plaintiff's property contrary to recommendation of city
planning director).
3. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409
(7th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977). This case was perhaps the first in which a
court of appeals found no discriminatory intent on the part of defendants, and yet found
for plaintiffs. See text accompanying notes 18 to 25 inlra. See also Southern Alameda
Spanish Speaking Org. v. Union City, 424 F.2d 291, 294 (9th Cir. 1970).
4. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), in which non-resident low and
moderate income blacks challenged the zoning ordinance of a municipality as unconstitu-
tional because it reserved only two percent of the land for non-single-family residential
use. The Court held for defendants on procedural grounds, but Justice Brennan,
dissenting, wrote that "the opinion . . . can be explained only by an indefensible
hostility to the claim on the merits." Id. at 520. See also James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S.
137 (1971) (upholding state constitutional amendment that would require that residents
of a municipality approve by referendum the location, construction or purchase of low
income housing in their jurisdiction).
5. 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977).
6. Id. at 558.
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town's approval of a zoning change.7 The MHDC contracted with
an architect to draw up plans for the proposed development. The final
plans provided for 190 units of two-story townhouses, over half of
which were to be particularly suited to elderly residents, and also pro-
vided that sixty percent of the land would be devoted to green space.
8
MHDC applied to the Village of Arlington Heights for a zoning
change, but this request was denied.9 The fifteen acre parcel had been
zoned R-3 (for single family dwellings), and would have to be rezoned
to R-5 (for multi-family dwellings) in order for the townhouses to be
built.' 0 The town's zoning plan called for an R-5 zone to be designated
only as a buffer between single family homes and such incompatible
uses as manufacturing or commercial areas. The parcel under consid-
eration faced single family dwellings on two sides and the open areas
of the church land on the other two sides. The Village Plan Commis-
sion turned down the request to rezone after a series of public meet-
ings" and despite MHDC's revision of the project design to meet the
village's technical objections.
12
The plaintiffs, MHDC and individuals representing those moder-
ate income minority members who worked or desired to work and live
in Arlington Heights but could not find decent and reasonably priced
7. Id. at 559. Initially MHDC intended to use the federally subsidized § 236
program but that program was halted in 1973 and MHDC had since indicated its
willingness to participate in the federally subsidized § 8 housing program of the Housing
and Community Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (Supp. V 1975), as
amended by Housing Authorization Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-375, § 2, 90 Stat. 1068.
Id. at 558 n.2.
8. 97 S. Ct. at 559; Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington
Heights, 517 F.2d 409, 411 (7th Cir. 1975); Brief for Respondents at 7, Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977).
9. 97 S. Ct. at 559-60. Two members of the Arlington Heights Planning Board
who dissented from the decision to deny the rezoning noted that there was no separate
classification for townhouses in the Arlington Heights zoning plan and that R-5 was
applied only because it was as close an approximation as was available. They further
noted that professional planners tend to treat townhouses as more akin to R-3 than R-5.
Comment, 7 Loy. CHi. L.J., supra note 1, at 142 n.7.
10. 97 S. Ct. at 558-59.
11. Id. at 559. Plaintiff MHDC attempted to impress upon the Court the
explicitly racial nature of the community response to the project that was evidenced at
three public meetings, in the local press, and in letters sent to town officials. Brief for
Respondent at 16-19. The Court, however, preferred to emphasize the positive concerns
voiced by the town officials in reaching the decision. 97 S. Ct. at 559-60.
12. Following the zoning change request investigations were undertaken and re-
ports issued by the local fire chief, building commissioner, director of public works and
acting director of engineering. Only one problem was mentioned, that of surface water
runoff, and the plans were changed to ameliorate that impact. Plaintiffs' Complaint at
13, Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 373 F. Supp. 208
(N.D. Ill. 1974); see 97 S. Ct. at 559.
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housing,'" filed suit in the federal district court alleging that the
village's refusal to rezone perpetuated segregation, 14 denied plaintiff
developer's right to use its property in a reasonable fashion under the
fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution, 15 and denied
individual plaintiffs' rights under the fourteenth amendment, 42 U.S.C.
sections 1981, 1982 and 1983, and the Fair Housing Act.16 The dis-
trict court found that the village's motivation in denying the rezoning
was based on its concern for property values and the integrity of its
zoning plan, and that there was no act of invidious discrimination that
would require the showing of a compelling state interest. 17
On appeal' 8 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals looked closely
at the evidence to determine if the Village had applied its zoning laws
with particular strictness in this case. It could not find clearly errone-
ous the trial court's determination that the village's purpose in denying
the rezoning application was a legitimate concern with the integrity of
the zoning plan.'" The court recognized that the town's failure to
rezone had a disproportionate effect on Blacks in the Chicago area, but
in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in James v. Valtierra,20
13. The Court ruling devotes substantial space to the matter of plaintiffs' standing.
97 S. Ct. at 561-63. In Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), the Court had denied
similar claims by nonresident plaintiffs seeking low income housing in the suburbs,
organizations that owned land in the defendant community, and builders' organizations
whose members had been economically injured. Denying standing to all plaintiffs, the
Court indicated that only those who were prepared and able to build a home or who
would be eligible to inhabit a particular project currently precluded and had been denied
the right either by the local ordinance or its enforcement would have standing to use the
courts. Id. at 516. Under Warth, MHDC could challenge an ordinance or its
enforcement on due process grounds as arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable under
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), but it could not assert the rights of
others with respect to an equal protection challenge. Plaintiff Ramson was empowered to
assert the equal protection claim because he would qualify for and would like to reside in
MHDC's project if it were built, and then if MHDC's claims were successful the court
could have a practical way of granting relief to him. See 97 S. Ct. at 563.
14. Plaintiffs' Complaint at 15, 21.
15. Id. at 22.
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
17. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 373 F. Supp.
208, 211 (N.D. II. 1974).
18. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409
(7th Cir. 1975).
19. That evidence showed that the town had rezoned land from R-3 to R-5 60
times. In about two-thirds of the cases the action had complied with the zoning plan. Of
the 15 stated failures, only four were clear violations, and in a number of cases where the
rezoning was denied the town was applying its buffer zone policy. Id. at 412.
S20. 402 U.S. 137 (1971). In James, the Court upheld a provision of the California
Constitution requiring that state-developed housing for low income persons be approved
only after approval by community referendum.
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the Seventh Circuit could not infer racial discrimination from dispropor-
tionate impact alone.
The court did not stop its inquiry at this point, but went on to
assess the town's decision in light of its historical context and ultimate
effect. 21 It noted that the Chicago metropolitan area had a long history
of segregated housing patterns. Although it did not suggest that Arling-
ton Heights was responsible for these segregated patterns,22 the court
did find that Arlington Heights had exploited those extensive patterns
of segregation by failing to integrate its community23 and was in this
case again attempting to avoid its responsibility by rejecting "the only
present hope of. . .making even a small contribution toward eliminat-
ing the pervasive problem of segregated housing. '24  Unable to find
a compelling state interest that would justify the rezoning denial, the
court implied that Arlington Heights had a duty to alleviate the problem
of segregated housing.25
After the Supreme Court granted certiorari 26 but before the case
was argued, the Court decided Washington v. Davis,2' a case involving
employment discrimination.28 In Washington the Court cited several
cases, among them the Seventh Circuit's Arlington Heights decision, as
incorrect applications of equal protection law.29 Writing for the
21. 517 F.2d at 413-14.
22. While not directly responsible for the areawide pattern, the court noted that
plaintiffs' demographic expert had testified that Arlington Heights was the most segregat-
ed community in the Chicago metropolitan area among municipalities of greater than
50,000 residents. Id. at 414 n.1.
23. The court's exploitation charge was based on a Seventh Circuit case in which a
builder was held liable for charging inflated prices for housing in black neighborhoods as
compared with similar housing it had constructed in white neighborhoods. Clark v.
Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1974).
24. 517 F.2d at 415. Although the court did not cite any cases, there is precedent
in state courts for requiring that a town take into account the regional housing situation
in enacting and enforcing its zoning plans. See cases cited notes 88-91 infra. But see
Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976).
25. 517 F.2d at 414. Whether the court would require that the town take
affirmative steps to alleviate the problem or that it merely refrain from frustrating any
attempted solution is not clear, but the latter possibility seems more probable. For a
discussion of the merits of the remedy that would require affirmative action, see note 88
infra.
26. 423 U.S. 1030 (1975).
27. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
28. The case involved unsuccessful black applicants for police training in Washing-
ton, D.C., who were challenging the use of a written examination testing verbal skills as
a criterion for selection of candidates. The Court denied their claim that the test was a
denial of equal protection because it excluded a higher proportion of blacks than whites.
Id.
29. Id. at 244 n.12. Other cases cited, all of which dealt with housing and zoning
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majority Justice White said, "[w]e have not held that a law, neutral
on its face and serving ends otherwise within the power of the govern-
ment to pursue, is invalid under the Equal Protection Clause simply
because it may affect a greater proportion of one race than of an-
other." 0  Disproportionate impact was held to be relevant to the in-
quiry, but not determinative.3'
While the Court could have simply remanded Arlington Heights32"
for reconsideration in light of Washington v. Davis,3 the Court chose
to use the case to elaborate on the Washington ruling. Writing for the
majority, Justice Powell held that proof of the racially discriminatory
intent or purpose that would be necessary to invoke the Court's strict
scrutiny test was to be determined by "a sensitive inquiry into such cir-
cumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available.""1  Dis-
proportionate impact might provide an important starting point, but
would not be determinative, absent a stark pattern of discrimination."
In the usual case alleging racial discrimination, at least three
factors might be considered: "a series of official actions taken for in-
vidious purposes";" "a specific sequence of events leading up to the
challenged decision";3 7 and departures from normal substantive and
and had been finally decided, were Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1971)
(public housing); Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971) (zoning); Southern Alameda Spanish
Speaking Org. v. Union City, 424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970) (zoning); Norwalk CORE v.
Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968) (urban renewal); Crow v. Brown,
332 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1971), afj'd, 457 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1972) (public
housing).
30. 426 U.S. at 242.
31. Id. at 242-43.
32. 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977).
33. In his dissent, Justice White indicated that he would have preferred not to
decide the case at all, but would rather have followed the Court's usual practice and
remanded the case to the lower court for reconsideration in light of Washington v. Davis.
Id. at 567.
34. Id. at 564.
35. Id. Here the Court used as an example Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339
(1960), a case in which a state legislature changed the boundaries of a town from a
square to an irregular 28-sided figure, effectively eliminating 99% of the town's black
voters from the voting rolls.
36. 97 S. Ct. at 564, citing the following cases: Griffin v. County School Bd., 377
U.S. 218 (1964) (school desegregation); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939) (voting
rights case in which there had been a long history of racial discrimination and a series of
contemporary activities that left little doubt of discriminatory intent); and Davis v.
Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala.), ajj'd per curiam, 336 U.S. 933 (1949) (voting
rights).
37. 97 S. Ct. at 564. Here the Court cited Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369
(1967), a case in which the Court had held invalid a recently passed California state
constitutional amendment that would have prohibited the state from interfering with
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procedural sequences .3  In extraordinary cases, the legislative or ad-
ministrative history of the particular actions or statutes may be consid-
ered. 9 Applying these criteria to the case before it, the Supreme
Court noted the district court's finding that racial discrimination had
not motivated defendant;41 that the circuit court had determined that
the zoning ordinance had not been applied more harshly in this case
than it had been in most similar instances and thus there was no series
of discriminatory official acts;4 and that there was no evidence of dis-
crimination in the legislative and administrative history.42 Having de-
cided the constitutional issue, the Court remanded the case to the cir-
cuit court to pass on plaintiffs' complaint under the Fair Housing Act.
43
private discrimination in the lease or sale of real property, and Kennedy Park Homes
Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010
(1971), in which the court of appeals had granted plaintiffs an injunction against the
town when it was shown that the town had declared a moratorium on subdivision
construction and rezoned the land on which plaintiffs had planned to construct low and
moderate income housing immediately after the town had become aware that the project
was being planned.
38. 97 S. Ct. at 564 (citing Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir.
1970), in which the defendant city refused to rezone a parcel of land for low income
housing against the advice of its planning directors, and without a valid reason).
39. Id. at 565. The Court is clearly not suggesting use of legal and administrative
history except in a very unusual case. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951), and
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974), indicate that a high degree of
privilege is accorded to legislators and lawmakers.
40. 97 S. Ct. at 565.
41. See note 19 supra.
42. The Court emphasized that the Planning Commission and Village Board were
apparently concerned with the integrity of the town zoning ordinance. The Court
refused to speculate on reasons why the Village Planner was never asked his opinion on
the proposed project. 97 S. Ct. at 566 n.19.
43. Id. The district court did not consider the Fair Housing Act claim because no
section was specifically pleaded and the court did not think any section was specifically
applicable to the facts of the case. 373 F. Supp. at 209. Section 3601 of the Act states,
"It is the policy of the United States to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair
housing throughout the United States." 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1970). Whether the Fair
Housing Act will be useful in the present case is not clear from court decisions. The one
exclusionary zoning case decided on the basis of the Fair Housing Act, United States v.
City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1186 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042
(1975), held that the effect of defendant's actions was racial discrimination and required
the defendants to demonstrate a compelling state interest. The denial of certiorari in
this case may have been an early signal from the Court that it would be willing to allow
the evidence of a racially discriminatory effect to affect the outcome of a civil rights case
based on a statutory claim, when it would not allow effect to play any significant role in
those cases based on constitutional claims. In Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976), the Court recognized that under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (equal
employment opportunity) a prima facie showing of a racially disproportionate impact
would trigger increased judicial scrutiny, but declined to extend that standard to a
constitutional claim. Id. at 246-48. The remand of the Arlington Heights case may
well indicate that the Court is suggesting that it is up to the Congress to prescribe or the
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The holdings in Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights make
a finding of racial discrimination much less likely by prohibiting courts
from inferring intent from disproportionate impact except in the most
outrageous cases 4 and by requiring a specific showing of intent to dis-
criminate."0 This approach is arguably not suitable for most equal pro-
tection cases, and is particularly inappropriate in the field of zoning and
housing.
In restricting the inquiry to the intent or purpose rather than the
impact of an official action or statute, the Court has limited the lower
courts to two types of evidentiary sources, both of which contain funda-
mental weaknesses. A court may look to an official action or series
of actions that may have led up to the challenged zoning action, or a
court may scrutinize the words or writings of those responsible for the
official action or statute in order to determine whether racial factors
motivated their decision.
The actions of officials prior to the passage of the challenged stat-
ute or taking of the action cannot be expected to provide much assist-
ance in the determination of discriminatory purpose or intent. From
the cases cited by the Court in Arlington Heights,40 it is clear that an
application of the Court's level of scrutiny will curb only the most
blatant and obvious examples of discrimination.47 Few municipal or
state officials would be expected to exhibit their prejudices or those of
their constituency so flagrantly.
The second consideration suggested by the Court is words or writ-
ings of the officials responsible for the challenged action. To rely on
the words or writings of the officials responsible presents a number
of evidentiary problems in any equal protection case. First, the court
lower courts to apply similar standards for the adjudication of equal rights claims in
cases involving something less than overt discrimination. See Comment, Applying the
Title VII Prima Facie Case to Title VIII Litigation, 11 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 128
(1976). But see Boyd v. Lefrak Org., 509 F.2d 1110, 1113 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 896 (1975). See generally Dubofsky, Fair Housing: A Legislative Histoty and a
Perspective, 8 WASHBURN L.J. 149 (1969); Note, Discrimination in Employment and in
Housing: Private Enforcement Provisions of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968, 82
HARv. L. REv. 834 (1969).
44. For examples of challenges likely to be sustained even under Arlington Heights,
see Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917), and cases cited note 2 supra.
45. For a thorough discussion of motivation as evidence in constitutional cases, see
Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205
(1970).
46. 97 S. Ct. at 564; see notes 36 & 37 supra.
47. See, e.g., Progress Dev. Corp. v. Mitchell, 286 F.2d 222 (7th Cir. 1961), in
which a Park Board condemned plaintiffs' land within three months of plaintiffs'
receiving city approval to build a subdivision that would be integrated. See also Crow v.
Brown, 475 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1972).
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is likely to find a multiplicity of constitutional and unconstitutional pur-
poses not only within the deliberative body, but also within any of the
individual members of that body. To attempt to determine the part
that the discriminatory purpose played in the decision would be ex-
tremely difficult. 48  Second, even assuming that the motivation of the
officials could be determined by looking at their words and writings,
at least with regard to this part of the test, the same act once struck
down as discriminatory could possibly be repassed following the recita-
tion of more constitutionally permissible words or writings.4  Third,
the purpose or motive behind an official act or statute does not neces-
sarily control the actual impact or effect of the act-good intentions
might produce unconstitutional acts and unconstitutional motives might
produce constitutionally acceptable acts. 50 Finally, the Supreme Court
has recognized that an in-depth inquiry into purposes of legislation for
the purpose of validating its constitutionality would be an unnecessary
or unwise intrusion into a coordinate branch of government .5
In light of these evidentiary difficulties, it appears that any plain-
tiff will bear a very heavy burden of proof when he challenges an offi-
cial act as discriminating under the equal protection clause. The
nature of zoning law is such that the burden of proof may be insur-
mountable in the case of challenges to zoning decisions. First, the acts
of local officials have traditionally been accorded a presumption of
validity by the courts, so the burden is immediately placed on the chal-
lengers of a zoning ordinance to establish that the regulation is clearly
arbitrary or unreasonable.12  Second, while open to the challenge that
48. The Court would appear to be aware of the difficuly of attempting to divine the
true intent of the legislature. See, e.g., McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 276-77
(1973); Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-25 (1971); United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1968).
49. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-25 (1971). Under a combined actions-
words test, however, a court might well find discriminatory intent sufficient to strike
down the second act, although under a pure words-writings standard, plaintiffs would
have no argument.
50. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) ("good intent or absence
of discriminatory intent does not redeem . . . procedures or . . . mechanisms" that
inhibit racial integration and are not related to job performance); Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961) ("It is of no consolation to an individual
denied the equal protection of the laws that it was done in good faith.").
51. See McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 276-77 (1973); Fletcher v. Peck, 10
U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
52. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926) ("If the
validity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the
legislative judgment must be allowed to control."); see Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,
416 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1974); Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 187-88 (1928); 1
C. ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW §§ 5.18-.19 (1975); 1A id. § 7.18 (1974).
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they do not serve a permissible purpose, zoning regulations are to a
great extent insulated from this type of challenge. Protection of prop-
erty values has long been a constitutionally accepted objective of zon-
ing,a3 and the discrimination inherent in the ordinance is primarily eco-
nomic discrimination. 4 The direct effect of that economic discrimina-
tion, however, is racial discrimination, because the poor include a dis-
proportionate number of minority individuals." Because local officials
have a judicially acceptable rationale for zoning out the poor,", and are
accorded a presumption of validity in their acts, proof of a racially dis-
criminatory intent or purpose sufficient to require the strict scrutiny of
the Court will be inordinately difficult to obtain.
In many ways Arlington Heights represents the Court's reaffirma-
tion of some of its long-standing principles. First, the Court has a long
history of avoiding the issues involved in land use legislation. 7 After
53. See Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Township of Wayne, 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693
(1952), appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 919 (1953); 1 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN PLANNING
LAW §§ 5.04, 15.01 (1974). Mr. Williams, who spent ten years reading over 10,000
cases involving zoning and land use, id. at vii, suggests that in practice, the real motive
could be stated in terms of "ensuring an increase" in property values, and that the result
of a court's analysis of zoning issues in terms of the protection of property values
rationale is normally, though not overtly, an anti-social one, typically involving racial or
economic discrimination. Id. § 15.04.
54. Protection of property values is achieved not only by preventing incompatible
or unsightly uses near residential areas, but also by zoning out uses that would allow
high-density developments and mobile homes-uses that are thought to put a strain on
the local tax base and increase property tax rates. See L. SAGALYN & G. STERNLIEB,
ZONING AND HOUSING COSTS 3-4 (1972). There is substantial evidence, however, that
apartments and high density uses, even with regard to school costs, more than pay their
way. See R. BABCOCK & F. BOSSELMAN, EXCLUSIONARY ZONING: LAND USE REGULATIONS
AND HOUSING IN THE SEVENTIES 53 (1973) [hereinafter cited as BABCOCK]. In the case of
MHDC there was also substantial evidence that the project would more than pay its way.
Brief for Respondents at 9, Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev.
Corp., 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977).
The discrimination is economic in a broader sense also. For any community to act
for the good of the larger metropolitan area (by accepting its fair share of low and
moderate income housing) would be to put itself in a less competitive situation (and
thus, to lower property values) in comparison with neighboring communities that do not
choose to accept their fair share. See ADVISORY COMM. TO DEP'T OF HUD, NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF SCIENCEs-NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ENGINEERING, FREEDOM OF CHOICE IN
HOUSING: OPPORTUNITIES AND CONSTRAINTS 31 (1972).
55. In 1967, 41% of the total non-white population was poor while only 12% of
the white population was poor. NATIONAL COMM'N ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE
AMERICAN CrrY 45 (1968) [hereinafter cited as BUILDING].
56. See authorities cited notes 52 & 53 supra.
57. See James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (the people of a community have
a right to decide whether they want low and moderate income housing). See also
Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 461 F.2d 1171, 1173 (5th Cir. 1972), a!f'g on rehearing en
banc per curiam 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971) ("Federal Courts are reluctant to enter
the field of local government operations.").
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it validated the concept of a zoning ordinance and the deprivation of
property rights which that might entail in the 1920's,58 the Court, with
only two exceptions,5" remained silent on these issues until the
1970's.00 The fact that neither the "Roosevelt Court" nor the "Warren
Court," with their activist approaches to the role of the judiciary and
respect for contemporary social issues, ever became involved in these
issues has left zoning law without any precedent that would justify sig-
nificant judicial intervention. 6'
Second, the Court was apparently unwilling to revive two equal
protection issues on which it might have based a decision favorable to
the plaintiffs in Arlington Heights-that wealth is a suspect classifica-
tion or that housing is a fundamental interest. The Court appears to
be holding to its decision in San Antonio Independent School District
v. Rodriguez 2 that wealth is a suspect classification only when an
individual is denied a benefit because of his poverty and thereby suf-
fers an "absolute deprivation of a meaningful opportunity to enjoy that
benefit."' 3  Regardless of whether housing is a benefit that might be
entitled to protection, the fact that plaintiffs were not suffering an abso-
lute deprivation appears to vitiate any claim they might have under
Rodriguez. The right to housing of a particular quality has been speci-
fically denied status as a fundamental interest, 64 although arguably
Arlington Heights does not involve the right to inhabit housing of a par-
ticular quality, but rather the right to inhabit housing in a particular
location.
58. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Nectow v. City
of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 187(1928).
59. Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (upheld mining restrictions on a
gravel pit within the city limits that made property virtually useless); Berman v. Parker,
348 U.S. 26 (1954) (validated exercise of eminent domain powers in urban renewal
program).
60. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (validation of a local
zoning ordinance that placed restrictions on the definition of family as it appeared in the
ordinance); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (upholding provision of state
constitution requiring that state-developed housing for low income persons be approved
only after community approval by referendum).
61. See 1 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 53, § 4.03. At one point, however, Justice
Douglas seems to have recognized the problem. Concurring in Reitman v. Mulkey, 387
U.S. 369 (1967), he wrote, "[L]eaving the zoning function to groups which practice
racial discrimination and are licensed by the States constitutes state action in the
narrowest sense in which Shelley v. Kraemer. . .can be construed." Id. at 384-85. See
also Justice Marshall's dissent in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 14
(1974).
62. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
63. Id. at 20.
64. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
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Finally, in remanding the case for consideration of the statutory
claim,"' the Court appears to reiterate its preference for requiring the
legislative branch of government to make those decisions that will have
substantial economic or social impact."0 In Washington the Court
made it clear that where statutory and constitutional claims overlap, it
prefers to require that a plaintiff carry a heavy burden of proof (absent
overt discrimination) with regard to the constitutional claim, leaving it
to the legislature, if it so desires, to prescribe more liberal standards
in a statutory context.6
7
The Court's deference to the decisions of local officials and its
attempt to place the responsibility for the integration of housing upon
the legislative branch is a short-sighted and dangerous avoidance of its
responsibility. Numerous non-partisan groups have come to the con-
clusion that the present pattern of racial segregation in housing is a very
unhealthy and potentially explosive feature of this society.08 On the
whole, to deny any group of persons access to reasonably priced hous-
ing in the suburbs is to deny that group access to a higher quality edu-
cation, 0 to diminish its ability to compete for new jobs in expanding
industries, 7 and to deny it amenities like fresh air, open space, and
65. See text accompanying note 43 supra.
66. Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974); Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970);
Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563 (1965).
67. 426 U.S. at 246-48.
68. See H. FRANKLIN, D. FALK, & A. LEVIN, IN ZONING: A GUIDE TO INCLUSION-
ARY ZONING 3 (1974) [hereinafter cited as IN ZONING]; NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON
CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT 1, 219 (1968) [hereinafter cited as CIVIL DISORDERS]; Testi-
mony of P. Davidoff, in HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING, CURRENCY & HOUSING, HEARINGS,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 69-70 (1976) [hereinafter cited as HOUSING COMM. REI.]; U.S.
COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN SUBURBIA 64-66 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as SUBURBIA]; U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TWENTY YEARS AFTER BROWN:
EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN HOUSING 167 (1975) [hereinafter cited as BROWN].
That the segregation in housing patterns is increasing is clear. See SUBURBIA, supra,
at 4.
69. Due to the broad disparities in fiscal resources available to school districts, the
wealthier suburbs have better schools than do the central cities. A comparison of
expenditures per pupil and pupil/teacher ratios between central city, and suburban
schools shows that expenditures per pupil in suburbs are about 35% greater and that
pupil/teacher ratios are about 35% lower. Based on these and other facts, a Senate
committee on equal opportunity in education has recommended that HUD take an active
role in the encouragement of low and moderate income housing opportunities outside
areas of present concentration. SELECT COMMITTEE ON EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OP-
PORTUNITY, TOWARD EQUAL EDUCATION OPPORTUNITY, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 44-45, 51-
52, 148 (1972) [hereinafter cited as EDUC. Opp. REP.]. See also IN ZONING, supra note
68, at 3.
70. See Opening Remarks, in HOUSING COMM. REP., supra note 68, at 6; Testinlo-
ny of P. Davidoff, in id. at 69-70. It should be noted that of the blacks who lived in
ghettos that were racked by the riots of the 1960's, almost half of the respondents to a
survey attributed the riots, at least in part, to discrimination and unfair treatment, and
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a lower crime rate.71
The movement of job opportunities to the suburban areas has
been well documented.72  Attracted by the lower property tax rates
and increased space available in suburban locations, businesses and
manufacturers have located their new facilities there to the extent that
from 1952 to 1972 over eighty percent of the newly created jobs in
large metropolitan areas were located in suburban areas.73  A large
portion of these are blue collar jobs that are usually filled by individuals
who would be eligible for low and moderate income housing, but who
have difficulty finding adequately priced housing near those jobs.74  As
a result, some areas are now suffering substantial labor shortages.75 In-
dividuals who are forced to commute from the central cities, if it is
possible to commute, receive much lower wages for their work when
the time and expense of the daily trip to work are factored in.76
The society as a whole also pays a high price for these segregated
housing patterns. By insisting on the integration of schools but not of
nearly a quarter mentioned the unemployment situation. "Better employment" was
chosen almost two-to-one over any other action which the government might take to
prevent future disturbances. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS,
SUPPLEMENTAL STUDIES 48 (1968). For a thorough description of the social and
economic effects that unemployment and underemployment have on inner city residents,
see CIVIL DISORDERS, supra note 68, at 121-23.
71. The number of arrests per thousand residents is about 50% greater in central
cities than in suburban areas. M. HINDELANG, S. DUNN, A. AUMICK & L. SUTroN,
SOURCE BOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STAiSncs-1974, at 336, 341 (1975). In a survey
of black workers in Baltimore, the three community problems most cited were, in order,
robbery, vandalism and violence. D. SOBIN, THE WORKING POOR 98 (1973).
72. See BUILDING, supra note 55, at 47-48; CIVIL DISORDERS, supra note 68, at 217;
HOUSING COMM. REP., supra note 68, at 69-70; NATIONAL COMM. AGAINST DISCRIM-
INATION IN HOUSING, THE IMPACT OF HOUSING ON JOB OPPORTUNTrrIES 21 (1968);
SUBURBIA, supra note 68, at 24.
73. EDUC. Opp. REP., supra note 69, at 121. Estimates vary as to the precise
magnitude of the trend toward job concentration in the suburbs. Another study cites
figures indicating that over 85% of the new jobs were located in the suburbs during the
last half of the Sixties. SUBURBIA, supra note 68, at 24.
74. CIVIL DISORDERS, supra note 68, at 217; SUBURBIA, supra note 68, at 25.
75. BABCOCK, supra note 54, at 51, 54. For a discussion of the relation between
land use controls and the proper functioning of the labor market, see Evans & Vestal,
Local Growth Management: A Demographic Perspective, 55 N.C.L. REv. 421 (1977).
76. A study of five major metropolitan areas found that in those cities that had
transit systems capable of transporting inner city residents to suburban job locations,
travel time could range from an hour and a half to five hours a day and might entail
three or four transfers. The cost of transit fares ranged from $4 to $15 per week. These
figures indicate that a worker earning $150 for a 40-hour week, or $3.75/hour, could be
effectively earning only $2.25/hour when transit time and expense are accounted for.
See BUILDING, supra note 55, at 48.
While a white collar suburbanite who commutes into the city may lose a significant
portion of his effective wages to transit costs too, he probably had an opportunity to
choose his home site.
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housing,17 the courts have put a heavy burden on already strained
school budgets78 and have diminished the concept of neighborhood
schools through the forced busing of school children. The cost in terms
of lost natural energy and community spirit is enormous.7 A factor
that ought not be overlooked is the loss of integrity that results from
a society that claims to be a melting pot, that prides itself on social
mobility and yet manages to deny to a significant portion of the popu-
lation the means to effectuate these principles.8
The segregated housing patterns that are in large part responsible
for these deficiencies are not necessarily the result of overt racial dis-
crimination. Racial motivations can easily be hidden using accepted
practices to manipulate the real estate market without any diminution
of the segregative effect.8' Racial motivations can likewise be easily
hidden by zoning officials who offer the protection of property values
as a justification for the exclusion of low and moderate income
families.8s2 For the Court to appraise local zoning decisions in light
of the traditional standards of review is a shallow and ineffective ap-
proach that is certain to avoid confronting the real inequities engen-
dered by many local land use regulations.8 8 The unwillingness of the
77. A study in 1974 concluded that school systems in many of the largest cities and
metropolitan areas are becoming increasingly segregated as a result of segregated housing
patterns. BROWN, supra note 68, at 177-78. See also CIVIL DISORDERS, supra note 68, at
236-37, 240-41, 245; Testimony of P. Davidoff, in HoUsING COMM. REP., supra note 68,
at 69.
78. SUBURBIA, supra note 68, at 64.
79. For a good discussion of the difficulties encountered in school desegregation
attempts, and an analysis of the community control movement, see M. FANTINI, M.
GITTELL & R. MAGAT, COMMUNITY CONTROL AND THE URBAN SCHOOL 3-22, 77-100
(1970).
80. See BABCOCK, supra note 54, at 50; CIVIL DISORDERS, supra note 68, at 1-2;
IN ZONING, supra note 68, at 3; SUBURBIA, supra note 68, at 14.
81. One study provides a particularly good description of how covert discrimination
in the housing market can be equally effective through the steering of prospective buyers
to particular neighborhoods, control of the listings of available housing, refusal of
financial institutions to provide mortgages in certain areas under certain conditions, and
the generally negative attitudes of the real estate brokers and organizations. SuuURBIA,
supra note 68, at 16-23.
That this subtle discrimination is racial and not only economic is suggested by other
studies showing that residential segregation based on race is greater than residential
segregation based on economic class. See EDUC. Opp. REP., supra note 69, at 120. See
also CIVIL DISORDERS, supra note 68, at 119.
82. See notes 53-55 and accompanying text supra.
83. 1 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 53, § 5.04. Williams refers to this stage in the
development of land use controls as "Faith in Local Autonomy" and compares it to the
next stage of "Sophisticated Judicial Review," which is
a wiser, more sceptical, and more realistic view of local government and of the
various parties in interest. . . [characterized by]
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legislative branch to slow or reverse this trend 4 is evidenced by the
inefficacy of the Fair Housing Act.8 5  It is at just such a point8 6 that
the Court has previously accepted its responsibility to act to protect the
basic democratic values of the society from the parochial and self-serv-
ing actions of local governments.
8 7
A more realistic analysis of . . . the relation between private rights and
public needs ....
A clearer definition of basic democratic values and their implications for
land use controls...
an tAnd] a more active judicial review, examining local action with care
and ready to carry out its constitutional responsibility for enforcing basic
values.
Id. § 5.05, at 107-08.
84. One of the major difficulties with the Court's apparent reliance on congression-
al activity in this field is that those persons presently trapped in inner city areas do not
have the political power to force congressional action. The departure of substantial
numbers of the middle classes to the suburbs has left the cities weakened politically.
BUILDING, supra note 55, at 7; H. ROSE, THE BLAcK GHETTO 107-09, 139-40 (1971).
85. Among the complaints are that HUD is grossly understaffed to deal with the
number of complaints it receives, and that HUD has not pursued the provisions of the
Act with any particular zeal. See BROWN, supra note 68, at 167-68, 174; SUBURBIA,
supra note 68, at 40-42; NATIONAL COMM. AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING &
URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, FAIR HOUSING LEGISLATION AND EXCLUSIONARY LAND USE 11
(1974) [hereinafter cited as FAIR HOUSING].
86. The need for the Court, in particular, to act now is acknowledged by a number
of authorities:
[T]he relative weakness and lack of success of nonlitigative approaches to the
problem of exclusionary land use have made the resort to litigation necessary
... . [T]he fact that litigation has assumed central importance in the attack
on exclusionary barriers is . . . a reflection of the relative failure thus far
to develop other techniques ....
FAIR HOUSING, supra note 85, at 11.
After noting that the Federal government had started late and had done a lot of
talking about dispersal, but had catered to the exclusionary desires of suburban whites and
failed to provide effective action either legislatively or administratively, the United States
Civil Rights Commission decided that "only in Federal and State adjudication of
exclusionary land use issues are there signs of an understanding of the steps which must
be taken if there is to be a real commitment to dispersal." BROWN, supra note 68, at
167-68.
87. This would not be the first instance in which the Court had enforced a right
not traceable to any specific constitutional provision. In 1941 the Court was faced with
a California statute that made it a crime to assist indigents entering the state. Holding
the statute invalid, the Court stated that no state could wall itself off from national
problems by erecting barriers to interstate migration. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S.
160, 162-63 (1941). The right to interstate migration is not specified in the Constitu-
tion, but the Court recognized that such a right exists under the fourteenth amendment.
Id. at 163.
In 1953 the Court found that education of school children was so important to the
individuals and the society that children could not be denied the benefits of racially
desegregated school systems. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1953). The
right to an education in a desegregated school system, however, is nowhere specified in
the Constitution, and the equal protection clause would seem, on its face, to justify
separate but equal schools.
In 1968 the Court was confronted with a state statute that prohibited the use of
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The Supreme Court could have begun to remedy some of these
deficiencies without a major break with precedent. The regional per-
spective taken by the court of appeals could have been implemented
either by imposing an affirmative duty upon communities to provide
in their zoning ordinances for housing for families at all income levels,
or by prohibiting a town from frustrating the actions of those who would
attempt to provide housing for low and moderate income groups when
alternative housing was not available in the area.
There is substantial precedent in at least three states for the first
alternative. 88 Courts in Pennsylvania, 0 New Jersey 0 and New York" t
contraceptives. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Speaking for the Court,
Justice Douglas looked to the "penumbra" of five of the Bill of Rights amendments to
find a right of privacy to protect the sanctity of the marital relationship. Id. at 481-86.
See also Williams, Planning Law and Democratic Living, 20 LAw & CONTEMv. PROD.
317, 318-19 (1955).
Although the Court has not recognized the quality of housing as a fundamental
interest, it has often recognized the importance of equal opportunities in housing. See
Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409
(1968); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1
(1948); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921).
88. In addition to the precedents, however, there are numerous reasons why the
first alternative is the more attractive of the two. An affirmative duty has the advantage
of requiring that a community plan for the inclusion of low and moderate income
housing. Low income plaintiffs, then, would not be required to go to the expense of
purchasing a parcel of land and drawing up project plans in order to provide the requisite
standing to bring suit, as was required in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975),
discussed in note 13 supra. The community and the court are not then restricted to the
specific parcel of land selected by the plaintiffs (and probably chosen for its price and
not because it was the logical location for multifamily housing) in fashioning a remedy.
See generally Moskowitz, Standing of Future Residents in Exclusionary Zoning Cases, 6
AKRON L. REV. 189 (1973).
The affirmative duty remedy can easily be linked to a region-wide determination of
housing needs and the regional needs-affirmative duty approach appears better to match
the solution with the problem. Numerous studies have discussed the exclusionary effects
of allowing each small incorporated community to use the police power to zone its land.
See, e.g., BUILDING, supra note 55, at 18-20; SUBURBIA, supra note 68, at 29-33. See also
Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 384-85 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring). The self-
protective act of a single community, by itself, does not really have a substantial effect
on the metropolitan housing market. But when seen in concert with similar acts by like
communities, each acting in its own best interest, the pattern and effects become
obvious. See E. BERMAN, ELIMINATING EXCLUSIONARY ZONING 6 (1974).
The affirmative duty approach has the further advantage of eliminating the competi-
tive disadvantages to which specific communities might be put under the second
alternative. Where each community is required to accept a proportion of low and
moderate income housing needs of the region, each suffers the same "loss," if there
is one, and none is unfairly disadvantaged.
89. In re Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 439 Pa. 466, 474-76, 268 A.2d 765, 768-69
(1970) (no township has the power to decide who may or may not live there while
disregarding the interests of the entire area); In re Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395
(1970) (township may not exclude uses that are in demand); National Land & Inv. Co.
v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 527-28, 215 A.2d 597, 610
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have accepted in varying form and degree the concept of a regional
perspective in the matter of zoning for low and moderate income hous-
ing. New Jersey, for example, requires that a developing municipality
make realistic, through its zoning regulations, the accommodation of its
fair share of the region's low and moderate income housing needs.9"
In the federal courts there is some precedent for the latter alterna-
tive."3 A number of lower courts 4 have based their holdings in exclu-
sionary zoning cases on the availability of land for low and moderate
income housing in the region. While those courts almost unanimously
have held for the defendant municipalities,95 their use of the regional
perspective indicates that it is not unreasonable to consider the acts of
a single municipality as they may affect a larger metropolitan area.
Further, in Hills v. Gautreaux,90 a case involving discrimination in pub-
lic housing, 7 the Supreme Court held permissible an inter-jurisdictional
remedy without having found an inter-jurisdictional violation, when that
type of relief was the only reasonable alternative. 98
(1965) (local governments may not use zoning to deny to the growing population of an
area sites for residential development).
90. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151,
336 A.2d 713, cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975) (developing
municipality must provide for its fair share of regional needs for low and moderate
income housing).
91. Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334
N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972) (town growth management plan
must provide for assimilation of regional population expansion).
92. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151,
174, 336 A.2d 713, 724, cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
93. United Farmworkers of Fla. Hous. Project, Inc. v. City of Delray Beach, 493
F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1974); Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1971), a!I'd, 457
F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1972). See also Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809, 821 (3d Cir.
1970).
94. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409
(7th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977); Ybarra v. City of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d
250, 254 (9th Cir. 1974); Acevedo v. Nassau Co., 369 F. Supp. 1384, 1390 (E.D.N.Y.),
af'd, 500 F.2d 1078 (2d Cir. 1974); Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of Sanborn-
ton, 469 F.2d 956, 962 (1st Cir. 1972).
95. The sole exception was the Seventh Circuit's decision in Arlington Heights.
96. 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
97. Plaintiffs, black tenants and applicants for public housing in Chicago, brought
class actions against the Chicago Housing Authority and HUD. The action against the
authority alleged that it had deliberately selected public housing sites in Chicago to avoid
integrating white neighborhoods in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) and the
fourteenth amendment. The action against HUD was based on 42 U.S.C. § 2000d
(1970) and the fifth amendment. Id. at 286.
98. The particular facts of the case, however, may have had a lot to do with the
remedy. Chicago was found to have actively discriminated on the basis of race in its site
selection process, and the remedy would not require the redrawing of any jurisdictional
boundaries because HUD could enforce the remedy. Note, however, that the Court
held, at least in dictum, that the district court had the power to fashion a remedy for
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The case of Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Corp. presented the court with an opportunity to elabo-
rate on its recent equal protection standards and to deal with the segre-
gative effects of exclusionary zoning. The Court used Arlington
Heights as a vehicle to demonstrate its aversion to equal protection
claims based on a racially discriminatory impact. It also foreclosed, for
the present, the use of the fourteenth amendment as a means to assure
integrated housing and its attendant societal benefits.
EDWIN P. CHESTER
violation from among "'all reasonable methods ... available to formulate an effective
remedy.'" Id. at 297 (quoting North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43,
46 (1971)) (emphasis added).
